








MONSTROUS MISEDUCATION:  FRANKENSTEIN AS EDUCATIONAL 




A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of 













MONSTROUS MISEDUCATION:  FRANKENSTEIN AS EDUCATIONAL 
THOUGHT ON THE MODERN PROBLEM OF TERROR 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE  





















































© Copyright by KRISTEN OGILVIE HOLZER 2016 





 I dedicate this work to the children among whom I have had the privilege of 
learning, including my two children, Keely Pate Holzer and Liam Reed Holzer.  My 
fondest hopes lie in their future and the possibility that this scholarship might contribute 
















 I thank my mother, Marilyn Bailey Ogilvie, who has supported and encouraged 
me as a scholar, a mentor, and a friend.  Words are inadequate to account for the debt of 
gratitude this work, and all of my work, owes my mother.  By her example and courage, 
my sister, Martha Kay Ogilvie, has always pushed me to realize my potential.  My 
brother, William Woodworth Ogilvie, has never stopped teasing or believing in me and 
I thank him for his humor and faith.  I am grateful to my spouse, Michael Reed Holzer, 
for the pride he has always taken in my little victories.  That pride made me believe I 
could finish what I started.  In her gentle, mindful way, my daughter, Keely Pate 
Holzer, has inspired me to envision a brighter future for women and girls.  I thank my 
son, Liam Reed Holzer, for the electric conversations that reanimated my work.  
 I am deeply grateful for the unfailing support, encouragement, and critical 
engagement of my educational studies professors, Dr. Susan Laird, Dr. John 
Covaleskie, and Dr. Joan K. Smith.  Their influence and example has shaped who I am 
as a scholar, a teacher, and a citizen.  I thank Dr. Michele Eodice for reminding that I 
had something to say and helping me carve out time in which to say it.  I am grateful to 
Dr. Robert Con Davis-Undiano and Angela Urick for their willingness to serve on my 
committee and support my work despite myriad commitments.  I am grateful to the 
administrators at the College of Education for reminding me of deadlines and forgiving 
me when I missed them.  To the teachers and administrators in my professional life with 
whom I have shared my work, I am grateful for the discourse.  I am forever in my 
students’ debt for helping me work through problems and think through literature.   
  
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iv 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... vi 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1 
 The Educational Landscape of Terror 
CHAPTER I .....................................................................................................................37 
 A Biographical Sketch of Mary Shelley’s Educational Metamorphoses 
CHAPTER II ...................................................................................................................76 
 Mary Shelley’s Lived Experience as Monstrous Miseducation 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................118 
 Exposition of Frankenstein as Educational Thought 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................162 
 Influence of Frankenstein as Educational Thought  
CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................190 
 Contemporary Relevance of Frankenstein as Educational Thought  
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................235  
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................................238 





Seeking to understand terror as an under-theorized educational problem with 
critical implications for contemporary schools and societies, this dissertation is an 
inquiry into the life, work, and influence of Mary Shelley (1797-1851) (Seymour 2000, 
Marshall 2000, Sunstein 1989, Mellor 1988).  It takes up Susan Laird’s proposition that 
as a “philosophical fiction of education,” Frankenstein “merits serious study” (Laird 
2008, 158).  The educational thought of her anarchist father William Godwin (1756-
1836) (McLaughlin 2007, St. Clair 1989) and feminist mother Mary Wollstonecraft 
(1759-1797) (Laird 2008, Martin 1985) are formative for her as is her husband Percy 
Bysshe Shelley’s (1792-1822) literary milieu, English Romanticism. 
As its grounding premise, this study theorizes literature as a genre of educational 
thought in the vein of the cave myth and the Pygmalion myth (Martin 2011, 2006).  It 
formulates monstrous miseducation, a species of “cultural miseducation” (Martin 2000) 
and its terror curriculum (the bildung and genius ideals) from Mary Shelley’s lived 
experience and her Frankenstein myth.  It identifies the core features of monstrous 
miseducation as:  Miltonic identity politics, Godwinian perfectibility, and abandonment 
to “multiple educational agency” (Martin 2002).  This dissertation claims that the core 
features of monstrous miseducation are matched by critical absences of maternal 
teaching and teachings (Laird 2013, 1994, 1988) and cyborg affinity politics (Haraway 
1991).  Through the case studies of Columbine (Cullen 2009) and the Freedom Writers 
(Freedom Writers and Gruwell 1999) the study tests monstrous miseducation’s 
pragmatic utility toward understanding contemporary terror and terrorism. 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Educational Landscape of Terror 
Amid suicide bombings, rampage shootings, and ecological disasters, few would 
dispute the characterization of this historical moment as a “time of terror.”  But a 
convincing characterization of terror as an educational problem requires a great deal of 
theoretical work that has not yet been done.  This theoretical work is worthwhile; 
indeed it is imperative, because when terror is theorized as an educational problem, one 
of human design, educational solutions become possible.   
Terror as an Educational Problem 
I define “terror” in the ordinary language sense as violence and/or intimidation 
in word and/or deed that involves a special way of being afraid and of causing fear, 
rational and irrational.  It would seem that the special way of being afraid that might be 
called terror is “special” and distinct from some other kind of fear because it involves 
feeling afraid nearly constantly and at the same time feeling that there is little or nothing 
we can do to avoid calamity.  Also, it seems we feel this special kind of generalized fear 
and dread in spite and because of empirically guaranteed threats like climate change and 
irrationally imagined threats like witchcraft in Salem, 1692.  As an emotional response, 
terror surely involves a calculus of intentional and unintentional causes and 
consequences linked to the aesthetic branch of philosophical and educational thought.   
The violence and intimidation of terror also seems to be a special way of 
causing fear in order to bring about a certain outcome, often, but not always, political.  
Violence and intimidation that fall under the rubric of terror are special and distinct 
from other kinds of violence and intimidation because they are purposeful.  Arguably, 
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the purposeful quality of terror suggests that this special way of causing fear aims to 
“educate” in the sense of raising awareness and compelling change.  For example, the 
violence and intimidation around which a dispossessed people united in the 1789 
French Revolution against an unjust monarchical system intended to teach both 
monarch and subject a bloody lesson toward the end of justice.  To say that terror 
“teaches” implies an intentionality that neither teaching nor learning possess, but it 
would seem that a modern change in hearts and minds was brought about by “the 
Terror” that “devoured its own children.”
1
  The generational transmission of the terror’s 
violence and intimidation terror instituted a qualitative change of an educational variety.  
Terror, then, has had enduring “learning outcomes.”    
Nonetheless, acts and actors of terror also terrorize by presenting and 
representing themselves as unknown and unknowable threats.  In these cases, the means 
and ends of terror often obscure rather than elucidate problems or solutions.  Hence, 
their educational value – for better and for worse – is questionable.  Violence like the 
2012 mass shooting of movie-goers at a theater in Aurora, Colorado, or that perpetrated 
on the school children and personnel at Sandy Hook Elementary School in New Town, 
Connecticut defies comprehension.  Other than possibly learning to feel the special kind 
of free-floating fear that might be called terror, what educational wisdom can we glean 
from acts of terror without a clear agenda?    
Most often, though, the targets of terror – violent words and/or deeds – are not 
“indiscriminate” (although there may be many unintended victims) nor are the acts of 
violence “senseless” (although an “objective” bystander might label them as such).  It 
                                                          
1
 Deborah Kennedy, Helen Maria Williams and the Revolution (Cranbury, NJ: Rosemont Publishing, 
2002), 113. 
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would seem that in many cases, the actors somehow mean terror that deploys violence 
and intimidation as a method of transmission, to activate change by example.  For 
instance, displaying an “enemy’s” decapitated head on a stake at the gates of a walled 
city might encourage would-be invaders to keep out or suffer the same fate.  In addition 
to changing the hearts and minds of threatening outsiders by example, such a terrific 
display might also help the neutral stranger at the gates to understand the kind of culture 
that lies within and a host of other learning outcomes.  The neutral stranger might return 
to her own people having added terror and its attendant violence and intimidation to her 
repertoire of horrendously effective practice.  Thus, the violence and intimidation of 
terror, in some sense, is meant to show, to demonstrate.  Suggesting its link to 
monstrousness, among other things, terror’s intention is to warn. The etymological 
history of monster and monstrous suggests an important relationship.  According to 
Mary Gregory, “Monstre is derived from the mid-twelfth century French, mostre, 
meaning prodigy, marvel, which, in turn, comes from the classical Latin monstrum, 
meaning potent, prodigy, monstrous creature, wicked person, monstrous act, atrocity, 
from the base monere, to warn.”
 2
   The internal logic of terror, it would seem, is itself a 
rather terrifying cultural construct.  And if terror is indeed a cultural construct rather 
than a biological one, what would be the implications for educational thought?    
Terror as Hidden Curriculum 
First, we would have to think of education itself as a cultural construct.  
Apparently, this does not go without saying because Jane Roland Martin has made such 
arguments her life’s work.  In Education Reconfigured:  Culture, Encounter, and 
                                                          
2
 Mary Gregory, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species (New York:  Routledge, 2007), 136.   
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Change, Martin’s theory of education as “a series of encounters in which cultural stock 
is yoked to individual capacities” claims, when seen through a cultural lens, “education 
is a maker and shaper of both individuals and cultures.”
3
  Cultural stock consists of both 
“assets and liabilities,” according to Martin.
4
  Through case studies that demonstrate 
“the items of cultural stock that become yoked to an individual’s capacities represent 
the content of that individual’s learning” in the same way that “the stock that an 
educational agent yokes to individual capacities represents the content of the cultural 
transmission,” Martin is able to support the propositions that “culture – or, more 
precisely, cultural stock – is curriculum,” and lived encounters with cultural landscapes 
are learning.
5
  Multiple educational agency extends far beyond schools, churches, and 
homes to include media outlets, military installations, political platforms, and the like, 
Martin argues.  Without recognizing the intentional and unintentional curriculum 
enmeshed in these entities, we cannot begin to take stock of or theorize the educative 
and, more important for this project, the miseducative consequences of encounters with 
them.  If, with Martin, we concede:  “that education takes place not just in schools but 
in every nook and cranny of society, that it brings about change in both individuals and 
cultures, and that the change education brings about can be for the better and the 
worse,” it follows that “education makes and shapes individuals and their cultures.”
6
  
If cultural stock is indeed curriculum – proper and hidden – the theoretical and 
practical implications for thinking about terror as an educational problem are 
staggering.  Martin’s “cultural miseducation” signifies the generational causes and 
                                                          
3
 Jane Roland Martin, Education Reconfigured (New York:  Routledge, 2011), 76.   
4
 Jane Roland Martin, Cultural Miseducation (New York:  Teachers College Press, 2002), 17. 
5
 Jane Roland Martin, Education Reconfigured (New York:  Routledge, 2011), 95-114.   
6
 Ibid, 94.   
 5 
consequences of the transmission of “devastating” values and practices (cultural 
liabilities) and/or the disappearance of values and practices (cultural wealth) such that 
“societies – and also the groups and institutions within them…become sadly 
miseducative.”
 7
  The Stanford Philosophical Dictionary traces the origin of the term 
“miseducation” to James Mill’s (1773-1836) superimposition of his educational 
philosophy over the phenomena of criminality, incarceration, and prisoner reform 
saying, “just as one's character can be well moulded by a good education, so too may 
one's character be badly moulded through miseducation.”
8
  Convinced that behaviors 
and mindsets classed as criminal were the direct result of “bad education,” he theorized 
that “reform” through punishment mimics the same miseducation that malformed the 
criminal character in the first place.
9
  What is the practical and theoretical importance, 
then, of thinking about terror as an educational problem, a cultural liability or a hidden 
curriculum transmitted by multiple educational agency and perpetuated by cultural 
miseducation?
 
 What constitutes the educational and aesthetic values and practices of 
terror?  How and in what ways do encounters with terror make and unmake, shape and 
misshape individuals and cultures?  How and in what ways do encounters with terror 
form, reform, and deform individuals and cultures?  What are the potentially educative 
and miseducative causes and consequences of encounters with terror?  Is there a 
peculiar species of cultural miseducation that is characterized by terror? 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Jane Roland Martin, Cultural Miseducation (New York:  Teachers College Press, 2002), 89. 
8
 Terence Ball, “James Mill,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. 




Terror as a Hidden Curriculum of Modernity 
Roughly taking the French Revolution of 1789 as my point of departure because 
I could trace the conceptual language of terror in its political guise to that historical 
event, I have begun to suspect that the cultural liability of terror was itself a least one 
hidden curricular tenet of modernity, albeit with much older roots in Western thought.  
If that is the case, then we might name it the “terror curriculum.”  Terror curriculum, it 
would seem, is implicated in a modern project comprised of educational and aesthetic 
values and practices whose curriculum proper includes universal progress, rationality, 
and emancipation.  Few would deny, though, that the same modern project that gave 
rise to the cultural wealth of early modern democracy and mass literacy also saw 
troubling cultural liabilities that surely included terror on an unprecedented scale and of 
an unprecedented kind.  If the cultural liability of terror is cast as a modern hidden 
curriculum, surely it has causes that might be traced to antiquity and consequences that 
persist to this “post-modern” moment. 
But characterizing the late-twentieth/early-twenty-first century a “post-modern 
moment” implies that the terror curriculum of an earlier revolutionary moment has been 
transcended or rehabilitated by a “sadder, wiser” sort of skepticism toward modernity’s 
curriculum proper: universal progress, rationality, and emancipation.  The day-to-day 
realities of this time of terror, however, suggest that the modifier “post” was born of the 
same hubristic modern project it seeks to dismantle.  This curious condition points to 
the kind of looping complexity imbedded in Martin’s concept of cultural stock as 
curriculum and cultural miseducation as a cause of, a vehicle for, and a consequence of 
cultural liabilities – especially if cultural liabilities are mostly hidden curricula.  It also 
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calls into question modernity and post-modernity’s self-conscious treatises on 
education.  My inquiry into the hidden curriculum of terror, then, calls for scrutiny of 
what is missing from canonical texts of educational thought as well as of educational 
thought outside of the canon. 
Therefore, my inquiry into the terror curriculum and its miseducative causes and 
consequences takes imaginative literature seriously as a source of educational thought.  
In the same way Plato reformulates Socrates’ cave myth and Martin reformulates 
Ovid’s Pygmalion myth to develop a conceptual language and framework for thinking 
and talking about education and miseducation, I reformulate the Frankenstein myth to 
think about terror curriculum as a distinctly modern, gendered educational problem. 
Frankenstein as Educational Thought 
Although literary critic Fred Botting famously said Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin Shelley’s Frankenstein: or the Modern Prometheus “is a product of criticism, 
not a work of literature,” many philosophers of education might dispute its legitimacy 
as source material for educational thought despite the fact that many disciplines have 
thought problems through the Frankenstein myth.
10
  Indeed Frankenstein has been 
summoned in the discourse of scientific progress (genetically modified foods and 
industrial agriculture; stem cell and cloning research; and biological, nuclear, and 
chemical warfare), and literary criticism and cultural theory (feminist and queer theory; 
post-colonial criticism; psychoanalytical approaches; and disabilities studies).  And just 
as the meme of the Frankenstein myth has saturated popular culture; it has educated the 
popular scientific imagination – for better and for worse.  “Frankensteinian” has 
                                                          
10
 Fred Botting, ed., Frankenstein/Mary Shelley (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), I. 
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become idiomatic, at least in the Western world, of hubristic kind of techno-scientific 
projects that unleash unintended negative consequences on a naïve human species, a 
species preoccupied with the business of “progress.”  Yet, despite the grand 
epistemological questions raised by the myth and meme, Frankenstein has not featured 
in the canon of educational studies.   
Clearly Frankenstein (and arguably its author) is haunted by the canon of 
educational thought (Plato, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
etc.) and other texts that might well be identified as educational thought.  This is so if 
the definition of what counts as educational thought were broadened to include literary 
studies as a foundational discipline of educational studies and if what counts as 
education were broadened to account for intended and unintended cultural encounters 
and exchanges, as Martin would have it.  Canonization is a controversial process, but it 
exists as a curricular reality to be confronted and addressed.  Although I protest the 
exclusion of Frankenstein from the canon of educational thought, I am neither 
advocating for blithely opening the existing canon nor endorsing the notion of 
eliminating the canon altogether.  Continuum Library of Educational Thought 
represents the most recent, international, and exhaustive formulation of a canon for the 
history of educational thought.  That canon includes only two women – one of whom is 
Mary Wollstonecraft, the mother of Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley, the author or 
Frankenstein.  Indeed, the Wollstonecraft volume proposed Frankenstein as a source of 
educational thought worthy of further study.
11
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 Susan Laird, Mary Wollstonecraft (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 155.  
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Hence, an important part of the work of this dissertation will be to show how 
literature has and does serve as a founding discipline of educational thought by drawing 
conceptual language from Mary Shelley’s educational biography, lived experience, and 
her thought experiment, Frankenstein, to show miseducation as a maker and shaper of 
individuals and of cultures.  Through a distinctly educational inquiry into the life, work, 
and influence of Mary Shelley focusing in the main on a critical and imaginative study 
of Frankenstein as educational thought, I take terror seriously as an under-theorized 
educational problem with critical implications for contemporary schools and societies.  
How might Frankenstein serve as a vehicle for theorizing the terror curriculum as a 
modern, gendered educational problem?  Could the Frankenstein myth, like Plato’s cave 
myth and Ovid’s Pygmalion myth, stand as a founding educational myth of a species of 
cultural miseducation we might name “monstrous miseducation”?   
Monstrous Miseducation as a Closed Circuit 
Monstrous miseducation denotes the gendered aesthetic and practical causes and 
consequences of unmediated encounters with the terror curriculum.  I deploy the 
concept to signify a cultural landscape that normalizes, naturalizes, and “super-
naturalizes” terror, thereby tacitly condoning the terror curriculum.  Monstrous 
miseducation transmits the terror curriculum vis-à-vis language and frameworks that, I 
suspect, operate under the level of consciousness.  Despite our avowed desire to 
eliminate terror when its hidden curriculum surfaces, the monstrous miseducation that 
informs and is informed by the way we learn to be afraid and to cause fear compromises 
our efforts.  Sometimes we do nothing to counter the terror curriculum because, like the 
terrorist, we are monstrously miseducated by an ideology that trades in nihilistic and 
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apocalyptic motifs.  The terror curriculum seduces us by promising the thrill of sublime 
fear even at the cost of crippling despair.  Finally, monstrous miseducation achieves a 
balance of terror between mutually insecure, impotent, resentful parties engaged in an 
endlessly looping terror campaign characterized by violent words and/or deeds aimed at 
symbolic targets.   
Monstrously miseducated people respond to the consequences of monstrous 
miseducation, terror, by preparing for an untimely end and/or sentimentalizing the 
victims’ plight rather than, in Slavoj Zizek’s words, “…by means of patient, critical 
analysis” we might “‘learn, learn, and learn’ what causes this violence.”
12
  But until 
terror is seen as a gendered educational problem with educational solutions, 
monstrously miseducative causes and consequences may well be inevitable.   
Monstrous miseducation is a closed circuit that is dangerously self-sustaining.  
Consider the recent attack on Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida.  Much of the 
media coverage has demanded that we need a “counter-narrative” to prevent such 
carnage and to “fight terrorism,” but without the language of monstrous miseducation, a 
monstrously miseducated public cannot write such a narrative.  Without a definition of 
terror as an educational problem, we become mired in false distinctions between a “hate 
crime” (which Orlando surely was) and “terrorism.”  When seen as an educational 
problem, terrorism is a hate crime because hate crimes are meant to change the hearts 
and minds of an individual or a given group by an individual or a given group whose 
logic may only be apparent to that terrorist actor or group.  We cannot begin to write a 
                                                          
12
 Slavoj Zizek, Violence (New York:  Picador, 2008), 7-8. 
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counter-narrative if the closed circuit of monstrous miseducation leads us (terrorists 
included) to ask the wrong questions.  
Unlike the tenets of what might be readily identified as a curriculum proper, it 
would seem that the tenets of terror’s hidden curriculum cannot be construed as morally 
neutral because the causes and consequences of monstrous miseducation’s closed circuit 
are inclusive – victims, perpetrators, and bystanders are alike “innocent” and “guilty.”  
The terror curriculum is miseducative on many counts, but its monstrous causes and 
consequences are by definition miseducative because they transmit the message – 
intentionally and unintentionally – that there is nothing we can do to avoid disaster.   
Martin says that cultural miseducation emerges out of a cultural stock portfolio 
that passes on cultural liabilities like racism, sexism, homophobia, and the like 
collectively and individually via hidden curricula transmitted by multiple educational 
agency that does not know or does not acknowledge its own miseducative power.
13
  In 
light of recent events, then, it seems especially important, that we test monstrous 
miseducation, a species of cultural miseducation, to see if it rightly names the 
educational character of the modern, gendered cultural liability of terror.   
Without names for the educational characteristics of terror, multiple educational 
agency will continue to naturalize violence as a biological imperative or “super-
naturalize” it as an unknowable force.  Thereby, monstrous miseducation sanctions 
violence as an inevitable “fact of modern life” or sensationalizes violence as an 
incomprehensible phenomena and feeling.  In the same way that violence is under-
                                                          
13
 Jane Roland Martin, Cultural Miseducation (New York:  Teachers College Press, 2002), 42. 
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theorized “in the text of education,” the terror curriculum and monstrous miseducation 
have thus far escaped the critical eye of educational studies.
14
 
Terror Curriculum as Deep Structure of Educational Thought 
I suspect that the hidden curriculum of terror driving and driven by the closed 
circuit of monstrous miseducation is buried within the ideological subsoil Martin 
uncovers in her “cultural anthropology” of the “deep structure of educational 
thought.”
15
  This deep structure, according to Martin, frames Western claims and 
conclusions about “what education is and is not, what it can and cannot do, and the way 
it can and cannot proceed.”
16
  I take Martin’s critique of the deep structure of education 
as a jumping off place for thinking about the terror curriculum as a modern, gendered 
educational problem and monstrous miseducation as its cause and consequence: 
In building intentionality into the very nature of education, this element of 
education’s deep structure casts the hidden curriculum of school and society 
outside the educational realm.  In requiring voluntariness on the part of learners, 
it rules out the first great metamorphosis, for newborns are not in a position to 
choose to be inducted into human culture.  In confining education to the 
achievement of knowledge and understanding, it excludes the acquisition of 
feelings and emotions, passions and actions.  In limiting the intended outcomes 
of education to ones that are worthwhile, it places vices and other undesirable 
qualities beyond the pale.  And, of course, in viewing education solely from the 
standpoint of the individual, it loses sight of education writ large.
17
 
Fictive media like Plato’s retelling of Socratic dialogues, Ovid’s literary 
retelling of transformational myths, Rousseau’s “philosophical-educational novel, 
Emile,”
18
 Gilman’s thought experiment, Herland provide a firm theoretical plane of the 
platform on which educational thought is built, despite educational studies rare 
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 Jane Roland Martin, Education Reconfigured (New York:  Routledge, 2011), 39. 
15
 Ibid, 26. 
16
 Ibid, 26. 
17
 Ibid, 44-5. 
18
 Susan Laird, Mary Wollstonecraft (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 18. 
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acknowledgement of its debt to literary sources of educational thought.  Martin points 
out the fallacies on which Plato’s “production model” of education and Ovid’s creation 
model of education rest.
19
  Martin asserts, “Plato bequeathed to us a model of education 
that envisions human beings as the raw materials of production” whose innate aptitudes 
could be exploited by the right kind of education aimed at producing the right kind of 
“finished product.”
20
  The problem, according to Martin, is that Plato’s model relies on 
a faulty Identity Postulate that fails to account for “individual differences” in learning 
and performing “societal task[s] and role[s].”
21
  Ovid’s model, Martin explains, is a 
“myth of creation” in which education itself stands as a Pygmalion figure, the “creator 
of something new” working with deliberation and purpose toward a preordained goal.
22
  
This model assumes that the “creative and transformational” project of education is an 
entirely “intentional activity or enterprise” and fails to account for unintentional 
learning and/or hidden curricula.
23
   
While these functional and mythical “historical models” of education focus on 
making and shaping individuals, they also have aesthetic and practical implications for 
the making and shaping of the larger cultural surround.
24
  The rubric of this deep 
structure of educational thought features profound dichotomies, assumptions, 
valuations, definitions, and equations that Martin considers to be false.
25
  Excluded 
from the rubric of this deep structure is “education ‘writ large’ which accounts for 
“individual learning” and “cultural transmission,” education for membership in “a home 
                                                          
19
 Jane Roland Martin, Education Reconfigured (New York:  Routledge, 2011), 78.   
20
 Ibid, 76-7.   
21
 Ibid, 77.   
22
 Ibid, 78.   
23
 Ibid, 78-9.   
24
 Ibid, 76-9.   
25
 Ibid, 28-37. 
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and family,” and violence as “an educational issue.”
26
  Educational thought from the 
Frankenstein myth fills in these gaps in the deep structure of educational thought. 
In Martin’s economy, these models, alongside the organic “growth conception 
of education” attributed to Rousseau, the utopian separatist “Herland dream” she 
attributes to Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and a host of other narratives of development, 
make up case studies Martin uses to show the educational reciprocity between the 
individual and her culture.
27
  Surely, then, this very educational and philosophical 
imaginary has also had a sculptor’s hand in un-making and misshaping individuals who 
have in turn learned to map the contours of and locate themselves within 
Frankensteinian monstrous miseducation.  Although Martin looks to literary sources of 
educational thought and uses the aesthetic language of “making and shaping,” she does 
not flesh out the gendered, aesthetic implications of encounters with terror curriculum. 
Monstrous Miseducation and Deep Gender 
The closed circuit of monstrous miseducation is “deeply gendered.”
28
  Deep 
gender, in the sense Carolyn Korsmeyer theorizes, is “deep” because it hides beneath 
and props up an apparently neutral, asexual discourse.
29
  She argues that deep gender 
operates in an aesthetic, “conceptual mode” that influences the way we frame ideas and 
the meanings we attach to those ideas rather than what I might call “shallow sexism” – 
one sex’s overt denial of material, intellectual, and emotional resources to the other.  
Subsumed in taken-for-granted aesthetic forms, concepts, and hierarchies, deep gender 
subtly informs the foundations of “entire conceptual framework[s]” why only certain 
                                                          
26
 Jane Roland Martin, Education Reconfigured (New York:  Routledge, 2011), 38-9. 
27
 Ibid, 79-85.   
28
 Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gender and Aesthetics (London:  Routledge, 2004), 3.   
29
 Ibid, 3. 
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discursive species “count as a ‘philosophical subject’.”
30
  For that reason, deep gender 
persists in cultures that would condemn crass sexism.   
Though she does not name it, Korsmeyer nods to terror curriculum in 
exploration of the “perverse” pleasure of the sublime.  She notes:  
the sublime itself appears to be grounded in the profound emotional pain of 
terror…[and] an experience of paradoxical mastery:  the vastness of its objects 
threaten to master the self, and yet the self recovers it’s integrity in the 
realization of its own freedom.
31
 
Perhaps the “sub” of the sublime suggests that rather than glimpsing some external, 
transcendent noumenon, the experience of sublimity involves gaining momentary 
insight about (often terrifying) systems, signs, structures running underneath – and 
inextricably linked to – the experience of the everyday material and phenomenological 
universe.  Perhaps modernity means a sort of ordinary, everyday miseducative terror.  
The deeply gendered concept of sublime that traces its origins to Mary Shelley’s 
modernity is especially important to my work around the terror curriculum, but 
Korsmeyer’s aesthetics overlook the implications of these values for education.   
It is important to note here that Korsmeyer’s deep gender, like Martin’s deep 
structure of educational thought is virtually invisible because it is, by design, a 
patriarchal framework that just looks like “the way the world is.”  In uncovering the 
hidden curriculum of terror and the causes and consequences of monstrous 
miseducation, I aim to account for those gendered concepts, frameworks, and 
approaches that escape or are buried beneath “the standard purview of philosophy” and 
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  With John Dewey’s aesthetics to link deep gender with the deep 
structure of education, I am able to name the conditions under which terror curriculum 
hides and on which the closed circuit of monstrous miseducation depends. 
Monstrous Miseducation and An-aesthetic Experience 
John Dewey’s aesthetics, while they traffic in some of Korsmeyer’s deeply 
gendered concepts and hierarchies and depend upon some of Martin’s deep structures of 
educational thought, directly address the link between aesthetics and education.  
Drawing an important distinction between art and aesthetics, Dewey provisionally 
defines art as a process involving the dynamic exchange of “doing” (making) and 
“undergoing” (suffering) toward the end of creating a physical object.
33
  Dewey 
admonishes what he takes to be an artificial separation between the productions of art 
and those of daily life.
34
  Blurring the boundary between spectator and spectacle, 
representation and that which is being represented, Dewey’s notion of the making and 
suffering will either result in an aesthetic experience or it will not depending on the 
degree to which meaning, action, and feeling converge as a “qualitative unity.”
35
  For 
Dewey, there is nothing in the spectacle itself that elicits the aesthetic experience, so the 
whole concept of the sublime would constitute a categorical error.  The making and 
suffering must fulfill a perceptual whole such that the aesthetic experience maintains the 
continuity between the everyday art of living and the “refined” judgment of art.
36
  The 
activities of the perceiver therefore must mimic those of the creator in order for an 
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aesthetic experience to emerge as such.  While making and suffering may constitute an 
experience, everyday or “refined,” without Dewey’s qualitative unity, such an 
experience cannot properly be called an aesthetic experience.
37
  The aesthetic of terror 
is simply not a sustainable aesthetic for our species.   
Dewey identifies those beings who fully engage aesthetic experience as “live 
creatures” who not only live in an environment, but who interact with that environment 
through “defense” and “conquest,” making the adjustments necessary toward the 
fulfillment of needs and desires.
38
  Through meeting, overcoming, and restoring a 
rhythmic equilibrium with the environment, the live creature’s experience is enriched 
by the struggle itself.  Maintaining an affective balance with the environment and 
negotiating the constantly shifting energies within her mind and body, it sometimes 
happens that the live creature senses a cosmic convergence that Dewey describes as a 
“dynamic unity.”
39
  The play of energies, the creative “tension” marking the aesthetic 
experience, according to Dewey, cannot be sustained in either a finished environment or 
in one of unremitting flux.
40
  It is incumbent upon the live creature, then to adjust her 
whole being to the environment; perceiving the past as a resource, losing and regaining 
balance in the present, and anticipating the possibilities of the future.   
Building on Dewey’s concepts of the aesthetic experience and the live creature, 
education itself becomes an aesthetic experience undergone by the live creature among 
other live creatures in an environment that is neither wholly finished nor wholly 
unstable.  It follows that the live creature’s environment is her curriculum and her 
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experience is her education.  Cultural miseducation, then, constitutes an an-aesthetic 
experience undergone by a live creature alone or among other live creatures in a 
completely finished environment of material abundance or in an entirely unstable 
environment of perceived scarcity.  And cultural miseducation, like education, changes 
the live creature through the process of “educational metamorphoses,” the always 
complicated, often-problematic “instances of whole person transformations brought 
about by education.”
41
  Ultimately, educational metamorphoses are about identity.  
Often, educational metamorphoses involve “culture crossings,” or “great 
changes [that] constitute crossings from one culture or cultural group to another” and 
“tend to be fraught with alienation, inner conflict, accusations of betrayal, and anxieties 
about going home again.”
42
  Alienation, conflict, betrayal, and anxieties are all 
symptoms of an an-aesthetic experience within an an-aesthetic environment – cultural 
miseducation – made and suffered by a Deweyan live creature.  An-aesthetic 
experiences and environments sometimes bring about educational metamorphoses that 
change live creatures into senseless creatures.  Over time, senseless creatures may 
become emotionally numb and existentially void.  Sometimes senseless, invisible 
creatures commit senseless violence (directed at the self and at others) in order to feel 
something and in order to be somebody.   
Except for Martin’s acknowledgement that “[t]he silence surrounding the topic 
of violence” represents a “gap in the text of education,” her efforts to point out that this 
“refusal to treat violence as an educational issue” amounts to furthering the “false 
illusion” that “learning guarantees improvement of the individual,” and her suggestion 
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that a given culture’s multiple educational agency is responsible for transmitting “vices 
as well as virtues,” no study of violence as an educational issue exists.
43
  Nevertheless, 
Martin, Korsmeyer, and Dewey’s language gestures toward the educational and 
aesthetic theory of the causes and conditions of a deeply gendered type of modern 
cultural miseducation characterized by violence toward the end of terror:  monstrous 
miseducation. 
Terror Curriculum as Technoscience 
Amid the educational agency of Mutually Assured Destruction and the student 
uprisings of the late 1960s, Hannah Arendt writes, “The technical development of the 
implements of violence has now reached the point where no political goal could 
conceivably correspond to their destructive potential or justify their actual use in armed 
conflict.”
44
  She claims that “the rebellion of the young…has been directed against the 
academic glorification of scholarship and science,” and “[p]rogress…can no longer 
serve as the standard by which to evaluate the disastrously rapid change-processes we 
have let loose.”
45
  Four decades later, Arendt’s warnings and her claims regarding 
unchecked multiple educational agency wrought by techno-scientific productivity still 
hold sway.  And while Arendt could not have known about the exponentially 
destructive potential of twenty-first-century “cyber-warfare,” an adolescent Mary 
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Coined by Bruno Latour, the term “technoscience” denotes science that requires 
technological devices as a precondition to knowledge.
47
  When the technology takes 
priority over a science that denies technology’s roots in aesthetics and dismisses local 
folk wisdom, it runs the risk of being miseducative.  Ideally, science and technology 
stand in reciprocal and aesthetic relation to one another.  As Dewey said in 1920: 
Science, “reason” is not therefore something laid from above upon experience.  
Suggested and tested in experience, it is also employed through inventions in a 
thousand ways to expand and enrich experience.  Although…this self-creation 
and self-regulation of experience is still largely technological rather than truly 
artistic or human, yet what has been achieved contains the guaranty of the 
possibility of intelligent administering of experience.  The limits are moral and 
intellectual, due to defects in our good will and knowledge.
48
  
Our techno-scientific “self-creation” and “self-regulation,” Dewey claims, is 
problematic if we do not understand that “reason” is “tested in experience” rather than 
the reverse.  However, the deep structures of educational thought and many educational 
agents insist that techno-scientific productivity is the means and end of education.  
“[A]rtistic and human…administering of experience,” suggests a different paradigm 
from these time-honored, Western deep structures of educational thought as well as 
critical evaluation of educational agency.  In the age of revolution, Mary Shelley knew 
from her lived experience that techno-scientific productivity void of what Susan Laird 
names “maternal teach and teachings” is monstrous.
49
   
Laird defines maternal teaching “as an educating task and achievement which 
occurs in a variety of social contexts outside the context of schooling,” and argues that 
it “must figure in any treatment of in loco parentis governance that does not simply 
                                                          
47
 Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1987), 174. 
48
 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920, Kindle 
Edition), location 958-964. 
49
 Susan Schober Laird, Maternal Teaching and Maternal Teachings (PhD diss., Cornell University, 
1988), 137-9. 
 21 
reproduce the injustices” of an oppressive, normative sense of the maternal ideal that 
saddles mothers with a majority of mystified and devalued childrearing tasks coupled 
with a “universalist,” “value-free,” Socratic teaching ideal that reduces what “counts” as 
teaching to “value laden” academic contexts.
50
  According to Laird, maternal teaching 
occurs in a safe environment where “sharing experiences” involves trusting others to 
help through both “criticism” and “praise,” while maternal teachings are “daily” lived 
experiences of “difficulties and triumphs” in “a playful and imaginative spirit.”
51
  
Maternal teaching and teachings are a practical expression of Dewey’s aesthetic 
experience.  Without maternal teaching and teachings, the live creature cannot learn to 
live wisely and well among other live creatures in a complex world.  The live creature 
learns to live instead by the tenets of terror curriculum:  fearfully and violently.  This is 
the lesson I derive from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. 
Terror Curriculum as Bildung and Genius 
 Emerging out of Prussian state-sponsored scholarship in the eighteenth-century, 
the concept of bildung articulated the very idea of “enlightenment” and was deployed in 
fields ranging from theology to natural philosophy and from political philosophy to 
pedagogical theory.  As Minister of Education in the Prussian State, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (1767-1835), defined the humanist bildung ideal “as the edification and 
cultivation of the whole individual” that he (masculine pronoun intentional) might 
realize his capacities for individual and collective self-determination in solidarity with 
other autonomous individuals to whom edification and self-determination have been 
                                                          
50
 Susan Schober Laird, Maternal Teaching and Maternal Teachings (PhD diss., Cornell University, 
1988), 137-9. 
51
 Susan Laird, “Teaching in a Different Sense: Alcott’s Marmee,” in Philosophy of Education, edited by 




  At birth, the aesthetic and educational philosophy goes, each individual 
possesses an embryonic form of universal humanity; the bildung that Humboldt insists 
our species develops in community over a well-lived lifetime.  Taking up Humboldt’s 
bildung ideal, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) “sought to displace academic 
philosophy with philosophical anthropology” and claimed bildung was the proper 
understanding of philosophy itself:  “a theory of how the individual develops into the 
sort of organic unity that will constantly work toward the full development of its talents 
and abilities and that will drive social progress.”
53
  For Humboldt, Herder, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), and others, the 
lived experience of bildung embodies Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) “Answer to the 
Question, What Is Enlightenment?”  The answer, for these neo-humanists, was to 
educate the individual reason and character in harmony with the individual mind and 
body such that the individual heart, mind, and body become contributing members of 
the body politic. 
 It is important to this project, a project that takes literature to be an important 
source of educational thought for educational studies, to note that bildung in its literary 
guise became bildungsroman.  These bourgeois, fictionalized narratives featured a 
naturalized aesthetic of education, apprenticeship, coming-of-age, and self-discovery.  
Historically, the German bildungsroman defined itself in opposition to the “decadence” 
of English and French “social novels,” but that should not suggest that the German 
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  Bildung has its roots in German Idealism and 
Romanticism, but the pedagogical platform of the bildungsroman was built upon 
concrete, “naturalized” notions of social responsibility, not transcendent, “super-
naturalized” ideals (like narratives of genius).  In conversation with Herder’s 
pedagogical sense of bildung, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprentice Years and 
Wilhelm Meister’s Travels have become paradigmatic bildungsromane in the German 
tradition.  Both trace a hero’s journey from the “self-cultivation” of talents to a unique 
vocation through which he might contribute to the general welfare of Goethe’s Weimar. 
 But the same historical moment that produced the naturalized growth model of 
bildung also produced the super-naturalized radical originality of genius.  How does the 
organic aesthetic driving the bildung account for the simultaneous turn of the 
nineteenth-century sublime ideal of “pure” genius of the individual “artist” whose 
inherent talent flouts social convention, transcends reason, and commands nature?
55
  It 
would seem that the radical originality of genius is inherently incompatible with the 
organic growth model of bildung.  Indeed, genius must have created, vacated, and 
broken the “natural” mold of bildung by which the ordinary intellect grows.  Genius, the 
theory goes, cannot be learned or taught, it just is.  And it rarely is.   
 According to German Idealism and Romanticism, genius is also gender neutral.  
But the “artistic creativity” of genius “is not just a feature of a superior reason, it is a 
feature of a superior mind,” and the model for that mind, Korsmeyer claims, is “a male 
mind:  one that is strong and capable of independence from tradition and social norms, 
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and that rises above the quotidian concerns that shape ordinary activities.”
56
  The genius 
mind is the male mind that first threw off the bonds of ignorance, first emerged from the 
darkness of Plato’s cave, first saw the sun of the “really real,” and first returned to free 
his fellow bondsmen.  According to the bildung ideal, the bondsmen may follow his 
naturalized bildung trajectory or not, but few possess the super-naturalized genius from 
which the original liberation ethos of bildung emerged.  Paradoxically, those who 
deviate from (refusing the ascent from “darkness” or questioning the “truth” of sunlight) 
the “natural” path of bildung are excluded from the realm of genius because genius is 
self-born, self-directed, and radically free.  “Some,” says the rhetoric of genius, “are 
born great, some achieve greatness” while others “have greatness thrust upon ‘em.”
57
   
 Beyond exploiting the super-naturalized creative power of genius, the theory 
goes, education cannot make genius.  Culture (as curriculum) cannot make genius.  
Genius is just not an educational concept, although it is problematically classed as one.  
Bildung is equally problematic as an educational ideal.  By encouraging the organic 
growth of bildung, it could be said broadly that education makes and shapes the 
individual, but because bildung is firmly planted on the nature side of the nature/culture 
divide, that individual’s development and the place that individual will occupy in 
society is essentially (pre)determined.
58
  The culture (curriculum) from which the false 
educational ideals of genius and bildung derive is miseducative because it does not 
acknowledge its own role as a maker and shaper of individuals and only narrowly sees 
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the individual as its maker and shaper.  The hidden curriculum, yet unnamed, that 
operates according to these false educational ideals is powerfully miseducative.  
 Thinking of the aesthetic representation of time and naturalized development in 
terms of Mikhail Bakhtin’s modern “historically productive horizontal” and medieval 
“extra-temporal, otherworldly” vertical trajectories, offers an expanded insight into the 
terror curriculum as bildung and genius.  Bakhtin’s idea that modernity saw history and 
time on a horizontal axis (bildung) while the medieval world saw history and time on a 
vertical one (genius) graphically depicts these competing trajectories of 
development/change and origins/destinations and their corresponding ideologies.
59
  The 
way in which the individual and cultural imagination is miseducated by bildung’s 
expectation of evolutionary development (the plant/garden/gardener metaphor) and 
genius’s expectation of revolutionary exceptionality (the sculpture/studio/sculptor 
metaphor) has practical implications. 
 Both the concept of genius and bildung take for granted that individuals make 
and shape culture, but neither acknowledges the role culture plays as a maker and 
shaper of individuals.  Martin’s “unified” theory of education as encounter sees “the 
processes of cultural transmission and individual learning” as “two sides of a single 
coin” and “represents education as an interaction between an individual and a culture in 
which both parties change.”
60
  Monstrous miseducation rests on the bildung/genius 
educational fallacy of terror curriculum and is comprised of complex, unmediated 
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(creative and destructive) encounters and exchanges with terror curriculum engendered 
by genius and bildung ideals.  The Frankenstein myth shows that these encounters and 
exchanges transform motherless, alienated individuals and cultures into monstrous 
creators and monstrous creatures.  
Terror Curriculum as Bildung-Terror and Genius-Terror 
  Recalling Dewey’s live creature and aesthetic experience, how might terror 
curriculum produce and be produced by individuals unable to imagine having creative 
control over their “energies” within a given environment?
 61
  At what point does cultural 
miseducation become qualitatively monstrous?  Could the inability to imagine a future 
in which the exertion of creative (or destructive) force that empowers individuals and 
cultures (economically, politically, and socially) be the consequence of other kinds of 
miseducation, or is this pervasive impotence unique to monstrous miseducation and 
related to the bildung and genius ideals?  What about miseducation that, while failing to 
educate the political imaginary, does indeed transmit, through violence and 
intimidation, an apocalyptic or nihilistic imaginary that re-presents the violence and 
intimidation that inspired it in the first place?  
 If the nature of violence has not changed, surely the methods of violence, 
“distinguished by its instrumental character,” have changed in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries.
62
  Arendt draws sharp conceptual distinctions between “power,” 
“strength,” “force,” and “authority” and the violence with which those abstractions are 
associated, saying, “Phenomenologically, it [violence] is close to strength, since 
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implements of violence, like all other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of 
multiplying natural strength until, in the last stage of their development, they can 
substitute for it.”
63
  For Arendt, violence itself evolves along a “natural” sort of bildung 
growth trajectory.  To some extent, I agree with Arendt but suspect she missed a crucial 
kind of violence characteristic of terror curriculum of late-modern culture:  violence as 
an end in itself.  Drawing important distinctions between different kinds of terror, 
Arendt says that totalitarian terror is a state of “one against all” reinforced by violent 
means.  While Arendt’s taxonomy is helpful, the larger scale of terror curriculum both 
fosters and depends upon the original sense of Hobbesian “all against all” violence that 
is not “normal,” “natural,” or “super-natural.”  We use those descriptors because we are 
monstrous miseducated by terror curriculum to imagine the future in binary extremes:  
techno-utopian progress or techno-dystopian regress.  Education, according to this value 
scheme must either be a social engineering project or a brainwashing enterprise.  
 Individuals or groups whose project might be characterized as bildung-terror 
want something – politically, economically, and socially – and use terror publically as a 
means to get what they want.  Conversely, an individual (not a group) who takes up the 
private project of genius-terror either does not want anything or never makes her/his 
desires public.  Perhaps, the individual engaged in genius-terror wants something that is 
so obscure as to be practically meaningless or wants something that is beyond the realm 
of ordinary, everyday human experience.  With genius-terror, inspiring and appreciating 
terror is perhaps an end unto itself:  the product is the process.   
 The preconditions to bildung-terror are perceptions of powerlessness and 
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invisibility within a society that normalizes and naturalizes violence, while the 
preconditions to genius-terror are unclear unless the “super-naturalization” of 
monstrous miseducation itself is taken as the precondition.  In the twenty-first century, 
bildung-terror has become an increasingly private act of seeming desperation (as 
opposed to the ideology-driven revolutionary terror or totalitarian terror of the last two 
and half centuries) as in the case of “domestic terrorist” Timothy McVeigh’s bombing 
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and less sensational cases 
of day-to-day gun violence in the streets and the “family terrorism” of private homes.
64
   
 Rhonda Hammer recognizes “family terrorism” as distinct from “domestic 
violence” or “family violence” because she argues that those labels are often used too 
narrowly to describe violence perpetrated by men on women.  For Hammer, they do not 
adequately describe the “widespread, global nature of emotional, physical, and sexual 
violence that is perpetuated against children and the elderly by both men and women 
every day.”
65
  In other words, “domestic violence” and “family violence” do not 
account for cultural miseducation.  She believes that only “by delineating and making 
apparent the dominant-subordinate pathological relations that take place in unequal 
family power relations” can we begin to address the deeply gendered roots of such 
violence.
66
  Her analysis is extremely important to the concepts of monstrous 
miseducation and the terror curriculum because she is talking about the buried cultural 
liabilities that inform family terrorism.  Citing recent studies of media coverage of 
“domestic terrorism,” Hammer concludes that “[t]he condoning, promotion, and 
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provocation of male violence against women within the mass media…takes place 
within a larger frame that addresses family terrorism and sexual abuse in a 
psychologized and individuated, decontextualized manner.”
67
  This individualizing of 
pathologies and decontextualizing of violence obfuscates the causes and consequences 
of terror and takes it out of the educational realm.  In other words, the terror may follow 
the naturalized bildung trajectory (the abuser was abused and thus became abusive), but 
the sensationalized coverage of the terror may project upon it the super-naturalized 
power of genius-terror (the abuse and the abuser are incomprehensible).  Both terror 
scenarios concentrate on the individual actor – the monster – rather than look at the 
broader cultural landscape.  It is difficult not to “psychologize” the terrorist as a genius, 
“self-radicalized,” “lone wolf” when our homes, like our media, are one of myriad 
educational agents indifferent to or ignorant of the miseducative consequences of 
transmitting the terror curriculum.
68
    
 This century has also seen its share of bildung-terror committed by well-
organized, well-funded, and well-armed groups laying claim to myriad causes.  Despite 
engaging in projects that the culture might identify as bildung-terror, groups and 
individuals who ally themselves with groups would not necessarily self-identify as 
terrorists.  They might call themselves activists pushed to violence by injustice or some 
wrong by another name.  Regardless, they would not deny having committed the 
violence.  For the bildung-terrorist, the violence has an intentional, educational aim, 
albeit with unintentional, miseducative consequences.  By causing fear and suffering, 
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the bildung-terrorist hopes to bring about changes that are potentially advantageous to 
her and the interests she imagines she represents.  The event itself and the reenactment 
via multiple educational agency transmit naturalized narratives that may advance a 
political, economic, or social agenda that may be educative or miseducative.  For 
example, lynchings in the South maintained the apartheid system through bildung-
terror.  An eco-terrorist might burn down a housing development to protest ecologically 
irresponsible suburban sprawl.  There is a difference in kind between these two 
examples of bildung-terror that might justify calling the latter violence, “activism.”  
Lynching is murder while arson is the destruction of property that may or may not result 
in death.  Both, however, intend to educate on a grand scale and to bring about change. 
 Genius-terror, by contrast, cannot have a specific educational mission because 
its purpose is so ambiguous it cannot hope to “teach” its victims or those who bear 
witness to the atrocity anything but fear itself.  Because the super-naturalized violence 
of genius-terror could happen to anyone, anywhere, for no clear reason, individuals and 
societies may learn to live in fear, but they cannot possibly learn any specific lessons 
that would benefit them in any affective or cognitive way.  The perpetrator of the 
violence stands to gain nothing materially, but may experience the fleeting thrill of 
horror and fascination at the spectacle she has created.  In the moment, the spectator or 
victim of genius-terror experiences all-consuming fear rather than any twinge of 
empathy.  Assuming the actor does not take her/his life in the act of genius-terror, she 
would be utterly detached from the product of the violence and the name “terrorist” or 
the idea of “terrorism” would carry no signification.  That is not to say genius-terror 
does not possess it own internal logic.  It is to say that such logic lies so far outside of 
 31 
ordinary experience as to be extraordinary and so far beyond “human nature” as to be 
super-natural.  Genius-terror like the 2012 mass shooting of movie-goers at a movie 
theater in Aurora, Colorado or that perpetrated on the children and school personnel at 
Sandy Hook Elementary School in New Town, Connecticut defies comprehension and 
stands out to spectators and survivors as singularly senseless, indiscriminate, and 
monstrous. By definition such genius-terror is miseducative, but is it also miseducative 
to cast these “all-to-human” acts and affects as extra-ordinary or super-natural? 
 Bildung-terror corresponds to the deep educational structure of bildung, and 
genius-terror corresponds to that of genius.  The organic growth determinism of 
bildung, as Martin implies in her treatment of the “growth model of education,” should 
not imply “growth pure and simple” for the individual.
69
  Rather, “educators” 
intentionally guide much of the individual’s development at home and at school, but 
encounters with cultural wealth and liabilities outside of home and school may well be 
unmediated.  Both encounters will have intended and unintended consequences for the 
individual, some of them miseducative.   
 Similarly, bildung-terror does not emerge “naturally” in a given culture.  The 
pre-conditions of perceived powerlessness and ontological insignificance must be 
present and the individual actor must feel the need to assert herself within the culture 
through violent means.  If violence and/or threats of violence were not deployed to 
force the larger culture or another individual to bend to the actor’s will and to 
acknowledge the actor’s existence, the actor cannot be said to have engaged bildung-
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terror.  Learning to consider violence as a means to an end, perhaps as a means that is 
“natural” to the species, bridges the ethos of bildung and the instrument of terror. 
Genius, while it may be “nurtured,” is presumed to be present in the individual 
at birth.  It is a disembodied creation myth, not a growth model, although it is somehow 
cast as a discursive species of educational thought.  The rhetoric of genius calls it rare, 
absolute, pure, transcendent, divinely deterministic, and detached from the everyday 
experiences of the material world. Genius, in a Kantian word, is “disinterested.”  
According to Korsmeyer’s understanding of Kant’s aesthetic experience of pure 
judgment free from interest, “[d]isinterested does not mean that we care nothing for [the 
object]; it means that our pleasure is not rooted in personal advancement or gratification 
– in the satisfaction of one of our desires.”
70
  As an end unto itself, genius-terror 
operates according to the same “objective” paradigm of “purity.”  Singular acts of 
genius-terror are statistical anomalies, but they inspire fear as few events can.  But these 
events also take the focus off of empirically guaranteed threats to the survival of the 
species in the form of myriad ecological disasters, epidemic diseases, gun violence, and 
the day-to-day peril of children and the elderly facing family terrorism.  It would seem 
that the hidden terror curriculum of monstrous miseducation cultivates in us a taste for 




Does the deeply gendered conceptual apparatus at the foundation of monstrous 
miseducation make and shape cultures and individuals that are fit only for one another?  
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In other words, does the symbiotic relationship between a monstrously miseducative 
culture and a monstrously miseducated individual amount to a balance of terror that 
arrests the “development” of either?  Given the terror curriculum, is “development” 
even a desirable narrative for education?  What kinds of narratives might sustainably re-
make and re-shape individuals and cultures?  
What would happen if a lone, male “genius” created and abandoned a physically 
mature creature to be educated by “nature”?  What kinds multiple educational agency 
could intervene to educate the creator and his creature?  How would these encounters 
shape them?  How might these encounters miseducate and misshape them?  What kind 
of culture emerges at the interstices of nature and nurture when a miseducated creator 
and a misshapen creature collide?  What sort of educational wisdom about terror as a 
modern, gendered, educational problem emerges from such inquiry?  What might be the 
value of having a conceptual language by which to conduct further pragmatic “cultural 
bookkeeping” projects using literary texts as sources of hidden educational wisdom and 
as case studies?
72
   
This study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter one is a gloss on Mary 
Shelley’s biography as a series of educational metamorphoses.  Just as her most 
renowned book Frankenstein is itself both a critique and a symptom of genius and 
bildung, the educational biography of its creator falls prey and bears witness to a 
peculiar material and intellectual history.  Therefore, to begin contextualizing and 
theorizing monstrous miseducation, chapter two looks at bildung and genius made 
manifest in Shelley’s educational biography.  This daughter of “genius,” William 
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Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, read widely:  the books in her father’s library and 
children’s book store; the educational thought of her mother; and the work of her 
revolutionary Romantic coterie.  All of these encounters shaped the lived experience of 
Mary Shelley from which I begin to formulate the concept of monstrous miseducation.  
Indeed, Mary Shelley’s lived experience against the backdrop of a revolutionary era 
stands as a case study of the core features of monstrous miseducation: Miltonic identity 
politics and their attendant essentialism and exceptionalism; Godwinian perfectibility
73
 
and its attendant paternalism and uneven development;
74
 abandonment to multiple 
educational agency
75
 and its attendant “techno-scientific” productivity
76
; and gothic 
sublimity
77
 and its attendant fatalism and will to irrationality.  As important as the core 
features that are present in monstrous miseducation are those that are absent: Laird’s 
maternal teaching and teachings
78
 with a focus on love and survival; Haraway’s cyborg 
affinity politics with a focus on alliances and amalgams;
79
 and Martin’s “circulation of 
gifts”
80
 with a focus on “cultural bookkeeping”
81




Chapter three is an exposition of Frankenstein as educational thought through 
which I further develop the core features of monstrous miseducation.  Expanding the 
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contextual boundaries, deploying the conceptual language, and following the conceptual 
framework developed in chapters one and two, this chapter concentrates on the matter, 
means, and method of instruction – intentional and unintentional – of monstrous 
miseducation.  The exposition will necessarily focus on the monstrous miseducation of 
Victor Frankenstein and his creature, but the educational thought of the text extends far 
beyond the these two archetypical “gods” and “monsters” to look at the false 
educational ideals and problematic aesthetic that undergird monstrous miseducation – 
namely, bildung and genius.   
Chapter four explores the possible influence of Frankenstein as educational 
thought.  Clearly Frankenstein is haunted by the canon of educational thought and other 
texts that might well be identified as educational thought if thought were broadened to 
include literary studies as a foundational discipline of educational studies and if what 
counts as education were broadened to account for intended and unintended cultural 
exchanges.  Equally apparent is the fact that the myth and meme of Frankenstein has 
become idiomatic, at least in the Western world, of hubristic kind of techno-scientific 
projects that unleash unintended negative consequences on our naïve species while it is 
preoccupied with the business of progress.  Just as Frankenstein has become a meme of 
popular culture, it has also educated the popular scientific imagination – for better and 
for worse.  Surely, allusions to Frankenstein inspire suspicion of unchecked scientific 
genius, but not on the educational ideal of genius itself.  Even facing the fear of 
“making monsters,” the educational components of such coming of age stories as that of 
the creature or his creator disappear in favor of essentially deterministic narratives that 
neatly ignore social, economic, and political contexts and problems.  The cultural 
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influence of Frankenstein is undeniable, but this chapter is interested in what parts and 
versions of the story that Western culture retells and reproduces and how that selectivity 
relates to monstrous miseducation and the terror curriculum.  Using the questions raised 
by Frankenstein, I will put prevailing narratives of education to a sort of “Turing Test” 
to show the ways in which these humanist myths might be classed as the untenable 
tenets of terror curriculum.  Such inquiry might well suggest that we need revised myths 
of education in the age of terror. 
The test of monstrous miseducation’s relevance and value to educational thought 
is its pragmatic utility in helping us to draw educational wisdom from contemporary 
cases of terrorism.  Deploying the deep educational structures of bildung and genius to 
explore the aesthetic – making and shaping – power of terror curriculum and monstrous 
miseducation, chapter five deploys the conceptual apparatus I formulated in the first 
three chapters alongside the influence of the Frankenstein myth detailed in chapter four 
to analyze the paradigm case of Columbine and the borderline case of The Freedom 
Writers.  Schooling is only one of myriad educational agents that act as custodians and 
transmitters of cultural stock, and school violence is but one consequence of monstrous 
miseducation.  However these cases most clearly show the contemporary relevance of 








A Biographical Sketch of Mary Shelley’s Educational Metamorphoses 
Until “the animal” arrived in Somers Town, London on 30 August 1797,
1
 its 
playfully expectant parents, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) and William Godwin 
(1756-1836), imagined their child would be a boy and called it by its father’s name, 
William.
2
  And although Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley was born a girl named 
after both her mother and her father, she would die Mary Shelley on the first of 
February 1851.  After the drowning death of her spouse, Percy Bysshe Shelley in 1822, 
she fatalistically refused to take any another name saying, “I like the name Mary 
Shelley too much. I've always found it very pretty and I mean to have it engraved on my 
tombstone.”
 3
  It would seem, then, that she chose the name she took with her to the 
grave and perhaps shed the name she was given in the cradle.  Surely she never took her 
in utero name, William, but for a time, she eschewed her father’s name and signed all of 
her work Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley (MWS).  Indeed, the names chosen for and by 
this woman – from “William,” to Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, to Mary Godwin, back 
to Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, to Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, to Mary Shelley – 
signal important transitions in her educational biography.  From birth to age four, Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin shed her birth name and became Mary Godwin, a legitimate, 
motherless, father’s daughter.  During early adolescence, she reclaimed her mother’s 
name and again came to know herself as Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin.  After 
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displeasing her father, Mary Godwin became Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, an 
illegitimate, fatherless, failed mother and wife.  Finally, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley 
became Mary Shelley, an eternal wife to the deceased Percy Shelley and mother to their 
sole surviving child. 
Along with revealing Mary Shelley’s tenuous grasp on her own legitimacy 
against the backdrop of early nineteenth-century mores, each name change marks an 
instance of what Jane Roland Martin names “educational metamorphosis.”  Educational 
metamorphoses involve complicated, often-problematic “instances of whole person 
transformations brought about by education…for the better or the worse.”
4
  The 
changes brought about by Martin’s educational metamorphoses necessarily involve loss 
and confusion.  Heralded by “culture crossings that “tend to be fraught with alienation, 
inner conflict, accusations of betrayal, and anxieties about going home again,” Mary 
Shelley’s educational metamorphoses are haunted by personal losses, but they are also 
marked by the losses associated with the grand upheavals of the larger cultural matrix.
5
   
 “William” to Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin (1796-1797):  Legitimacy 
Nothing in the extant primary source material suggests that Wollstonecraft and 
Godwin preferred that their child be born a boy, only that they referred to the pregnancy 
as “William.”  There is reason to suspect, though, that the couple believed “William’s” 
illegitimacy would be problematic, especially in light of Wollstonecraft’s questionable 
past; she already had an illegitimate daughter in her custody, Fanny Imlay.  Despite the 
couple’s well-known stance against marriage, “the most odious of all monopolies,” 
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Wollstonecraft and Godwin married on 29 March 1797.
6
  In silent attendance at the 
secret ceremony in St. Pancras’ church, second trimester “William” received the 
surname Godwin on that day.  On 10 September 1797, eleven days after giving birth to 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, her mother died of puerperal fever. 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin to Mary Godwin (1797-1801):  Abandonment 
A devastating sense of loss, then, heralded Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s first 
great metamorphosis from “creature of nature” to the little girl who would come to 
know herself as Mary Godwin, a “member of human culture.”
7
  Anne Mellor points to 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s “anxiety” about being abandoned by her father during 
her four-year educational metamorphosis into Mary Godwin.
8
  In letters home to Mary, 
the often-absent Godwin repeatedly reassured her that he would “not give her away.”
9
  
Perhaps these very reassurances were unsettling.  Surely the little girl who had lost her 
mother formed an intense attachment to her father during her “formative years,” the 
years she spent in the house her father had once shared with her mother, the Polygon.  
Under the watchful, but somehow domesticated John Opie portrait of her mother – a 
portrait painted in 1797 when Wollstonecraft was pregnant with “William” – baby Mary 
found herself profoundly abandoned to the care of a grieving, preoccupied Godwin.   
During Mary’s first year of life, Louisa, a friend of Godwin’s sister, was charged 
with her day-to-day care while Godwin poured his grief into immortalizing her mother 
in his Memoirs of the Author of “The Rights of Woman.”  In response to a letter from a 
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female friend inquiring after Fanny and Mary’s welfare, he confessed to being “totally 
unfitted to educate” and “direct the infant mind” unlike Wollstonecraft, the “best 
qualified in the world” to teach children.
10
  Here and elsewhere, duty-bound Godwin 
revealed his tacit belief in Wollstonecraft’s “fitness” for the task of educating and 
directing young minds even while contradicting her theories and thus exposing his own 
narrow definition of education as a process of training the mind of an individual subject 
– an intellectual enterprise isolated from the emotional, physical, and cultural surround.  
But Godwin did not seem bothered by myriad incongruities as he ushered Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin from a creature of nature to a member of culture.  Godwin’s 
educational philosophy flew in the face of popular phrenology, yet he had the screaming 
three-week-old Mary examined by a phrenologist who confirmed what Godwin knew 
must be the case: “she had ‘quick sensibility’ and ‘considerable memory and 
intelligence’.”
11
  And Mary soon proved to be a “singularly bold, somewhat imperious, 
and active of mind[ed]” daughter.
12
  While these qualities attracted Godwin to 
Wollstonecraft, in her namesake, they complicated things.  
And as a very young girl, most of what Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin knew of 
her mother came filtered through the sentiments of “a love amounting to veneration by 
her father” and from “the warm-eyed lady who smiled from the wall in her father’s 
study, whose grave she was taken to visit when she was still too small to understand 
quite what death meant.”
13
  According to Charlotte Gordon’s recent Romantic Outlaws: 
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The Extraordinary Lives of Mary Wollstonecraft and Her Daughter Mary Shelley, 
Godwin “did not think it odd to teach” little Mary to read and write by tracing the letters 
of her own name on her mother’s gravestone “[a]nd Mary was eager to learn anything 
her father had to teach.  In her eyes, he became ‘greater, and wiser, and better…than 
any other being.’ He was also all she had left.”
14
  Despite Godwin’s paternalistic bent, 
his own pursuits, projects, and pressures increasingly competed for his time and he 
became ever more closed off to the little girl who had learned to think her father “was 
my God.”
15
  And atop the grave marked by the name she shared with her deceased 
mother, “Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin,” this little girl began her first great educational 
metamorphosis from creature of nature to member of human culture, figuratively 
burying her former self in her mother’s grave and transforming the self that “yet lived,” 
her father’s daughter, Mary Godwin. 
Mary Godwin to Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin (1801-1814):  “Perfectibility”   
Although Mary’s formal education was largely neglected, when Godwin was at 
home for any extended period of time, he directed her early schooling.  He went to 
some trouble to research and procure age-appropriate reading material for her.
16
  
Godwin tried to implement Wollstonecraft’s posthumously published Lessons (written 
for the “unfortunate” Fanny and published by Godwin in 1798) in his initial attempts to 
bring the girls up “to good.”
17
  But as Mary’s precocious intellect grew, he abdicated 
direct responsibility in the educational realm and simply granted her unrestricted access 
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to his library comprised primarily of “Old English authors,” classical Western literature, 
and contemporary volumes of radical thought including his work and that of her 
mother.
18
  As to educating “the affections,” Mary was left to her own devices.  
Perhaps Godwin’s inability or unwillingness to attend to Mary’s affective 
development combined with his fear of losing custody to Wollstonecraft’s sisters 
inspired his search for a second wife so soon after Wollstonecraft’s death.  Godwin’s 
urgency to remarry may also have grown out of his concern for his own health and 
wellbeing.
 19
  Real tensions arose at the Polygon after Godwin married Mary-Jane 
Clairmont in 1801 and blended Mary and Fanny with Clairmont’s two children, Jane 
“Claire” and Charles.  In 1803, the “William” of expectant Mary Wollstonecraft and 
William Godwin would finally be born to Mary-Jane Clairmont and William Godwin.  
Godwin was grateful to the woman who promised to meet his “standing rights due from 
a wife to a husband” and to be his “mamma” when his own mother died.
20
  Mary-Jane 
was grateful to have found “an eligible widower conveniently nearby” and won his 
affection by reading just enough of Political Justice to flatter the “immortal Godwin.”
21
   
Indeed, the new Mrs. Godwin was anxious that interested friends of 
Wollstonecraft, like the Lady Mountcashell who would become Mrs. Margaret Mason, 
know “Charles knows Latin Greek and French, mathematics and draws well.  The girls 
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have been taught by Mr Godwin Roman Greek and English history, French and Italian 
from masters.  Frances and Mary draw very well.”
22
  Godwin’s impressive library grew 
to include volumes of children’s literature, some contributed by close friends of 
Godwin’s, but most written, edited, and published by Godwin and Mrs. Godwin and 
collected together in the “Juvenile Library.”
23
  Although Mrs. Godwin fancied herself 
rather an expert in children’s literacy (she was a skilled translator), it was Mary 
Godwin, not her stepmother nor her father, who taught little William Godwin to read.
24
   
It was not just “the Clairmont family’s invasion of her home” that began ten 
year-old Mary Godwin’s educational metamorphosis into fatherless, mother’s daughter, 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin; it was the family’s move from the Polygon in “semi-
rural” Somers Town to the five-story shop and residence at 14 Skinner Street amid the 
urban squalor of Holborn Hill in 1807.
25
  With Mrs. Godwin’s encouragement, Godwin 
hoped that moving to this district of prisons, public hangings, “butchers and 
booksellers” would prove financially advantageous.
26
   
Now, Mary Godwin knew she was home by a sensory assault of death and dying 
that replaced the “tranquil churchyard where her mother seemed only to lie asleep under 
the tall grass.”
27
  From her stifling attic “schoolroom,” she heard the screams of animals 
being slaughtered at Smithfield and the tolling bell of St. Sepulchre’s signaling convicts 
condemned to die at Tyburn gallows.  Minding the bookshop on the ground floor, she 
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saw the thronging crowds of people rushing to public hangings at New Drop outside the 
Old Bailey and the orphaned children of mothers’ confined to the overcrowded prison at 
Newgate.  She might have known that debtors like her father rotted away in debtors’ 
prisons like the one just blocks from their new home, but she surely knew that Skinner 
Street was not a safe place.  Her childhood effectively ended at the age of ten. 
Yet her keen mind found sanctuary in the Skinner Street library.
28
  Alone with 
the books where she “discharged the business of the shop with the prudent steadiness of 
a man of forty,” the self-educating “shop girl,” Mary Godwin, must have begun to 
identify more keenly as a motherless child.
29
  She read widely in the canon of English 
literature, including excerpts from John Milton’s Paradise Lost featured in “The 
Poetical Class-Book, published in 1810 and probably assembled by Godwin himself.”
30
  
Although she would not write Frankenstein for six years, well after her educational 
metamorphosis into Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, important seeds of that work and of 
her transformation were sewn in Mary Godwin’s sullen encounters with Milton.
31
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The preoccupied, “perpetually cash-strapped” Godwin too became increasingly 
closed off to Mary Godwin despite his claims to the contrary.
32
  Sounding very 
Rousseauian even while quoting John Dryden in a letter to his young disciple, Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, about his daughters’ education, Godwin optimistically relates that he 
has sewn the “seeds of intellect and knowledge, seeds of moral judgment and conduct,” 
seeds that have for years been “’ungrateful to the tiller’s care,’” were finally responding 
to his assiduous attention.
33
  And it is true that Godwin did take Mary Godwin (along 
with the other children) to theaters and lectures and to galleries and gardens during this 
time, but according to a young adult Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, while her father did 
sacrifice his time and talent to train her, he was “unfit for” early childhood “formation 
of character” because of his “undeviating” exactitude delivered in “pointed and 




Suffering from what she would later call the “girlish troubles” of her “father’s 
house,” Mary Godwin was sent away to a boarding school in Ramsgate.
 35
 There is no 
evidence that she was sent to the “Ladies School” at Ramsgate for a formal education.  
In contrast to the education afforded Charles and the younger William Godwin, she 
received “only room, board, and kindness.”
36
  Her “condition” did not improve.  In 
Seymour’s account, Mary Godwin’s girlish troubles amounted to “eczema in times of 
                                                          
32
 Charlotte Gordon, Romantic Outlaws (New York:  Random House, 2015, Kindle Ed.), location 2620. 
33
 Miranda Seymour, Mary Shelley (New York:  Grove Press, 2000), 66.  Martin would say that an 
interpretation of Rousseauian education that sees it as “growth pure and simple” is flawed, however 
Godwin’s approach with Mary comes very near to this misinterpretation of Rousseau.  
34
 Charles Kegan Paul, William Godwin:  His Friends and Contemporaries, Volume 1 (London:  Henry S, 
King and Company, 1876), 38. 
35
 Miranda Seymour, Mary Shelley (New York:  Grove Press, 2000), 61-64.  
36
 Anne Mellor, Mary Shelley (New York:  Routledge, 1988), 11. 
 46 
stress” brought on by her intense dislike of her stepmother and the “move into the city 
from a semi-rural home” at the urging of the stepmother she so resented.
 37
  It is also 
possible to infer from Mary Godwin’s periodic banishments and from surviving 
correspondence that, during her early adolescence, she did not show a propensity for the 
“perfectibility” outlined in Godwin’s educational philosophy.
38
  In a letter to William 
Baxter, the patriarch of the Glassite family to which a chronically ill and disillusioned 
adolescent Mary Godwin was sent twice between 1810 and 1814, Godwin confided, “I 
am anxious that she should be brought up…like a philosopher, even like a cynic.  It 
would add greatly to the strength and worth of her character.”
39
  Contrary to Godwin’s 
cold directives, it was in the “affectionate, uncritical household” of the Baxter family 
that Mary Godwin transformed into her mother’s daughter.
40
  
Despite her abiding reverence for Godwin, she would never forget that it was 
ultimately he who had banished her to the Sir Walter Scott’s romanticized Scottish 
Highlands.  Here, she made her first close girlfriend, Isabella Baxter.
41
  She and Isabella 
cultivated their gothic imaginations, “memorized reams of poetry and loved Dundee’s 
legends and ghost stories.”
42
  When the girls left their initials in a windowsill at the 
Baxter’s house, Mary Godwin carved her mother’s initials with deliberation: MWG.
43
  
But in her reclamation of her mother’s name, Mary Godwin seemed to identify more 
with the gravestone image of her mother than the living mother immortalized in the 
legacy of her work.  She did not “fit” anywhere in the educational and cultural 
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landscape of early nineteenth-century Britain.  Her father had indeed betrayed and 
abandoned her, as she always feared he might.  But the Baxter’s home was a chrysalis, 
and during her exile she underwent the next whole person transformation of her 
educational metamorphoses: from Mary Godwin to Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin:
44
 
…the eyry of freedom, and the pleasant region where unheeded I could 
commune with the creatures of my fancy…beneath the trees of the grounds 
belonging to our house, or on the bleak sides of the woodless mountains near, [ ] 
my true compositions, the airy flights of my imagination, were born and 
fostered.  I did not make myself the heroine of my tales.  Life appeared to me 
too common-place an affair as regarded myself.  I could not figure to myself that 
romantic woes or wonderful events would ever be my lot; but I was not confined 
to my own identity, and I could people the hours with creations far more 
interesting to me at that age, than my own sensations.
45
 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin to Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley (1814-1816): Sublimity 
It was this Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin who returned from exile to her father’s 
house in 1814 wearing an “illegal” tartan to find Percy Shelley.
46
  She had first met 
Shelley at the age of fifteen when she returned home from Scotland for a brief visit in 
1812.  Having been the exciting subject of correspondence with her family, the dashing 
and dangerous “[s]on of a man of fortune in Sussex” represented financial security for 
Godwin’s chronically impoverished family and a revitalization of Godwin’s waning 
reputation as a radical thinker.
47
  Mary shared her family’s fascination with “PB 
Shelley: Democrat, Philanthropist, and Atheist.”
48
  Certainly, Godwin did not 
discourage Shelley’s patronage or adoration, although he displaced his own desires on 
“Mrs. Godwin and three daughters” who he confessed were “interested in your letters 
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  During the early summer of 1814, the married Shelley began 
taking his meals regularly with the Godwin family on Skinner Street.  By 26 June of 
that same year, Mary Godwin Wollstonecraft and Percy Shelley had declared their love 
for each other in the graveyard of St. Pancras in front of Mary Wollstonecraft’s grave.
50
  
The couple “marked this day as the start of their sexual relationship.”
51
 
Less than a month later, on 18 July 1814, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin and her 
stepsister, Jane/Claire, ran away with Shelley to France.
52
  Among his many causes, was 
Shelley’s mission to liberate young women from their oppressive domestic 
circumstances.  Only three years before liberating Mary and Jane/Claire, he had sprung 
the sixteen-year-old Harriet Westbrook from her domestic trap and eloped with her 28 
August 1811.  Now he had left the pregnant Harriet and his first child in London and 
embarked on a new “rescue” mission guided by his “harem psychology”:  saving Mary 
and their failed chaperone, Jane/Claire Godwin, from stifling Skinner Street.
53
  The 
sixteen-year-old Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin was likely seduced by Shelley’s 
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hypocritical chivalry, but she was also frightened and fascinated by his suicidal 
ideations and attempts at the prospect of being separated from her.   
Through a haze of “incarnate romance” during their pilgrimage to Rousseau, 
Shelley became Mary Godwin Wollstonecraft’s father figure, her “everything,” until 
she might regain Godwin’s paternalistic love.
54
  According to Mellor, “Percy, as the 
older published poet, quickly assumed the role of mentor-teacher to his young student-
mistress, setting Mary to work on a rigorous program of reading and study that she 
followed dutifully for years to come.”
55
  But having studied her mother’s Letters 
Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (1796), a work 
that was “calculated to make a man [Godwin] fall in love with its author 
[Wollstonecraft],” Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin was already well-schooled in the 
“romantic aesthetic” that she would develop experientially on this first, difficult “tour” 
of the “wartorn” continent.
56
  Problematically, she could “find beauty in a natural scene 
only by removing people from it.”
 57
  The letters and journals that she would eventually 
publish as History of a Six Weeks Tour through a Part of France, Switzerland, 
Germany, and Holland, with Letters Descriptive of a Sail round the Lake of Geneva, 
and of the Glaciers of Chamouni (1817) are particularly telling of Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin’s adolescent worldview during this complicated educational metamorphosis.   
Mellor reads Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s experience and treatment of a 
feminized nature as “a sacred life-force that sustains those human beings who treat her 
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with respect” as an “ecological vision that she owed in part to what she read as 
Wordsworth’s celebration of a maternally nurturant Nature “that never did betray / the 
heart that loved her,” while for Shelley, Nature embodied a thrillingly sublime and 
terrifyingly unstable force.
58
  In both visions, though, Nature is cordoned off and 
elevated from all-too-human culture.  Mellor suggests that Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin idolized Nature because she craved stability in the wake of her severed 
relations with Godwin.  Perhaps her worship of Nature as a maternal caregiver may also 
have been inspired by her feelings of motherlessness and by the decidedly unromantic 
poverty that heralded her educational metamorphosis into Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley. 
After six weeks, the half-starved, bedraggled, and penniless travelers returned to 
London to face the consequences of their scandalous conduct.  The pregnant Mary had 
been terribly ill on the stormy sea passage home, leaving Shelley and Jane/Claire alone 
to cultivate their gothic romance on the ship’s deck.  When they reached London, 
Shelley found that he could not pay for their return voyage from France because his 
wife, Harriet Shelley, in the final trimester of her pregnancy, had withdrawn all the 
money from their account.  Shelley begged for funds from his abandoned wife at the 
Westbrooks’ “stolid, bourgeois” home when no one in London would help the trio.
59
   
Their “gloomy little lodgings” on Church Terrace overlooked Wollstonecraft’s 
grave where Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin “often went to sit and read,” and perhaps to 
wonder if Shelley was more in love with her name than with her in all her complexity.
60
  
Surely, he loved her for her “exquisitely fashioned” mind, but troublingly he saw 
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himself as “possess[ing] this treasure.”
61
  Claire, as her stepsister Jane Clairmont had 
fashionably renamed herself, was becoming an unbearable burden and an intolerable 
presence in Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s view.  But Claire delighted Shelley with her 
levity and her susceptibility to his tales of terror.  Shelley was finally living his radical 
thought experiment of free love and had no intention of releasing either captive. 
Anxious that Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin should join him in practicing free 
love just as she had joined him in flouting the institution of marriage according to 
Godwin’s principles, Shelley encouraged the pregnant adolescent to have a sexual 
relationship with his university friend, Thomas Jefferson Hogg.
62
  While she became 
and remained close friends with Hogg, and scant evidence hints that she obeyed 
Shelley, her own words unfailingly suggest her discomfort with Shelley’s plurality 
schemes.
63
  While Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin could not understand how her father 
could fault her for practicing his principles, she could not well endure living Shelley’s 
communal “experiments” either.  Yet, perhaps it was this seventeen year-old girl’s 
sense that she had lost her father that pushed her to promise Shelley to “be a good girl & 
never vex [him] and to “learn Greek” just as Godwin would have wanted.
64
 
The trio fashioned themselves as socially conscious bohemians: refraining from 
consuming animals and sugar to protest the unethical treatment of non-human and 
human animals; moving from place to place in London to avoid creditors who had 
rented to them on Shelley’s family name; reading revolutionary texts; attending 
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incendiary lectures and poetry readings; and keeping only the most radical company.  
But the reality was that they were undernourished (children, in the case of the girls), 
anxious, and dogged by scandal.  Little wonder, then, that Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin’s daughter, Clara, was born two months prematurely and scarcely survived for 
eleven days, the same period of time Wollstonecraft survived after giving birth to 
Clara’s mother.  Neither is it surprising that Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin blamed 
herself for the baby’s death just as she blamed herself for her mother’s death and 
dreamed the dream of a child-mother “that it had only been cold & that we rubbed it by 
the fire & it lived.”
65
  
In an attempt to ease Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s devastation at having lost 
Clara, Shelley sent Claire off to Devon.  Some scholars speculate that Claire was 
pregnant and Shelley sent her away to hide the pregnancy from the grieving Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin.
66
  Whatever the actual case may be, Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin came out of her dark depression during Claire’s absence, reread Edmund 
Spenser’s The Faerie Queen and her father’s Fleetwood, wrote children’s stories 
(“Maurice” and “The Fisher’s Cot”),
 67
 and again dared to imagine Shelley as her 
“sweet elf” until he left her to check on Claire’s welfare.
68
 
During their residence at Bishopgate, a time Seymour says was characterized by 
“unconscious comedy and high earnestness,” Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin became an 
active participant in the philosophical, scientific, moral, and political debates of her 
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time.  When William Lawrence, the respected surgeon who had attended Clara’s birth, 
espoused scientifically racist theories about Africans, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin 
educated herself on the slave trade and became even more vehemently against it, but not 
vocally against Lawrence.
69
  While others mocked Lord Monboddo’s theory of a “lost 
simian civilization,” Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin found the underlying ideas 
fascinating.
70
  She studied to keep up with the classicists in her midst even while she 
managed to grow a garden in the city to better nourish her second pregnancy.  
The birth of William “Willmouse” Shelley in January of 1816 was not enough to 
warm Godwin’s heart to again allow Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin under his Skinner 
Street roof as she had hoped it would.  She was hurt by the injustice that Claire was 
permitted to see her mother in Godwin’s house, but motherless Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin was cut off from her father and scandalized by her stepmother’s relentless 
gossip.  Fanny, all the while, occupied the awful status of an illegitimate, unmarried 
daughter of marriageable age whom, like a good Miltonic daughter, copied Godwin’s 
cold, hurtful letters to Shelley demanding his promised financial support.
71
  Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin’s correspondence and journals during this time clearly show her 
resentment toward Fanny’s uneasy father-daughter relationship with Godwin. 
While the trio’s decision to go to Geneva, the “refuge of the English 
enlightenment in exile,” was most likely due to the rabid gossip that haunted them in 
England, Claire’s infatuation with George Gordon, Lord Byron, also self-exiled to 
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Geneva, may have also have influenced their decision to leave London.
72
  The pregnant 
Claire had met and had a sexual relationship with him in London a few months prior 
and could not see that “[her] mistake was to have fallen in love with the devil’s mask 
which hid a surprisingly old-fashioned Regency dandy.”
73
  Ignorant of the pregnancy 
and certainly of the possibility that Shelley had fathered Claire’s child, Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin dared to be hopeful and spent the “summer during which 
Frankenstein was conceived” learning Italian, marveling at powerful Alpine electrical 
storms, touring the sublime Alps, and mothering her beloved Willmouse.
74
  With Byron, 
John William Polidori, Byron’s personal physician and harassed houseguest, Shelley, 
and Claire, the “devout but nearly silent listener,” Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, spent 
many evenings discussing ideas and telling stories while nature, in pathetic fallacy, 
raged in the mountains and skies that overlooked blackened Lake Geneva.
75
  Inspired by 
readings of German ghost stories, Coleridge’s “Christabel,” interactions with sublime 
nature, discussions of galvanism, speculations on the origins of life, and experiences of 
guilt and exile, Byron challenged each of them to write a horror story.  Only Byron and 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin would fully develop the narratives sketched out during 
this time into full-length works: Manfred and Frankenstein.
76
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Claire’s pregnancy brought the trio back to England in September.  They settled 
in Bath where Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin attended the theater, lectures of the 
Literary and Philosophical Society, and a salon of sorts at the home of Mary and 
Thomas Peacock.
77
  Discussions at the Peacock’s suppers focused on issues of social 
and economic justice, especially the corn failure and subsequent famine of 1816.  While 
she learned of contemporary social, political, and economic ills, Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin could not see that her personal woes were symptomatic of those same ills.    
During this time, Fanny wrote Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin despairing letters to 
which she replied tersely.  Perhaps caring for Claire during her pregnancy hardened her 
to the plight of her half-sister.  When Fanny went missing in October after a “very 
alarming” letter, all assumed the “worst possible,” but Shelley had a particularly violent 
reaction to the news and “jumped up thrust his hand in [his] hair” and joined the 
search.
78
  Fanny’s body was found alone in an inn at Swansea, an apparent suicide by 
laudanum.
79
 A necklace of mysterious origin, a Swiss watch from Mary and Shelley, 
and her stocking stays, embroidered with her mother’s initials (MGW) and passed down 
to Fanny, were the only clues to the identity of this young woman.
80
  Godwin, in 
striking contrast to his reaction to Wollstonecraft’s death, insisted that Fanny be buried 
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in an unmarked grave so that in death she could realize the “obscurity she so much 
desired” in life.
 81
  Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s journals went suspiciously silent.   
Real tragedies and sensational gossip continued to interrupt Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin’s attempts to live a scholarly and private life, but during her 
transformation into Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley she sought solace in heavy artistic 
collaboration with Shelley.  As she wrote Frankenstein, the couple read Paradise Lost 
and speculated on Godwin’s thesis in Caleb Williams that members of our species are 
social animals and their exclusion from society leads to violent and criminal behaviors.  
But the horrors of reality again broke the spell of their study.  
The pregnant body of Harriet Westbrook Shelley “Smith” was found in the 
Serpentine River in London about six weeks after her initial drowning.
82
  It is unclear 
whether she took the name “Smith” because a man by that name had fathered her 
pregnancy or if she took it to protect her anonymity, but many biographers suggest that 
Shelley was the father of Harriet’s unborn child at the time of her suicide.
83
  
Indisputable, however, was the fact that Shelley wanted custody of Iathe and Charles, 
his two acknowledged children with Harriet, and Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin 
supported his suit.
84
  A desire to appear stable for the custody courts may have 
motivated Shelley to marry Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin on 30 December 1816 just 
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seventeen days after Harriet’s body was discovered.
85
  Godwin was in attendance.  She 
had been calling herself Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley for some time and “while 
indifferent enough to write the wrong date for the wedding in her diary, [she] took 
sedate pleasure in signing herself ‘Mary W. Shelley.’”
86
  She replaced Godwin’s name. 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin was now legally Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, but 
her educational metamorphosis was still in process.  Pregnant again, she continued to 
balance motherhood (caring for the temperamental Shelley must be included in her 
mothering), her studies, writing, Mozart concerts, visits to Lord Elgin’s “removals” at 
the British museum, and attending talks by Coleridge and others.
87
  While she finished 
Frankenstein and ran a busy household, Shelley studied and wrote work that focused 
more overtly on social, political, and economic justice, seemingly blind to those issues 
at home.  Shelley was virtually sainted by followers like Leigh and Marianne Hunt 
while Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, “a sedate faced young lady…with her great tablet 
of a forehead, and her white shoulders unconscious of a crimson gown” was the only 
one to take herself and the world very seriously.
88
  The nineteen year-old finished 
Frankenstein on 13 May 1817 and showed the manuscript to Godwin before adding the 
petulant, adamantine question from Book X of Milton’s Paradise Lost to the epigraph 
just under her dedication of the book to her father: “Did I request thee, Maker, from my 
clay / To mould me Man, did I solicit thee / From darkness to promote me?”
89
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None of Godwin’s contacts would agree to publish the controversial manuscript, 
but Shelley’s would.  Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin wisely kept the copyrights and 
allowed her “hideous progeny” to be published anonymously by Lackingtons, a 
publishing house known for its “cheap books.”
90
  In this, Shelley literally replaced 
Godwin as far as pushing for publication.  And much like Godwin, he missed the 
educational thought of Frankenstein.  Perhaps because it would damn him as much as 
the Milton quote would damn Godwin, Shelley refused to see that his ideas about 
education were Godwinian:  the environment created people, but people changed 
society and therefore could improve society and individual people.  At the same time, 
though, Shelley, like Godwin subscribed to “the fatality of heredity, appearance and 
temperament – and they seemed particularly interested in this in relation to women.”
91
  
Shelley would not have considered himself Godwinian or Frankensteinian at this stage, 
but Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s book certainly cast him as embodying contradiction.  
Her grateful references in the Preface to a “friend” who helped her novel come to life 
caused critics and readers to speculate that Shelley or Godwin actually wrote it.  Finally, 
in naming herself as the author, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, she owned her rejection 
of Godwin and his name even while she allowed herself to be subsumed in Shelley’s 
name.  But she kept the part of herself that was her mother’s daughter, Wollstonecraft. 
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley to Mary Shelley (1816-1851):  Posterity 
Perhaps Wollstonecraft’s scandals still clung to Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s 
new name despite having dropped Godwin and taken Shelley, making it difficult for her 
to remain in England.  More likely, though, it was the birth of Alba, Claire’s illegitimate 
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child with Byron, which provided the impetus the trio needed to move their household 
to Italy where Byron now lived.
92
  Too, after Shelley was denied custody of Ianthe and 
Charles in the midst of rumors he had fathered Alba, his health declined and Dr. 
Lawrence recommended the Italian climate.
93
  Amid London gossip and plans to move 
to Italy, Mary gave birth to her third child and named her Clara, after the daughter who 
had died in her arms only two years before.  
After christening Willmouse, Clara, and Alba (who Byron renamed Allegra), the 
trio set out for Milan in March of 1818 via Napoleon’s road from France to Switzerland, 
where they “suffered only the minor irritation of a temporary confiscation of the works 
of Rousseau and Voltaire…at the French border.”
94
  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley 
continued her program of study, reading Sir Walter Scott’s Rob Roy and Byron’s 
“Lara,” “The Corsair,” and “The Giaour” and attending the opera, plays, and mothering 
her children (including Shelley) and Allegra.  Byron refused to visit them in Milan and 
sent a messenger to retrieve the child, but Allegra was too ill to travel.  Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley knew if Allegra stayed, her mother Claire would stay, and she 
wanted Claire out of their house.  Against Shelley’s desire that they all live together, 
she arranged to have Allegra sent to Byron in Venice with the nurse, Elise Duvillard.
95
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With Allegra gone and Claire consoled by reports that Allegra, “dressed in little 
trousers trimmed with lace,” was being raised in Byron’s home “like a little princess,” 
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s social consciousness was raised in economically strained 
Pisa where she saw the anxiety of poverty and “chained gangs of prisoners.”
96
  In Italy, 
she was able to reacquaint herself with the strong, exiled women who had been her 
mother’s friends and her earliest caregivers, Margaret Mason (formerly Lady 
Mountcashell and Margaret Kingsborough) and Maria Gisborne.
97
   
Finally settling in Pisa near these friends and a university in Casa Bertini, Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley’s intellectual life flourished as she read Latin texts, Ben 
Johnson, and drafts of Shelley’s work.
98
  Godwin suggested that she write “a collection 
of short histories of leaders of the Commonwealth established by Oliver Cromwell after 
the execution of Charles I,” but Shelley discouraged her efforts as a biographer, 
preferring that she “write a tragic drama.”
99
  Godwin himself finally authored A History 
of the Commonwealth of England while Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley copied her 
husband’s translation of Plato’s Symposium.
100
    
This male coopting of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s talent, time, and desires 
must have seemed a petty disappointment in the light of letters they received from Elise 
begging to be rescued with Allegra from Byron’s house.  Shelley and Claire went to 
Venice to retrieve Elise and Allegra, and left Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley alone with 
the “terror” she always experienced at the prospect of Shelley’s leaving her, especially 
                                                          
96
 Miranda Seymour, Mary Shelley (New York:  Grove Press, 2000), 206. 
97
 Janet Todd, Daughters of Ireland (New York:  Random House, 2003), 297-8.  Maria Gisborne had 
been one of Godwin’s marriage interests. 
98
 Ibid, 209. 
99
 Ibid, 208. 
100
 She would eventually write Perkin Warbeck: A Romance (1830) as a historical fiction.  After Shelley’s 
death, she also published a great deal of serious scholarship including biographies and reviews. 
 61 
to “rescue” young women, and most especially when he left with Claire.
101
  This terror 
may well explain why she agreed to follow when Shelley summoned her to Venice to 
alleviate suspicion about his travelling alone with Claire, despite the fact that Clara was 
very ill with dysentery.  On 24 September 1818, in Este, a village outside of Venice, 
Clara died and “was buried on the lonely beach of the Lido” without a grave marker.
102
 
Later in autumn of the same year, the Shelleys and Claire became resident 
tourists in Rome.  By November, they were in Naples making pilgrimage to Virgil.  It 
was also in Naples where Shelley adopted and gave his name to his “Neapolitan 
‘charge’,” a baby named Elena Adelaide Shelley.
103
  While speculations abound, 
nothing in the extant source material is definitive as to this child’s parentage.  What is 
clear is that the day after registering the baby as the daughter of Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley and Percy Bysshe Shelley, the Shelley’s and Claire returned to Rome with 
Elena on 28 February 1819 where she died during the summer of 1820.
104
    
Amid rumors of Claire’s aborted pregnancy, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s 
actual pregnancy, Shelley’s melancholy poetry, and Willmouse’s illness, social events 
in Rome like receiving royalty and being presented to the Pope must have rung rather 
hollow in the tense, ill Shelley home.  Willmouse’s illness was eventually identified as 
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malaria.  It grew critical, and along with so many young children suffering in malarial 
southern Italy, the little boy died 7 June of 1819.
105
   
During this time, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley completely withdrew from the 
household and finished her mother’s The Cave of Fancy first as The Fields of Fancy and 
finally as the novella, Mathilda, the story of a father with incestuous desires for his 
daughter.
106
  Godwin was horrified and confiscated the manuscript his daughter sent 
him.
107
  While there is no evidence to suggest that Shelley read the manuscript, he 
surely appears in the novella as Woodville, a poet who unsuccessfully courts the 
suicidal Mathilda who holds herself responsible for the death of her father.   
News of the more that 500 peaceful demonstrators killed in the Peterloo 
Massacre on 16 August 1819 inspired Shelley’s “The Masque of Anarchy” (1819), but 
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s revolutionary zeal was darkened by an endless train of 
loss and she would later claim that Shelley’s revolutionary spirit had been long dead by 
1819, too.
108
  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley could not emerge from her grief over 
Willmouse’s death until Percy Florence Shelley was born on 12 November 1819.
109
  
After his birth, she began publically supporting revolutionaries in both Spain and 
Naples, but her domestic relations were chilly at best.
110
  Shortly after a visit from 
Margaret Mason from Pisa, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley moved her study to Mason’s 
villa.  On Mason’s advice, she had cordoned off a “room of her own” away from 
Shelley and Claire.  Eventually, though, Mason would favor Claire over Mary.  
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The Shelley’s friendship with Edward and Jane Williams that began in 1821, 
however, promised to be longer-lived.  Right from the beginning, Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley overlooked Jane’s duplicitousness and envied what she took to be her “simple” 
love for Edward.  And Shelley, too, compared his cold marriage to the Williams’s warm 
one and wrote rather cruel poems reproaching his frigid wife.
111
  Shelley’s spirits rose 
and his passion for sailing, all but left behind in the Geneva summer of 1816, was 
reignited by Edward’s love of sailing.  But the Byron-Claire-Allegra situation continued 
to complicate the Shelley’s lives.   
News that Byron had sent the four-year-old Allegra to live in the convent 
Bagnacavallo in Ravenna, brought Shelley and Claire to Allegra’s rescue and left Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley alone in Pisa, anxiously caring for baby Percy.  The result of 
their journey south was a new collaborative publishing venture for Shelley; a journal 
with Leigh Hunt and Byron called the Liberal.
112
  For this, Shelley would secure much 
larger lodgings in Pisa to accommodate the Hunts and Byron and his mistress, Teresa 
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  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley was pleased with the prospect of the their 
company and the assurance that Claire would be forced to leave their house.
114
 
Byron joined them at Pisa, but Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s moods continued 
to be dark.  The promise of reliving Geneva, 1816 was a failed promise.  She was no 
longer her father’s daughter, Mary Godwin, nor was she the Mary Godwin 
Wollstonecraft of 1816.  Her resentment-fueled marriage to Shelley made it difficult to 
claim his name, her only surviving child’s name, yet she could not seem to shed it.  She 
turned inward and read.  Most notably, she sullenly read “the Hist. of Shipwrecks” 
while Shelley and Edward Williams engineered a boat.  With the arrival of the 
“extraordinarily young…fun,” ex-naval recruit, Edward Trelawny, Shelley and Byron 
planned to test their vessel the following summer.
115
  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley was 
as taken with Trelawny and his stories as the others in her expatriate circle, and they 
built a friendship around their common interest in gothic literature.  Only Byron was 
skeptical of Trelawny’s “swashbuckling” tales of his seaworthy expertise.
116
  The 
stories thrilled Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, but Shelley’s sailing fantasies terrified her. 
And she began to feel unwelcome in Pisa.  She wanted to attend Protestant 
services in Pisa but the clergyman, Dr. John Nott, used Shelley’s atheism as a platform 
for an attack on atheism itself.
117
  Excluded from Nott’s circle, Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley turned back to social activities that orbited around Shelley.  Largely because of 
Shelley’s poetic presentation of himself as a “victim” of her coldness, however, even 
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their close friends rather maligned her.
118
  The final cause, though, of their move to the 
Villa Magni on the bay of Lerici was the news on 23 April 1822, that Allegra had died 
of typhus in the convent at Ravenna.
119
  The Shelleys agreed that the distraught Claire 
must be shuttled away from Byron for her own protection.    
The sublime setting of Villa Magni did indeed inspire terror and “visions” for 
Mary, during the early months of her fourth pregnancy.  From this isolated house, 
perched “above the surge of the sea” against the “rocky coast,” Mary entertained 
ideations of impending disaster and feared something terrible might befall baby 
Percy.
120
  Shelley, however, was smitten with the house and the bay, despite reporting 
hallucinations of a smiling, clapping little girl rising out of the sea, “nightmarish 
visions” of dead “sleepers” engaged in a “ghastly dance,” and “dreams” of his 
doppelgänger.
121
  In this sublimely gothic crucible, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley 
miscarried 16 June 1822.
122
   
Shelley and Edward Williams built their “new toy,” dubbed the Don Juan, 
extending its stem and stern and adding top-sails to give the illusion that it was longer 
and taller than Byron’s boat.
123
 Watching all of this construction and foolishness from 
the cold comfort of Villa Magni, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley became convinced that 
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the place itself caused her to miscarry and begged Shelley to return to Pisa.  During a 
visit with the Hunts to Pisa, Shelley wrote to Mary to tell her the family would stay on 
at Villa Magni and that he, Edward Williams, and a young sailor would soon set sail 
from Livorno to Lerici to join her.  The three set sail on 8 July in spite of a storm. 
When they did not appear by 11 July, Jane, Claire, and Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley began to worry.  Jane and Claire went to the Hunt’s house in Pisa to see Byron 
and Teresa before travelling on to Livorno to speculate about the Don Juan’s fate with 
Trelawny and Roberts, who held out impossible hope for its safe return.
124
  Returning to 
Lerici later that same morning, Jane Williams and Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley were 
still hopeful until the news that two bodies, later identified as Edward Williams and 
Charles Vivian, had washed ashore halfway between Livorno and Lerici, in Viareggio, 
on 18 July.  When another body surfaced, only the book of Keats’s poems in the pocket 
identified him to Trelawny as Percy Bysshe Shelley.
125
   
After his death, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley took a suicidal kind of solace in 
her belief that Shelley was always with her, teaching her to be “worthy to join him.”
126
  
She wanted him buried next to William in Rome, but Trelawny would have the final 
word on the ceremony.  He chose to have Shelley’s body covered in quicklime and 
burned on the Italian shore in a Pagan rite.  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley was not in 
attendance, but witnesses marveled at the supernatural flames that leapt from Shelley’s 
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“transcendent, not quite human” funeral pyre.
127
  None seemed to know that the 
chemical properties of quicklime cause it to glow with incandescence at high 
temperatures.  Finally, the Shelleyan myth, rather than the reality, became the matter. 
For Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, it was her guilt over her publically reknowned 
coldness that was to be the legacy of her life with Shelley thanks in large part to 
Shelley’s poetry and correspondence as well as to Trelawny’s flawed biography of 
Shelley.  While she did fight Trelawny for Shelley’s heart, snatched in gothic glory 
from the funeral pyre, she could not stem the tide of resentment against her, nor did she 
seem to want to thwart the proposed canonization of Shelley’s sainthood by speaking 
her truth.
128
  However, in a letter to her mother’s dear friend, Maria Gisborne, dated 17 
September 1822, her tone is resentful, blaming Shelley, her “own beloved, and exalted 
& divine Shelley,” for having “left [her] alone in this miserable and hateful world.”
129
   
 The poles of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s educational metamorphosis into 
Mary Shelley were, on the one hand, her desperate attempts to use her mother’s name to 
regain acceptance from her radical circle despite Trelawny’s smear campaign, and on 
the other, her desperate attempts to use her husband’s name to attain some measure of 
respectability that would insure Sir Timothy Shelley’s acknowledgement of his 
grandson, Percy Shelley.  The embittered, guilt-driven twenty-four year-old widow set 
about devoting the remainder of her life to securing the legacies of both Percys.  In “the 
last story I shall have to tell,” Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley assures Gisborne that with 
“all that might have been bright in my life…now despoiled,” she “shall live to improve 
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myself, to take care of my child, and render myself worthy to join him [Shelley].”
130
  
But Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s educational metamorphosis into Mary Shelley 
would take place over the remainder of her life. 
Living under Byron’s protection as his “fair copyist” during the period 
immediately following Shelley’s death, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s journal entries 
suggest that she succumbed to Byron’s uncanny “power…of exciting such deep & 
shifting emotions.”
 131
  When confronted by Teresa’s jealousy, however, she marveled 
at anyone who could be jealous of a “living corpse.”
132
  With Byron and Hogg’s help, 
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley and Jane Williams joined the Hunts in Genoa while Claire 
carried on a brief affair with Trelawny.
 133
  Amid copying Byron’s endless “Cantos”; 
writing for The Liberal; unearthing and copying Shelley’s unpublished writing; 
beginning work on Shelley’s biography; and finishing her novel, Valperga,
134
 Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley taught her son, Percy.  Again in Godwin’s good graces, 
ostensibly because of her attempts to support herself through her writing (although he 
suggested she pursue the more popular vein of travel writing), she asked him to send her 
a copy of her mother’s Lessons from which she took Percy’s curriculum.
135
     
Regardless of her relative independence, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley was 
impoverished.  After Byron met with Sir Timothy on her behalf to convince him to help 
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support his widowed daughter-in-law and his grandson Percy, Sir Timothy agreed to 
support Percy if Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley agreed to surrender him to the Shelley 
estate.
136
  Despite Byron’s urging her to relinquish Percy, she insisted on keeping him 
while redoubling her efforts to appease Sir Timothy.  Between Byron’s leaving Italy to 
fight for Greek independence and Jane’s betrayal in gossiping about her troubled 
marriage, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley planned her return to England.
 137
     
During the summer of 1823, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley returned to England 
by way of France where she stayed a short time with the Smiths and the Kenneys, old 
revolutionary friends of her parents (and not admirers of the “new” Mrs. Godwin).
138
  
She was thrilled to report in a letter to the Hunts that “Mrs. K[enney] says that I am 
grown very like my Mother, especially in Manners – in my way of addressing people – 
this is the most flattering thing anyone cd say to me.  I have tried to please them, & 
have hopes that I have succeeded.”
139
  Both the Smiths and the Kenneys, far more 
partial to Wollstonecraft than to Godwin, warned Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley that she 
would find England a very difficult place, but she dared to refuse her exile, took her 
first steamboat voyage, and arrived a “famous” prodigal in London, August of 1823.  
Her fame came not from the novel Frankenstein, but from the sensational stage 
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production, Presumption, or the Fate of Frankenstein.
140
  She attended the amusingly 
warped version of her novel with her brother, William, Jane, and her father.  
Over the five years Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley spent in Italy, London had 
clothed itself in the ultra-modern raiment of empire and transformed into “an urban 
Arcadia for the wealthy.”
141
  She felt like a stranger in this “city of the future.”
142
  Thus, 
she and little Percy settled with Jane in a Kentish Town that had gone from a sleepy 
village to a suburb, and she began writing her apocalyptic novel, The Last Man.
143
 
The enduring animosity between Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley and her 
stepmother Mrs. Godwin made it difficult to return to her father’s London, but the sixty-
seven year-old Godwin was very pleased to have the “curator of his reputation” in close 
range.
144
  Beyond her value to Godwin’s intellectual legacy, reconciliation between 
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley and Sir Timothy would mean the financial security 
Godwin desperately craved.  She felt obliged to support her father, but held out little 
hope of securing an allowance from Sir Timothy during her lifetime or an inheritance 
for Percy.  However, Sir Timothy did agree to give her an annual pittance of £200 if she 
agreed not to publish a Shelley biography or to use his name, her hard-won surname, in 
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any of her published works.
145
  She agreed.  This precarious agreement would haunt 
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley until Sir Timothy’s death in 1844. 
Somehow, she kept her private sense of humor while publically performing the 
part of an “elegant, sickly, and young” widow, devoted to the memory of Shelley and 
the future prospects of Percy, even while she entertained various suitors.
146
  In 
particular, organist Vincent Novello, educated Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley in the 
oratorio of Haydn’s The Creation.
147
  But when news came that Byron had died of 
malaria in April of 1824, Mary sank into another depression and resigned herself to 
follow the “immortals” into an early grave after immortalizing their lives and work.
148
  
Because of Sir Timothy’s mandate, however, she could not openly publish her 
biographical and editorial work.  Plenty of others were free to “research” and publish 
this material, however.  Disturbing her quiet Kentish Town life of scholarship and 
caretaking in Kentish Town, “friends” like Trelawny and Thomas Medwin sought Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley’s intimate biographical knowledge of these immortals beyond 
what they only vaguely knew.  She finally agreed to help Thomas Moore, a poet and 
scholar with whom she was romantically attached, but Medwin “scooped” Moore and 
published Byron’s biography in the fall of 1824.
149
  Shelley was relegated to a footnote 
in Byron’s life and Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley was completely absent.  
She stayed current on the state of social, political, and economic crises on a local 
and global scale, watching Parliamentary debates and corresponding with radical 
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friends, but she must have felt a victim of the very system she critiqued.  Constantly 
plagued by financial anxieties, focused on future success for Percy and survival for 
Godwin, when The Last Man was published in 1825, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley 
desperately needed the novel to be successful.  It was not.  To make matters worse, Sir 
Timothy suspended her meager allowance until his grandson and heir, Harriet’s son, 
Charles Shelley, died in September of 1826.
150
  Percy was now the only surviving heir 
to the Shelley fortune, and while Sir Timothy did increase Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley’s yearly allowance by £50, he was chronically late in remittance.
151
  Seymour 
claims that “Sir Timothy’s punitive attitude had by this time given Mary a terror of 
seeing her name in print; every time the words ‘Mrs Shelley’ appeared, she could be 
sure that her allowance would be withheld until she begged forgiveness.”
152
  Financial 
insecurity and the betrayal of friends guided her final metamorphosis.   
Jane Williams moved out of the home she shared with Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley and moved in with Thomas Jefferson Hogg, becoming his common-law wife.  
This betrayal was particularly painful to Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley who considered 
herself “wedded to Jane” and found Hogg despicable.
153
  Heartbroken, in 1827, Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley moved to Sompting on the southern coast of England.  Here, she 
turned her attentions to helping a young woman and her illegitimate daughter escape to 
France with her transgendered lover to live their unconventional domestic arrangement 
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  All the while, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley edited Shelley’s work, wrote 
for ladies annuals, and researched her historical novel Perkin Warbeck (1830).   
Acknowledging the influence of her parents and her husband in an 1827 letter, 
Mary Shelley discloses the burden and blessing of her legacy and metamorphoses:   
The memory of my Mother has been always been the pride and delight of my 
life; & the admiration of others for her, has been the cause of most of the 
happiness [of my life] I have enjoyed.  Her greatness of soul & my father high 
talents have perpetually reminded me that I ought to degenerate as little as I 
could from those from whom I derived my being.  For several years with M’ 
Shelley I was blessed with the companionship of one, who fostered this 
ambition & inspired that of being worthy of him.  He who was single among 
men for Philanthropy – devoted generosity – talent & goodness.  –yet you must 
not fancy that I am what I wish I were, and my chief merit must always be 
derived, first from the glory these wonderful beings have shed [? around] me, & 
then for the enthusiasm I have for excellence & the ardent admiration I feel for 
those who sacrifice themselves for the public good” (my emphasis).
155
   
On the eve of Victoria’s long reign, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley was optimistic about a 
republican ethos in France led by a new progressive king, Louis Philippe, and hoped 
English children, too, would “live to see a new birth for the world!”
156
  She did not 
seem to think that an English republic was possible in her lifetime, however, and her 
final two novels, Lodore (1835) and Falkner (1837), reveal this skepticism.  Politically 
aligned with the Independents’ domestic policy, she surreptitiously advocated for the 
removal of forces in Ireland, lower taxes on the poor, and a reformed system of national 
education.  Regarding international policy, she supported the Independents’ call to 
abolish slavery globally.  She travelled extensively, returning to the now-Romanticized 
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European destinations of memory.
157
  But she grew disillusioned by the day-to-day 
reality of her own precarious domestic arrangements. 
After her younger brother William Godwin died of cholera before his thirtieth 
birthday, Mary Shelley clung more intensely to her son, Percy, and began making 
arrangements beyond her means for his schooling.  When advised by a radical friend 
that Percy ought to be taught to think independently, it was Mary Shelley, not Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley, that cynically remarked, “Teach him to think for himself?  Oh, 
my God, teach him rather to think like other people!”
158
  She sent Percy to Harrow and 
then to Cambridge.  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley had paid an exorbitant price for her 
education, and in the end, it seemed she wished to protect her son from the weight of 
her parent’s legacy and have him inherit only the titled name of his father’s legacy.   
Throughout the remainder of her life, though, she did travel with the thoroughly 
modern and bourgeois Percy and “attempt[] to enrich his mind.”  Four years after Percy 
inherited the baronetcy upon Sir Timothy’s death in 1844, he married Jane Gibson St. 
John, by all accounts a caring, “simple” woman who worshipped Mary Shelley.
159
 Sir 
Percy Florence Shelley and Lady Shelley would tenaciously defend Mary Shelley’s 
memory, likely destroying letters and journals that recorded the most unsavory details.  
They had learned well from Mary Shelley what it meant to preserve a legacy. 
When Mary Shelley’s father William Godwin died in 1836 at the age of 80, 
Mary Shelley turned again to the treacherous Trelawny to make arrangements to have 
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him buried next to Wollstonecraft.
160
  She never forgave her stepmother and effectively 
wrested all spousal rights from Mary-Jane Clairmont Godwin after Godwin’s death, 
remaining estranged from her and from Claire for the remainder of her life.  Even as she 
edited and published a new, mythic edition of Shelley’s works, she dutifully 
immortalized Godwin’s life in Monody on the Death of William Godwin.
161
  It remained 
to Sir Percy and Lady Jane Shelley to shape the version of Mary Shelley for posterity.  
At the age of 53, Mary Shelley died from a brain tumor, on 1 February 1851 
having produced a substantial oeuvre that could have sustained her financially, but it 
was Percy’s welfare and future that preoccupied her all of his life.  As Mellor says, after 
she felt sure “that her son was financially secure and emotionally happy, Mary Shelley 
lost the will to live” and followed the “immortals” of her memory into death.
162
  Sir 
Percy and Lady Jane had the bodies of Wollstonecraft and Godwin exhumed and 
reburied in Bournemouth with Mary Shelley and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s heart, “leaving 
the second Mrs. Godwin ignobly behind.”
163
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CHAPTER II 
Mary Shelley’s Lived Experience as Monstrous Miseducation 
Copious biographical research and literature on Mary Shelley makes clear that 
the tale of her life is both critical and symptomatic of a problem theorized by 
philosopher of education Jane Roland Martin:  “cultural miseducation.”  Cultural 
miseducation involves the generational transmission of “cultural stock” that includes 
items that might be valued as “cultural liabilities” and those that might be valued as 
“cultural wealth.”  By preserving cultural liabilities and/or losing items of cultural 
wealth, “societies…become sadly miseducative.”
1
  Arguably, all cultural miseducation 
is “deeply gendered,” but Mary Shelley’s cultural miseducation was surely of a deeply 
gendered variety that is suggestive of the subspecies of cultural miseducation I have 
theorized from her lived experience:  monstrous miseducation.
2
   
Troublingly, Mary Shelley’s miseducation, like her thought experiment 
Frankenstein, is emblematic of what Donna Haraway calls the “masculinist 
reproductive dream” – a dream of creative authorship, in the sense of authority and 
autonomy.
3
  Premised on “hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities,”
4
 this dream, 
Haraway argues, has enabled the very real “traditions of ‘Western’ science and politics 
– racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the 
appropriation of nature as resource for the productions of culture; [and] the tradition of 
reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other.”
 5
  With Carolyn Korsmeyer, 
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Haraway argues that the qualitatively gendered and quantitatively ranked concepts, 
frameworks, and approaches of art and science constitute “a border war” in which the 
stakes “have been the territories of production, reproduction, and imagination.”
6
  When 
those boundaries are crossed or blurred, “the transcendent authorization of 
interpretation is lost, and with it the ontology grounding Western epistemology.”
7
  Mary 
Shelley’s lived experience tells the story of an unstable being within a world that 
sometimes does not play by its own patriarchal rules.  Along with unprecedented access 
to some of the most radical thought of the Enlightenment Era, Mary Shelley inherited 
deeply gendered cultural liabilities much older and more deeply rooted than the modern 
project to which her biographers and critics so often bind her.  This dubious inheritance 
informs the core features of monstrous miseducation. 
In the previous chapter, I unpacked the biographers’ ideologically freighted 
name of choice, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley, showing how it typographically 
represents changes undergone by this individual, changes Martin would attribute to her 
encounters with items of cultural stock that in turn became “yoked” to her “individual 
capacities.”
8
  The educational component that biographers miss and Martin catches goes 
further, though, to say that alongside the individual, the culture undergoes changes, 
changes brought about by education’s “making and shaping” power.  By the same 
token, miseducation is imbued with the power to affect change that unmakes and 
misshapes individuals and cultures.  It would seem that Mary Shelley’s lifeline, located 
in context, is most properly conceptualized as a series of looping encounters and 
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exchanges rather than as a progressive linear ascension.  Her lived experience, then, is 
not a bildung, which may well have been seen as problematic at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, and arguably, at the turn of the twenty-first.  Despite being a 
daughter of radical revolutionaries who surely believed in Enlightenment promises, 
Mary Shelley’s lived experience amounts to a deeply gendered narrative of declension 
and loss, troubling modernity’s myths of progress and gain.  Her “coming of age” did 
not fit the naturalized, essentialist trajectory of bildung.  Too, she never quite satisfied 
the super-naturalized, exceptionalist promise of genius.   
In large part, Western culture, too, believed in the failed promises of revolution 
(genius) and modernity (bildung) and begets the disillusioned, disaffected children of 
monstrous miseducation.  Thus, it is from Mary Shelley’s lived experience against the 
backdrop of a revolutionary era that I begin my formulation of monstrous 
miseducation’s core features: Miltonic identity politics and their essentialism and 
exceptionalism; Godwinian perfectibility
9
 and its paternalism and uneven 
development;
10
 and abandonment to multiple educational agency
11
 and its “techno-
scientific” productivity
12
 and gothic sublimity.
13
  As important as the core features that 
are present in monstrous miseducation are those that are absent: Susan Laird’s maternal 
teaching as the “circulation of gifts”
14
 and maternal teachings
15
 with their focus on love 
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and survival such that we might imagine sustainable, “rational hopes of futurity”
16
 and 
Haraway’s cyborg affinity politics with their focus on alliances and hybridity.
17
  
Miltonic Identity Politics as Monstrous Miseducation:  Essentialism and 
Exceptionalism 
Wollstonecraft was in the second trimester of her pregnancy with Mary Shelley 
when Godwin gave his daughter his surname at the secret marriage ceremony, on 29 
March 1797, at St. Pancras’ church, London. The same year he gave her his name, 
Godwin published a series of essays in a radical periodical, The Enquirer.  These widely 
circulated essays dealt with a range of subject matter, but focused prominently on 
education, specifically on “awakening the mind” of the immature learner.  Published 
four years before these essays, his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) had 
gained Godwin notoriety as a public intellectual and a rabidly loyal readership.  
Arguing that “government is antithetical to enlightenment” and that “‘perfectibility’ 
[that is, ‘perpetual improvement’ or continual progress toward intellectual and moral 
perfection] is one of the most unequivocal characteristics of the human species,” 
Political Justice suggests Godwin’s ideological leanings and indeed reinforces the truth 
that any political, social, and moral economy has profound educational implications.
18
  
But it was in The Enquirer essays written on the eve of Mary Shelley’s birth that 
Godwin explicitly laid out his educational philosophy.   
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Godwin begins his first essay on education by defining education as a “moral 
process” whose “true” end “is the generation of happiness.”
19
  Looking forward to Mary 
Shelley’s birth, he argues the masculinist dream of genius, saying a father’s first 
responsibility to a child is “to awaken his mind” and “to breathe a soul into the, as yet, 
unformed mass.”
20
  The “higher” mind and soul come from the father’s breath while the 
“lower” body is an “unformed mass” produced by the mother.  Expectant father 
Godwin, who by his own admission “become[s] Milton” when he “read[s] Milton,” 
surely adopts a Miltonic tone as he theorizes the origin and formation of genius:
21
 
…the first indications of genius ordinarily disclose themselves at least as early, 
as at the age of five years. As far therefore as genius is susceptible of being 
produced by education, the production of it requires a very early care….  [t]he 
infant comes into our hands a subject, capable of certain impressions and of 
being led on to a certain degree of improvement. His mind is like his body. 
What at first was cartilage, gradually becomes bone. Just so the mind acquires 
its solidity; and what might originally have been bent in a thousand directions, 
becomes stiff, unmanageable and unimpressible.
22
 
The “production” of genius, for Miltonic Godwin, is an intentional process with 
predictable results in the hands of a skilled “preceptor.”  According to his “progressive” 
educational philosophy, the task of developing the infant’s capacities for 
“improvement” before “the mind acquires its solidity” would land squarely in the 
intentional hands of the individual creative geniuses into which his genius baby would 
fall.  Godwin’s progressive mindset cannot fathom that the change brought about by 
education as “a maker and shaper of individuals and cultures” can come from 
unintentional encounters with culture as curriculum and have unintentional 
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consequences that might be “for the worse.”
23
  Indeed, Godwin’s contribution to 
educational thought is informed by and informs what Martin terms the “deep structure 
of educational thought,” Western claims and conclusions about teaching as intentional, 
learning as voluntary, curricula as virtuous, and “education as the achievement of 
knowledge and understanding” without acknowledging the critical importance of “the 
acquisition of feelings and emotions, passions and actions.”
24
  In good Miltonic form, 
Godwin sees education, and certainly the “production” of genius, as a process 
undergone by an individual at the hands of another individual and does not 
acknowledge the reciprocal making and shaping (unmaking and misshaping) power of 
multiple educational agency.  Unsurprisingly, Godwin never mentions the loss, 
confusion, and alienation that accompany the educational metamorphoses of a singular 
genius born of singular geniuses about which he waxes Miltonic.        
 Although she certainly lived the experience of loss endemic to educational 
metamorphoses, Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley’s lost mother, never directly treated loss 
as part and parcel to educational metamorphoses either.  But she must have objected to 
Godwin’s educational philosophy on other grounds.  Much better known in 
contemporary circles for her overt philosophical inquiry into education, Wollstonecraft 
must have wondered at the general absence of girls and women in Godwin’s rhetoric. 
As the author of a treatise that stands as “the English-speaking world’s first widely read 
argument for women’s full independence and citizenship,” A Vindication of the Rights 
of Woman (1792), Mary Shelley’s mother must have found Godwin’s lack of 
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  Indeed, she might well have found those gaps 
culturally miseducative, despite the fact that, as Laird points out, the Early Modern 
idiom had no such descriptor.  One of the “central educational concepts” Laird 
identifies in Rights of Woman, “the Divine Right of Kings and its corollary conception 
of women’s ‘sexual character’” stands as a clear case of cultural miseducation and 
surely points to the essentialism of Miltonic identity politics.
26
  Mary Shelley’s genius 
birthright was fixed to the essential and exceptional stars of her genius parentage, in 
Godwin’s estimation.  Indeed, his rhetoric of Miltonic essentialism and exceptionalism 
falls under the educational concept of, “monarchist miseducation.”
27
   
Wollstonecraft’s view of education was looking beyond individual 
transformations to a larger cultural landscape marred by bourgeois, late eighteenth-
century essentialist concepts of femininity and masculinity.  But Wollstonecraft was 
chiefly concerned with the material injustices of her time: the cultural liability of overt 
sex discrimination.  The workings of Korsmeyer’s “deep gender” in the monstrous 
miseducation of men and women remained invisible in Wollstonecraft’s polemics likely 
because she was preoccupied with confronting the everyday, material injustices women 
and girls suffered in the large and small scale “educational realm” of the late eighteenth-
century.
28
  When the curriculum proper was so openly sexist (surely informed by 
Miltonic identity politics and the cultural liabilities of essentialism and exceptionalism), 
the hidden terror curriculum of deeply gendered monstrous miseducation stayed hidden.  
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For all of its “enlightened anarchism,” Godwin’s deeply gendered educational 
thought traffics in conceptual language that reproduces exceptionalist narratives of 
genius and essentialist narratives of bildung that are part and parcel to the terror 
curriculum.  It is difficult to imagine that Wollstonecraft would not have objected in 
some substantive way to the monstrously miseducative underpinnings of Godwin’s 
work, especially in its possible consequences for imminent Mary Shelley, but she would 
not live long enough to craft a proper rebuttal. 
Wollstonecraft’s death on 10 September 1797 of blood poisoning contracted 
quite literally at the hands of her surgeon and figuratively by deeply gendered cultural 
liabilities of monstrous miseducation.  When the placenta did not immediately follow 
the baby into the world, Godwin brought in a “man-midwife” and physician whose 
unhygienic practice poisoned Wollstonecraft’s blood.
29
  A terrified Godwin simply 
could not resist the prevailing cultural liabilities of a Miltonic identity politics dictated 
by a medical science and its terror curriculum.  Going against Wollstonecraft’s own 
wisdom in these matters, in his panic, Godwin rejected an item of cultural wealth 
Wollstonecraft had circulated during her tenure as governess to Margaret King of the 
Anglo-Irish Kingsborough family.
30
  As Lady Mary Mountcashell, the once-spoiled girl 
under Wollstonecraft’s tutelage, would publish a treatise (1833) advising women 
against “the prejudice” that leads a birth attendant “to bring away either the child, or its 
appendages” in an “artificial” manner.
31
  What is “natural” with regard to childbirth, 
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according to Wollstonecraft and Mountcashell after her, varies from one woman to 
another and tampering with these natural rhythms and processes has devastating 
consequences.
32
  In his terror at Wollstonecraft’s bedside, Godwin listened to the 
Miltonic voice “reason” – the physician’s orders.  He authorized the surgical removal of 
“the placenta piece by piece,” forced Wollstonecraft to drink red wine, and allowed a 
litter of puppies to nurse the “excess” milk from her breasts.
33
  Godwin’s connections to 
and his investment in the miracles of modern medicine amounted to a cultural liability, 
a terror curriculum that cast a long, monstrously miseducative shadow on mothers and 
their children.  The lost cultural wealth in Wollstonecraft’s portfolio and the imposed 
cultural liability in Godwin’s portfolio proved deadly for Wollstonecraft.  Under a 
“strange star” first identified by Caroline Herschel, incidentally the Kingsborough 
family’s “Assistant Astronomer,” Mary Shelley “from great parents sprung” and “dared 
to boast/Fortune my friend.”
34
  Herschel’s “star” would prove less than auspicious to the 
twenty-five year-old widow who wrote those lines. 
Very early on Mary Shelley’s educational metamorphoses were characterized by 
the loss associated with deeply gendered culture crossings that alienated her from what 
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Laird names “maternal teaching.”
35
  Laird’s maternal teaching is “an educating task and 
achievement which occurs in a variety of social contexts outside the context of 
schooling…that does not simply reproduce the injustices” of an oppressive, normative 
sense of the maternal ideal that saddles mothers with a majority of mystified and 
devalued childrearing tasks.  Neither does maternal teaching comply with a 
“universalist,” “value-free,” Socratic teaching ideal that reduces what “counts” as 
teaching to “value laden” academic contexts.
36
  Rather, maternal teaching demonstrates 
to children the “habits fundamental to the art of learning love and survival” so that they 
might learn to love and survive in an indifferent and often hostile modern world.
37
  It 
accomplishes this through the transmission and circulation of cultural wealth while 
taking stock of cultural liabilities to minimize the likelihood of cultural miseducation:   
…sharing experiences with each other, thinking aloud about them in the 
retelling, risking and taking honest criticism, helping each other along with 
encouragement and praise, recognizing explicitly what each has learned through 
daily difficulties and triumphs, applying a playful and imaginative spirit to the 
hardest learning tasks of all: such as overcoming humiliation, disappointment, 
shyness, vanities, raging tempers, laziness, spitefulness, selfishness.
38
  
The pragmatic test of maternal “teaching achievement,” Laird argues, is a child’s 
“growing capacity and responsibility for learning to love and to survive despite their 
conflicts, pains, and troubles, most especially their mothers’ absence” (Laird’s 
emphasis).
39
  Despite the legacy of maternal teachings and cultural wealth left behind 
explicitly and implicitly in her mother’s educational thought, Mary Shelley cannot be 
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said to have learned the habits of heart that could enable her to survive conflict, pain, 
and trouble in her mother’s absence.  If it is to be valued as an item of cultural wealth, 
love must mean more than desire, dependence, and/or patronage.  Similarly, survival 
must mean something beyond that of “bare life” in the sense Giorgio Agamben insists is 
the “the very model of political power,” of sovereign violence that sees survival as 
“[n]ot simple natural life, but life exposed to death.”
40
  For Mary Shelley, this void of 
maternal teaching and teachings often amounted to living Agamben’s bare life.  
 Although she does not name them as such, Wollstonecraft theorizes maternal 
teaching and teachings in her educational thought.  Despite his avowed purpose to 
educate Wollstonecraft’s two daughters according to their mother’s principles of 
maternal teaching and teachings, Godwin could not make them conform to his own 
philosophy and therefore could not practice them in earnest.  Echoed in a letter from 
Lady Mountcashell to Godwin shortly after Wollstonecraft’s death, the aim of 
Wollstonecraft’s maternal teaching and teachings (like her own) was to educate children 
“as early as possible to think for themselves” toward the end of making them “happy 
and virtuous.”
41
  In other words, the principle aim of educating children to live in a 
world in which suffering and disappointment abound ought to be teaching them the 
habits of heart and mind to survive in and to love that world and those within it.  In 
principle, perhaps Godwin agreed with maternal teaching and teachings.  In reality, 
Godwin often left Wollstonecraft’s daughters in the care of a succession of her loyal 
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  In reality, Godwin often shut himself away in the room where the portrait of 
Wollstonecraft hung, the room that had been Wollstonecraft’s study.  In reality, the 
grieving Godwin was emotionally unavailable to Fanny Imlay and Mary Shelley.  In 
reality, Godwin’s monstrous miseducation could not suffer an alternative narrative.   
But perhaps Godwin did not agree practically or philosophically with the 
maternal teaching and teachings within Wollstonecraft’s principles for educating girls 
and women.  Surely for this financially panicked father of two girls, providing them an 
expensive formal education may have struck Godwin as frivolous.  After all, “[‘t]ill the 
softer sex has produced a Bacon, a Newton, a Hume or a Shakspeare [sic],” Godwin 
remained skeptical as to the value of educating girls and women beyond the needlework 
and smattering of French that bourgeois girls and women received.
43
  Miltonic Godwin 
speaks of “sublimest genius” when praising “the poets” (male) and uses a language of 
transcendence and singularity that would seem to contradict his ideal of a naturally 
“unfolding” individual (male) character.
44
  Further, he insists that it is the individual 
(male) who shapes the political economy, not the other way around. Godwin adored 
Mary Shelley’s mother and her self-educated wit, but his own essentialist and 
exceptionalist educational thought would ironically exclude Wollstonecraft and her 
daughters from the realm of genius and from the province of makers and shapers.     
In contrast to the maternal teaching and teachings of Wollstonecraft’s 
educational thought, Godwin narrowly defined education as a process of training the 
mind of an individual subject – a strictly intellectual enterprise isolated from the 
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emotional, the physical, and the cultural surround.  It suggests that Godwin’s practical 
methodology and philosophical predilections were both overtly sexist and deeply 
gendered, laboring under Martin’s deep structures of educational thought. 
Doubtless, Godwin admired Wollstonecraft, but whether he understood her 
educational thought is another question entirely.  Perhaps Godwin’s own thought on the 
subject eclipsed his understanding of her work.  It could be, too, that he did not bother 
to understand Wollstonecraft’s educational thought.  After all, he inherited deeply 
gendered cultural liabilities along with cultural wealth.  Invested as he was in the flawed 
deep structures of education, Godwin’s own monstrous miseducation might well have 
caused him to misunderstand his encounters with maternal teaching and teachings in 
Wollstonecraft’s work and the cultural stock that became yoked to his capacities may 
not have included learning how to love and survive in a complex and troubling world.
45
 
As much as any one of so many fine minds of his generation, Godwin was a 
man of his time and place – himself, both a maker and shaper of individuals and 
cultures and made and shaped by individuals and culture.  Surely he saw himself and his 
curriculum of enlightened anarchism as contributing to cultural wealth, but it is unlikely 
that he saw himself and his curriculum as made and shaped by encounters with items of 
cultural stock.  He certainly saw himself as “fitted” for recognizing and developing 
genius.  Fancying himself a genius, Godwin believed he knew the educational needs 
and desires of genius.  But the educational sense of genius contains a built-in 
contradiction that Wollstonecraft exposed:  the radical self-sufficiency of genius “will 
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  Genius, a rather dubious educational concept of the terror curriculum, 
while it is used in educational contexts, is not an educational project.  However, the 
rhetoric of genius may well amount to a miseducational project – a curriculum that 
amounts to a cultural liability.  In Godwin’s view: 
The capacity which it is in the power of education to bestow, must consist 
principally in information. Is it to be feared that a man should know too much 
for his happiness? Knowledge for the most part consists in added means of 
pleasure or enjoyment, and added discernment to select those means.
47
   
Godwin was rationally discerning and selective indeed, but “when the wild cries of 
baby Mary fill the house, threatening to shatter the glass in the windows, [he] 
succumb[ed] to unreasoning panic.”
48
  And as baby Mary cried for a week following 
Wollstonecraft’s funeral, he wrote Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights 
of Woman in her Polygon study that he now occupied.  Godwin published his memoirs 
of Wollstonecraft’s life not even a full year after her death and told a tale that rather 
besmirched the intellectual and moral reputation she had enjoyed in diverse circles 
during her life.
49
  The work he wrote as an unflinchingly honest and loving tribute was 
received as a licentious, celebrity tell-all.
50
   
 Godwin never acknowledged that one could indeed “know too much for his own 
happiness” and made public his knowledge of Wollstonecraft’s private failure to 
conform to the manners, if not the morals, of the Georgian middle class lady.
51
  Even 
those sympathetic to Wollstonecraft’s lived experiment in “revolutionary self-
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education” found some of the details Godwin included to be shockingly contrary to the 
zeitgeist of classical liberalism:  rational progress toward enlightened independence.
52
  
Generations to come might read Godwin’s retrospective on Wollstonecraft’s suicide 
attempts and love affairs as an accidental pièce de résistance to the deeply gendered and 
overtly misogynistic modern project, but Mary Shelley learned to read those memoirs as 
her own monstrous creation myth.  Knowledge of her own “illegitimate” origins might 
well have made her cling to her father’s name and shun the half-sister with whom she 
would have to share it.  
Godwinian Perfectibility as Monstrous Miseducation:  Paternalism and Uneven 
Development 
After Wollstonecraft died giving birth to Mary, Godwin legally adopted Fanny.  
From his correspondence, it is clear he and Fanny were fond of each other, but he only 
moved to give Fanny his name after Wollstonecraft’s sisters, Everina Wollstonecraft 
and Eliza Bishop, offered to raise the “orphaned” child with them in Ireland according 
to their mother’s wishes.
53
  Some of Godwin’s most impassioned promises to deploy 
Wollstonecraft’s ideas and methods in raising her daughters sprang from his desire to 
keep them from their relatively independent aunts.  In denying their claim to Fanny, 
Godwin appealed to his own essentialist educational thought, reasoning that blood 
relation “is of no consequence” in determining what arrangements are in the best 
interests of a child “when it has once been ascertained that the child will receive greater 
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benefit by living under the superintendence of a stranger.”
54
  Perhaps Godwin genuinely 
believed that his keeping and raising Fanny would afford her the “greater benefit,” but it 
is also clear that he found the task a daunting one that defied the reason upon which his 
world-view was built.  For Godwin, the needs of little girls must have seemed vast and 
mysterious.   
For like the cries of baby Mary, the “spirits and animation” of the four-year-old 
Fanny broke Godwin’s concentration.  Frequently, he had to “curb [his] temper” when 
she demanded his attention beyond the “stated hours.”
55
  While he speaks of  “the 
genius of education” having been “disheartened and unnerved by the pretense that man 
is born all that it is possible for him to become,”
56
 by all accounts Godwin did not 
believe Fanny possessed the essential intellectual promise or capacity of his biological 
daughter, Mary Shelley.
57
  Genius, not the “genius of education,” Godwin might be 
pressed to say, was his exceptional daughter’s birthright.
58
 
Genius appears to signify little more in the first instance than a spirit of prying 
observation and incessant curiousity….  If nothing occur to excite the mind, it 
will become torpid; if it be frequently and strongly excited, unless in a manner 
that, while it excites, engenders aversion to effort, it will become active, mobile 
and turbulent. Hence it follows, that an adequate cause for the phenomenon of 
genius may be found, in the incidents that occur to us subsequent to birth. 
Genius, it should seem, may be produced after this method; have we any 
sufficient reason to doubt of its being always thus produced?  ...Give me all the 
motives that have excited another man, and all the external advantages he has 
had to boast, and I shall arrive at an excellence no inferior to his.
59
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Godwin, in his own paternalistic estimation, was better positioned than 
Wollstonecraft’s sisters to offer the “advantages” of the “genius of education” to his 
girls, but according to Miranda Seymour’s exhaustive biography of Mary Shelley, 
Godwin agreed that Wollstonecraft’s principles were fine for Fanny, but “Godwin 
believed that his own daughter was destined for higher things.”
60
  Godwin would train 
Mary Shelley’s mind.  Ironically, Fanny would be trained according to the curriculum 
Rousseau laid out for Sophie in his educational-philosophical novel, Emile, the very 
curriculum that Mary Wollstonecraft criticized.  Another prominent biographer of Mary 
Shelley, Anne Mellor, claims that Fanny would become Godwin’s favorite.
61
  From an 
educational biographical standpoint, it is true that jottings recording Fanny’s cognitive 
and affective developments appear most often in Godwin’s diary, especially after 
February 8, 1806 when he told Fanny the truth about her mother’s affair with the 
American Gilbert Imlay and her illegitimate birth during the height of the terror in 
Paris, 1794.
62
  To Fanny, Godwin felt he owed all that the protection of paternalism 
implied, including Joshua Esty’s colonial studies concept of “uneven development.”
63
 
Paternalistic Empire, Miltonic Godwin, and its biological progeny, cannot afford to 
allow the imperial subject, Fanny, to grow up and become capable of self-governance 
because Empire’s exceptional identity is built upon the arrested development of the 
colonial holding.  And even during the years right after her mother’s death, Fanny was 
old enough to know – even if she was too young to understand – of the assault on her 
mother’s reputation in the wake of Godwin’s Memoirs and she would never openly 
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champion the Rights of Woman.
64
  Both of Wollstonecraft’s daughters were subject to 
the power of an insecure Empire and products of uneven development.  
And Godwin’s documented insecurities about educating Wollstonecraft’s 
daughters ran deep.  Especially after the reception of Memoirs, he worried that 
Wollstonecraft’s sisters might actually be able to build a custody case and take away his 
“pets.”
65
  He was as afraid of losing Mary Shelley and, by all accounts, she was afraid 
of losing him.  Perhaps Godwin’s appeal to the overtly sexist “rights” of a patriarch and 
his turn toward a deeply gendered modern cultural stock portfolio that included 
paternalism and uneven development was driven by his fear of losing his daughters.  It 
would seem that the motivations of both father and daughter informed and were 
informed by monstrous miseducation.    
If the total impetus behind Godwin’s educational metamorphosis into a more 
openly traditional patriarch is not exactly clear, the culture crossing he underwent 
alongside Mary Shelley came in the wake of an actual loss and seems connected to a 
fear of future losses.  It is unequivocal that Mary Shelley’s actual loss of her mother and 
her fear of losing her father amounted to a culture crossing that mapped her educational 
metamorphosis into a motherless daughter whose very self-definition depended on her 
father’s attention and affection.  Without the guidance of maternal teaching, the 
maternal teachings sketched in Wollstonecraft’s work could not counter the powerful 
sense of loss that signaled this young girl’s transformation into her father’s daughter.  
Perhaps her mother’s maternal teachings, housed as they were in a space that no longer 
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belonged to her mother, a space that had become her father’s library, represented the 
loss and alienation of becoming Mary Shelley.  And imperial Godwin’s attention 
toward his daughter and presence in her life was uncertain and intermittent, too.   
Most of the time, Mary Shelley must have felt the absence of both her mother 
and her father.  In the very early years, she did not learn the lessons of maternal 
teachings that must accompany the loss and alienation associated with educational 
metamorphoses:  love and survival.  Rather, she developed an “excessive & romantic 
attachment” to a father/empire who could not or would not return her jealous 
devotion.
66
  Miltonic Godwin vacillated between “icy remoteness and passionate, 
demanding affection,” offering Mary Shelley a model for all of her fictive fathers who 
refused to acknowledge the “emotional needs” of their daughters when those needs 
impeded upon “his customary habits.”
67
  Ordinary processes of generation and growth, 
including parenting children, had none of the grandiose qualities and cosmic 
implications of Godwin’s real perfectibility project:  the creation of a utopian society 
composed entirely of immortal, male, adult human beings.  
Although Godwin relegates his utopian, social and biological engineering 
bildung ideology to an appendix titled, “Of Health, and the Prolongation of Human 
Life,” in subsequent editions of Political Justice, in the first edition, he explicitly states 
immortality as the end of human progress.  Siobhan Ni argues that the “spirit” of 
immortality in Godwin’s political philosophy holds from the first edition to the fourth.
68
  
Answering widely publicized criticism of the first edition from Thomas Malthus and 
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others, Godwin chose to append these radical perfectibility “conjectures,” but the 
revisions he published during Mary Shelley’s early childhood maintained that because 
certain “powers” are currently beyond the species does not preclude the attainment of 
those powers (physical immortality) in the future:
69
 
…The whole will be a people of men, and not of children. Generation will not 
succeed generation, nor truth have…to recommence her career every thirty 
years….There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of justice, as it is 
called, and no government…there will be neither disease, anguish, melancholy, 
nor resentment….  Men will see the progressive advancement of virtue and 
good, and feel that, if things occasionally happen contrary to their hopes, the 
miscarriage itself was a necessary part of that progress.
70
 
Godwin was not alone in his utopian belief in human perfection, but even his fellow 
“perfectibilists,” among them David Hartley (1705-1757), Joseph Priestley (1733-
1804), and the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794), could not unreservedly endorse 
Godwin’s bildung dream of physical immortality.  Their vision of immortality relied on 
the ultimate triumph of the mind over the body.
71
  In Godwin’s utopian trajectory, the 
mind would ultimately master all matter.   
Certainly Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a frequent visitor at the Polygon, could not 
have imagined a utopia without children as Godwin did.  Indeed, he found “the 
cadaverous Silence of Godwin’s Children…quite catacomb-ish: & thinking of Mary 
Wolstonecroft [sic] I was oppressed by it the day Davy & I dined there.”
72
  Coleridge 
and his son, David Hartley Coleridge, found that the coldly rational, day-to-day reality 
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of the Godwin house not only lacked a progressive or liberating atmosphere, it was 
oppressive.  Few would want the cadaverous immortality and catacomb-ish perfection 
of Godwin’s house.   
Visits from “red-lipped, large-eyed” Coleridge, “so brilliant in his unstoppable 
loquacity that even Godwin, who liked to guide conversation, sat and listened,” 
temporarily broke up the deadening silence of the post-Wollstonecraftian Polygon and 
resuscitated the wasting, motherless Godwin girls.
73
  But it was a strange kind of life 
that Coleridge breathed into the Polygon.  Long before his famous recitation of “The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner” to which Mary Shelley would listen, frozen by fear and 
fascination under a sofa, Coleridge began to embody a sort of opium-addicted “ancient 
mariner,” dragging an albatross of heavy consciousness round his neck, compelled to 
tell the endlessly looping story of the perils and promises of coexistence in futurity.
74
  
Godwin cannot have understood what Coleridge seems to have discovered about 
educational encounters terror curriculum:  like the mariner’s story, monstrous 
miseducation is a sort viral code that downloads cultural liabilities alongside cultural 
wealth and taking stock without taking action amounts to a terrifying kind of 
consciousness.
75
  Otherwise, Godwin would have recognized and been horrified at the 
sibylline implications of his immortality and “perfectibility” schemes.  
As for Mary Shelley, perhaps the implications of immortality and perfectibility 
would not take on the appalling character of Coleridge’s “life-in-death” nightmares 
until she underwent another educational metamorphosis.  Her second painful culture 
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crossing involved her desperate attempts to reclaim her mother’s name and to 
understand what it meant to love and to survive without her mother.  Love might well 
be a largely ineffable emotion, but from an aesthetic and pedagogical standpoint, love 
may mean a longing for wholeness and a sharing of that whole self so that another 
might feel complete.  Survival, with all of its profound ontological implications, it 
would seem, is also profoundly connected to affective development. 
Despite Godwin’s grateful acknowledgment that Mary Shelley’s intellectual 
acuity had “unfolded” itself in her early “scribbling,” he was oblivious (perhaps 
willfully) to the profound sense of loss his daughter experienced at the very moment she 
gained a stepmother, Mary-Jane Clairmont in 1801.  Seemingly, neither Godwin nor the 
new Mrs. Godwin gleaned the tenets of Wollstonecraft’s “coeducational remedy”:  the 
cultural wealth of “mutuality” between men and women that might confound the 
cultural liability of the “sexual double standard” wrought by the cultural miseducation 
of “sexual essentialism and the sexual economy” and the monstrous miseducation of 
deeply gendered modernity.
76
     
Abandonment to Multiple Educational Agency:  Techno-scientific Productivity 
and Gothic Sublimity 
Mary Shelley’s essentialist understanding of her identity as an exceptional, 
Miltonic father’s daughter faced a real crisis.  She balked at having to share Godwin 
with a woman who is described almost universally as “clever” but “disagreeable” and 
prone to rages.  In time, Mary Shelley would learn to mirror her stepmother’s behaviors 
even as she would soon rename herself after her “real” mother, Wollstonecraft.  
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Certainly, the new Mrs. Godwin did not bring maternal teaching and maternal teachings 
into the Polygon.  On the contrary, in response to an inquiry after the educational 
welfare of the girls, Godwin said that he and his new wife had no time for experimental 
methods that might create “little monsters of curiosity.”
77
  The methods of maternal 
teaching and the tenets of maternal teachings were absent for all the children of this 
blended family.  Instead, he abandoned them to unmediated encounters with cultural 
stock from acknowledged and unacknowledged multiple educational agency.  
After the family moved to Skinner Street above what would become the 
Godwins’ bookshop, Mary Shelley must have sought solace from the crowded, noisy, 
violent neighborhood streets in the volumes of the “Juvenile Library.”  There, she 
encountered a volume Mary Lamb’s “graceful retelling of Shakespeare’s plays,” the 
first publish work of which was The Tempest.
 78
  In some important way, this 
motherless, father’s daughter must have seen herself as a Miranda dependent upon a 
paternalistic Prospero for her history, her education, and her very reality.  Miranda, like 
Mary Shelley, has vague memories of being “tended” by “Four, or five, women once,”
79
 
but when Prospero asks Miranda what other memories she can retrieve “from the dark 
and abysm of time,” she reports a blank.
80
  Like Mary Shelley, Miranda has no memory 
of her own mother, but infers of Prospero’s comments about his brother that “good 
wombs hath borne bad sons.”
81
  After a slew of strange hints about incest and 
illegitimacy surrounding Prospero, Caliban, and Caliban’s also-absent hag-witch-
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mother, Prospero ostensibly relinquishes his creative authority (genius) and “magic” 
howling with grand finality, “this thing of darkness I/Acknowledge mine.”
82
  But 
Prospero’s acknowledgment only casts a final spell that restores patriarchal order and 
reasserts Haraway’s masculinist reproductive dream – cultural liabilities.
83
  Motherless 
Caliban, like Mary Shelley, will inherit the monstrous legacy of a bastard, and 
motherless Miranda, like Mary Shelley will inherit the patriarchal legacy of Prospero’s 
magic.  Prospero’s genius status, like Godwin’s genius status, absolves him of his own 
darkness and casts both Miranda and Caliban as monsters.  At this culture crossing in 
Mary Shelley’s educational metamorphosis, she must have identified with both Miranda 
and Caliban – as a motherless monster dependent for all things on the genius father who 
merely acknowledged her and surely did not mediate her encounters with deeply 
gendered items of cultural stock – wealth and liabilities – that Haraway says amount to 
the “systems of myth and meanings structuring our imaginations.”
84
  
Chronically short of money and time, Godwin abandoned Mary Shelley to 
educational encounters beyond the books.  He abandoned her to encounters with 
Martin’s multiple educational agency, those entities responsible for transmitting cultural 
stock and extend far beyond schools, churches, and homes to include media outlets, 
military installations, political platforms, and the like.
 85
  As in our time, the “agency” of 
these unacknowledged and unaccountable entities and institutions in the early 
nineteenth-century was unchecked by the larger culture.  Martin argues that a culture 
                                                          
82
 William Shakespeare, The Tempest in The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd Edition, Eds. G. Blakemore 
Evans and J. J. M. Tobin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 5.2.275-6. 
83
 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (New York: Routledge, 1991), 152. 
84
 Ibid, 163.  Percy Bysshe Shelley must also have imagined himself in relation to Prospero.  He 
originally named the sailboat on which he met his death, Ariel. 
85
 Jane Roland Martin, Cultural Miseducation (New York:  Teachers College Press, 2002), 32-61. 
 100 
cannot begin to take stock of or theorize educative and miseducative consequences of 
encounters with the items of cultural stock transmitted by these various entities unless 
that culture recognizes the making and shaping power of these entities and institutions 
and takes deliberate stock of their value.
86
  On Skinner Street and beyond, little Mary 
Shelley encountered a dazzling and devastating array of multiple educational agency 
with unstated educational aims and unintended consequences, the theoretical 
implications of which would surface in her work. 
From the smoldering periphery of the revolutionary “Godwin School,” Mary 
Shelley silently spied on fiery debates from which she was excluded.  The Godwin 
School included a virtual pantheon of radical thinkers: Anthony Carlisle, Sir Humphrey 
Davy, Henri Fuseli, William Hazlitt, Charles and Mary Lamb, William Wordsworth, 
William Blake, Aaron Burr, Thomas Paine, and others.
87
  Godwin may have 
unintentionally abandoned his daughter to encounters with multiple educational agency, 
but the new Mrs. Godwin actively tried to place limits on her access.   
Mary Shelley never forgave nor forgot the evening her stepmother dragged her 
from under the parlor sofa where she had hidden to listen to Coleridge recite his “The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner.”
88
  She also never forgot the “rime.”  To little Mary 
Shelley, Coleridge must have seemed himself and a “glittering”-eyed ancient mariner 
doomed to tell the story of his transgression to an equally doomed listener.  Mrs. 
Godwin sent Mary Shelley off to bed, “like one that hath been stunn’d,/And is of sense 
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forlorn:/A sadder and a wiser” girl.
89
  She already would have known the mariner’s 
sentimental didactic to “loveth” all creatures “great and small” the way God loves all 
creation because such messages were prevalent in the Godwin School and in the larger 
culture surround.
90
  What must have been stunning to Mary Shelley was the coda to 
Coleridge’s long poem: wisdom can come through depression.  Stuck a sort of amber of 
depression from girlhood, this kind of rage at injustice turned inward, she began to see 
the awful beauty in “a thousand, thousand slimy things,”
91
 and perhaps the viral nature 
of life itself.
92
  Indeed, the encounter with Coleridge and his mariner’s viral code was 




Her encounter with John Milton’s Paradise Lost during this time also had 
unintended consequences.  Eve’s claims about the flawed logic of genius as an 
educational ideal, bildung models that marginalize certain experience, and terror 
curriculum that lacks maternal teaching and teachings would emerge in the arguments 
of her Frankensteinian creature.  And perhaps Eve’s arguments resonated for this 
presumed genius daughter of genius who may have seen herself in Milton’s Eve.  
Denied both infancy and maternal reciprocity in Paradise, Milton’s Eve responds with 
pleasure to her own sympathetic gaze in the pool and is censured for it.  Like Mary 
Shelley, Eve “mothers” herself at the pool and sees herself as the source of her own 
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  This vision of absolute self-possession is surely the problematic stuff of 
Godwinian genius and perfectibility.  In the context of the division of labor, when 
Milton’s Adam questions Eve’s “wandering,” she, like Mary Shelley, resists his 
“paternal solicitude”
95
 (God’s paternal solicitude), insisting that she must be free to 
resist temptation alone, otherwise “Eden were no Eden thus exposed” (IX.320).
96
  The 
radical implication of Eve’s logic, and possibly Mary Shelley’s logic, is:  if I am not 
free to wander and resist temptation alone, God is not a justifiable God.  Mary Shelley 
may well have begun to wonder if Godwin was a justifiable god.  Milton’s Satan, “self-
begot, self-raised/by his own quick’ning power,” tempts Eve with precisely what has 
been denied her and, perhaps, what has been denied him in the arbitrary hierarchy of 
Heaven.
97
  Using the simile of mothers’ milk to describe the smell of the forbidden 
fruit, he claims that the fruit has awakened in him the power of reason and the freedom 
of speculation, precisely Godwin’s educational aims.
98
  Eve resists the Garden’s 
arbitrary prohibitions and hierarchies, seemingly knowing the structural flaw of an 
ironic paradise that grows “luxurious by restraint” through “tending to wild” long 
before she ever tastes of the fruit.
99
  Forbidden formal admission into the Godwin 
School, yet abandoned to its radical thought by “virtue” of neglect, young Mary Shelley 
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must have felt the squirm of ironic recognition in these Miltonic characters and tropes.  
How could Godwin be so indifferently permissive while so narrowly tyrannical?
100
  
It was Wollstonecraft, who, arguing against Rousseau’s caricature of Sophie, 
agreed with Milton’s Eve, writing, “…it is a farce to call any being virtuous whose 
virtues do not result from the exercise of its own reason.”
101
  Unlike Fanny, Mary 
Shelley certainly was not overtly receiving Sophie’s education, but she, who, like her 
Frankensteinian creature would read Milton’s Paradise Lost and C.F. Volney’s The 
Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires and the Law of Nature, at this stage, 
seems to lean toward a patriarchal tradition that fathered a feminized nature capable of 
casting a lone “Genius” into an inhospitable world and saying: 
Feeble work of my hands, I owe thee nothing, and I give thee life; the world 
wherein I placed thee was not made for thee, yet I give thee use of it; thou wilt 
find in it a mixture of good and evil; it is for thee to distinguish them; for thee to 
guide thy footsteps in a path containing thorns as well as roses.  Be the arbiter of 
thine own fate; I put thy destiny into thine own hands!
102
  
Mary Shelley must have begun to wonder if the very structure of this world is 
insupportable to certain kinds of creatures.  And what if that creature knows that she 
cannot be “the arbiter of [her/his] own fate” because a more powerful other has “put” 
her to that task?  Would this very knowledge of her powerlessness become her 
undoing?  These questions beg a distinct, insular, modern, deeply gendered kind of 
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cultural miseducation:  monstrous miseducation.  Mary Shelley’s father became a less 
and less justifiable god, and with knowledge – albeit knowledge filtered through a 
patriarchal lens – this self-educating creature, abandoned to encounters with multiple 
educational agency, became increasingly disillusioned with her hypocritical maker.  
Arguably, monstrously miseducated Godwin did not possess the philosophical 
imagination of Wollstonecraft, and thus could not have that valued maternal teaching 
and teachings.  Amid the failed promises and graphic spectacle of the French 
Revolution, Wollstonecraft critiqued the deeply gendered, deep structures of 
educational thought that confine education to an intentional, repeatable process of 
training the mind of the individual to the good of that individual and the larger 
society.
103
  Wollstonecraft’s critique of genius and bildung as educational ideals, in 
short, survived to haunt Godwin’s limited and limiting vision of education.  Godwin’s 
solution was to send the troubled and troubling Mary Shelley away where she might 
learn to transcend her “girlish troubles” and fit herself to a smaller world.   
And in her exile, Mary Shelley did not learn to conform to the “strictures” laid 
out by Hannah More, a contemporary of Wollstonecraft.  Neither did she learn to live 
the principles of maternal teaching and teachings laid out in her mother’s polemics, 
although she read and admired her mother’s educational thought.  In fact, through the 
patriarchal lens of her father’s library and example, and the larger cultural surround, her 
readings and re-readings of her mother’s educational thought may only have only 
served to make the adolescent Mary Shelley more acutely aware of the gulf between the 
liberatory promises of education and the stifling material reality of her experience.  
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Thus, Percy Bysshe Shelley’s promises to free her from Godwin’s oppressive 
house must have sounded wonderful despite the fact that his infatuation with Mary 
Shelley was always already linked to his Romantic (genius and bildung) associations 
with her pedigree.  In dedicating The Revolt of Islam (1818) to Mary, published in the 
same year the first edition of Frankenstein, Shelley describes her in terms of her genius 
lineage even while he criticizes her “Sire, of an immortal name” for his abandonment of 
his “aspiring” daughter and his liberal principles: 
They say that thou wert lovely from thy birth,  
Of glorious parents, thou aspiring Child. 
I wonder not for One then left this Earth 
 Whose life was like a setting planet mild, 
 Which clothed thee in the radiance undefiled 
Of its departing glory; still her fame 
 Shines on thee, through the tempests dark and wild 
Which shake these latter days; and thou canst claim 
The shelter, from thy Sire, of an immortal name.
104
 
To the “mortal imagination” of Sir Timothy, Shelley’s father, “[t]he sublime and 
rapturous moment” in which the sixteen-year-old Mary Shelley, “a spirit that sees into 
the truth of things,” gave herself to his son was as shocking as his son’s treatise in 
defense of atheism.
105
  This Shelleyan “romance,” with its fatalism and will to 
irrationality, was simply not “mortal” or sustainable, and Mary Shelley would spend the 
remainder of her life trying to repair the damage of her life with Shelley in an effort to 
secure an inheritance for her only surviving child, Percy.  In effect, she spent her life, 
after Shelley, striving to meet the demands of rather opposite ends of the same 
patriarchal power:  that of husbands and that of fathers. 
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“Dazzled” as she was “by enlightenment,” “tormented” as she was “by 
passions,” Mary Shelley finally found herself “miserable as savage man…reasoning 
about a state different from his own.”
106
  She knew the bildung narrative of political, 
economic, and social justice even while she knew she had been and would be denied the 
“rights of man.”  She desired and was forbidden Miltonic Godwinian perfectibility even 
while she pursued and was barred from sublime Shelleyan transgression.  No one would 
accuse Mary Shelley of possessing a less than stellar intellect, so her adoption of a 
fatalistic mindset and willing suspension of rationality must have come from this bitter 
knowledge of what she could not be.  As much through the uneven development of her 
education as through the disappointed expectations of her genius, Mary Shelley herself 
was pieced together from fragments of monstrous miseducation’s archetypical 
characters, mythic tropes, and stock symbols. 
Despite careful restoration, these shards of terror curriculum’s larger cultural 
texts of creation (the Promethean transgression and punishment of genius) and 
development (the formation and declension of bildung) suggest the fatalism and will to 
irrationality that comprise the misshapen contours of monstrous miseducation.
107
  Mary 
Shelley, the illegitimate daughter of an insecure empire, abandoned by her Miltonic 
father, now eschewed the rationality he prized and willed herself to believe she was 
fated to suffer alongside Shelley’s sublime genius.  Now, with Shelley and his 
Romantic coterie, she delved deeply into the competing early-modern political, social, 
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Suggesting the fatalism and will to irrationality that characterized Mary 
Shelley’s early adulthood, the two full-length texts that emerged from Lord Byron’s 
“ghost story challenge,” Manfred and Frankenstein, featured a guilt-ridden, outcast (by 
choice) Byronic Hero who uses a sort of scientific magic to create terror, which he then 
abandons to a society that may well be the real terror. Manfred’s “sin” is never detailed.  
His suffering, it would seem, is Byron’s point.  But Victor Frankenstein’s hubristic 
transgressions and his self-serving sufferings are detailed again and again.  For Mary 
Shelley, the transgression and suffering seem to be but two of many points she wished 
to make in Frankenstein.  Another was peculiar sort of aesthetic that emerged out of her 
lived experience of the larger cultural matrix:  the gothic sublime.   
In her legendary coldness and silence, Mary Shelley must have pondered the 
gothic sense of the sublime that draws on philosophical imagination rather than reason, 





 century Western Europe, the gothic tradition in art materialized as 
a ghoulish specter of madness threatening to cast a dark shadow over the well-lighted 
path of reason governed by early-modern democracy, peopled by a growing middle 
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class, and guided by capitalism’s “invisible hand.”  The Enlightenment’s positivistic 
promise to banish superstition, master monsters, and contain desire, ultimately could not 
subdue terror or deny uncertainty in the bloody wake of the French Revolution.  Hence, 
scientific empiricism proved a woefully inadequate apparatus for appreciating the 
suddenness and strangeness of this violent brand of political and socio-economic 
upheaval.  In Mary Shelley’s view (a view she shared with her Romantic coterie), her 
parents’ generation and the generation that preceded them (among them, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, 1712-1878 and Denis Diderot, 1713-1784) were using the wrong tools and 
asking the wrong questions.  And those failed attempts to establish clear causal 
connections across events made the nightmare of the revolution all the more 
nightmarish.  Pandemonium made a mockery of staid methods of inquiry.  Rationality 
hindered discernment, but Enlightenment progress could not allow for monsters. 
While her mother actually lived the experience of The Terror in France during 
her pregnancy with Fanny, Mary Shelley theorized its aesthetic.  Her growing 
ideological sympathies with Romanticism’s aesthetic counter-culture, pushed her 
toward a gothic tradition that would revive a medieval ethos of terror moved to 
extremes by “natural” power and majesty.  However, the Byronic Hero’s individual 
freedom from mechanistic philosophies and embrace of mysterious “super-nature” 
became the gothic heroine’s (and Mary Shelley’s) sense of solitary vulnerability and 
awareness of fragile mortality.  Destabilized by menacing forces beyond her control, the 
gothic heroine (like Mary Shelley) stumbles through darkness only vaguely appreciating 
her rather paltry place within a vast and puzzling universe.  For the gothic heroine, 
“super-naturalized” terror is ultimately unknowable.  Representative of the rapid 
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educational metamorphosis from gothic heroine into the ontologically unstable monster, 
Mary Shelley, the monster of the gothic sublime maims the guilty and the innocent alike 
and acts on rage informed by a complex logic of revenge.  Indeed, while gothic artists 
often cast monsters as morally reprehensible, only rarely do they insult their audience 
by failing to offer the monster’s horrific rationality.  The monster understands its work 
and so does the transformed Mary Shelley.  It is our species that lacks imagination in 
the moral universe of gothic sublimity, a moral universe that took its shape for Mary 
Shelley during her outcast summer of 1816, the summer of Frankenstein.  
Having lived most of her young life as an exile, Mary Shelley was 
brokenhearted when her only documented girlhood friend, Isabella Baxter Booth, 
remained in the abusive hands of her once-egalitarian husband, David Booth, rather 
than escape with Mary Shelley to Italy.  Mary Shelley must have felt mighty 
disillusioned when Isabella’s liberal father and good friend of Godwin, William Baxter, 
supported his son-in-law, and forbade Isabella to join the unconventional Shelley 
household.
109
  Like her mother and her husband, Mary Shelley fell in love with and 
attempted to rescue several women from marriage and Miltonic fathers over her 
lifetime.  
But Mary Shelley also fell in love with a gothic aesthetic that accompanied the 
incredible losses she endured over her lifetime.  She lost her mother, Mary 
Wollstonecraft; four children, Clara, William, Clara, and an unnamed miscarriage; a 
rival, Harriet Westbrook Shelley; a half-sister, Fanny Imlay; her mentor, George 
Gordon Lord Byron; and her god after Godwin, Percy Bysshe Shelley.  She became 
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suicidal and fatalistic, believing that her transgressions had cursed her and somehow 
warranted her suffering and loss.  She blamed herself for killing her mother and linked 
the death of her own first child after eleven days to the death of Wollstonecraft after 
eleven days.  After the deaths of each child, Godwin reminded Mary Shelley of her 
essential and exceptional identity, writing to her that she was “formed by nature to 
belong to the best” of two classes of people:  “the dependent and the supporters,” and 
that in “voluntarily enrolling [herself] among the worst,” she might garner pity for 
herself in the short term, but ultimately those same people would “cease to love [her], 
and scarcely learn to endure [her].”
110
  According to Godwin, it was Mary Shelley’s 
duty, indeed the duty of genius and bildung, not to wallow in selfish emotion.  Godwin 
was right even if it was for the wrong reasons.  
After William’s death, Shelley wrote a letter to the couple’s friends, the 
Gisbornes, claiming that Mary Shelley “feels no more remorse in torturing me than in 
torturing her own mind,” and his desire to reconceive their marriage as an “equal” 
friendship between two “distinct being[s]” in “perpetual communion” to the end of 
Mary “obtain[ing] empire over herself.”
111
  But Mary Shelley’s uneven development 
made her the imperial subject of both Shelley and Godwin.  After the letter, the 
Gisbornes withdrew their friendship and Mary Shelley again felt more than the usual 
sting of gossip’s barbs toward her family.  Even as an exile, with her fellow exiles, she 
felt personally shunned and alone.   
After Shelley’s death, it seems she resigned herself to the fate a deeply gendered 
terror curriculum had educated her to believe was her lot:  
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I was never the Eve of any Paradise, but a human creature blessed by an 
elemental spirit’s company & love - an angel who imprisoned in flesh could not 
adapt himself to his clay shrine & so has flown and left it - & I feel as poets 
have described those loved by superhuman creatures & then deserted by them.
112
 
Eschewing her father’s name, but not his indelible influence, this widowed, motherless 
daughter had indeed transformed into the dutiful Mary Shelley into a woman who 
would keep her silence and her place.  Characterizing herself as the negatives of a 
Shelleyan “elemental spirit,” an “angel” trapped in a “clay shrine,” or a “superhuman 
creature,” Mary Shelley grounded herself as a “blessed” but “deserted…human 
creature.”  In describing herself as a “human creature” in relation to “superhuman 
creature,” Shelley.  Most biographers point to this language as evidence of her adulation 
of Shelley, but this language of genius also suggests that she has thrown off the chains 
such an essential and exceptional identity implies.    
By 1823, her infamy in London took on new dimensions after the opening of a 
popular stage production of Frankenstein, Presumption, or the Fate of Frankenstein.  
She was both celebrated as a genius and condemned as a degenerating deviant for the 
ideas explored in this warped version of her novel.  Protesters outside the theater 
insisted “the monstrous Drama, founded on the improper work called Frankenstein” 
dealt in matter “pregnant with mischief.”
113
  Presumption was just one of so many 
shockingly new commercial developments of “progressive” London, and Seymour 
speculates that the protests were a publicity stunt.
114
  This production, on which Mary 
Shelley made no money, hijacked the thought experiment of her Frankenstein and 
ushered in the horror story that survives today.  No “purists,” including Mary Shelley 
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and Godwin, spoke up in defense of the “real” message of the novel.  Rather, the 
opportunistic Godwin capitalized on the novel’s popular appeal and republished it.  
Like its author and like her London, the novel flouted the genius and bildung ideals.  
Demarking a clear line between the monstrous and the human paradoxically tamed it.     
The sixty-seven-year-old Godwin was pleased to have Mary Shelley, the 
“curator of his reputation,” in close range again.
115
  Having long-since abandoned the 
idea that his namesake, William, would take his place as a public intellectual, Miltonic 
Godwin pinned his legacy on his surviving daughter.  Mary Shelley, however, enjoyed 
visits to Coleridge’s lectures with her capricious half-brother William, and Coleridge 
was grateful for the young company after his own dear son, the David Hartley 
Coleridge of Mary’s childhood, refused to visit him.  Mary Shelley and William 
speculated that Hartley’s descent into alcoholism was related to his failure to complete 
his own Prometheus story before Shelley completed his.
116
  Mary always acknowledged 
her debt to Coleridge’s Rime even if she did not see how her own work had influenced 
others, including Hartley.  Coleridge was devastated by his estrangement from Hartley, 
but Godwin was a more practical man and found his son’s failed bildung disappointing.  
When William Godwin the younger died of cholera in the fall of 1832, Claire, in a letter 
to Jane Williams Hogg, said she believed “William’s chief misfortune had been to lack 
genius in a family who thought anything less a form of failure.”
 117 
 But Mary Shelley 
had finally become Miltonic Godwin’s obedient, monstrously miseducated creation. 
Beyond her value to Godwin’s intellectual legacy, Mary Shelley’s marriage 
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promised Godwin financial security in the present tense.  Like a dutiful colonial subject, 
she committed the remainder of her life to Godwin and to Percy.  Even though the 
woman who would go to her grave as Mary Shelley saw her father’ contribution to her 
education as a paternalistic sort of bequeathing of cultural stock (liabilities along with 
wealth) or Miltonic abandonment to multiple educational agency, she sometimes 
experienced her mother’s teaching achievement through her mother’s work as a 
circulation of gifts.  Thus, Mary Shelley was, at least in part, self-aware that her lived 
experience was cultural miseducation.  This very experience and inheritance may well 
have enabled her educational thought experiment, Frankenstein.   
Finally, her lived experience shows that monstrous miseducation, a patriarchal 
aesthetic “at the very foundations of philosophy” rooted in “concepts that often do not 
directly refer to males and females at all, yet whose hierarchies are imbued with 
gendered significance” taught this motherless daughter of “artist-fathers” and “male 
creators” to see herself as both an excluded monster and an exclusive monster-maker.
118
  
Without maternal teaching and teachings and with Godwin’s bequeathing of essentialist 
and exceptionalist ideologies, Mary Shelley could not begin to positively value the 
amalgam of her making and being or build mutually beneficial alliances by which one 
learns to share power and pain.  In other words, even thought she was mired in Miltonic 
identity politics, she could imagine Haraway’s cyborg affinity politics but could not live 
it in any meaningful way.  It is, significant that Mary Shelley dedicated the first, 
anonymously published manuscript of Frankenstein to her father.  
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She was “brought up to share their (Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s) central belief 
in the duty of engagement in pubic debate on all pertinent moral, social, and political 
issues as a means of contributing to the general welfare.”
119
  Perhaps for that reason, she 
felt the sting of remorse at having disappointed her father more acutely during periods 
of estrangement from him.  Indeed, she wrote Frankenstein during just such a period.  
Perhaps, too, having been an ardent but distant pupil of the Godwin School made her 
more acutely aware of her father’s disregard for her individual welfare and hypocritical 
stance toward her unconventional domestic arrangement with Shelley during the writing 
of Frankenstein.  This dedication evidences the mixed feelings of admiration and 
disappointment that would characterize the relationship between Mary Shelley and 
Miltonic Godwin.  In the end, neither was very good at practicing egalitarian principles 
in the private sphere, and Mary Shelley later disavowed them in the public sphere. 
But Mary Shelley’s self-education, like that of the creature she imagines in 
Frankenstein, also allowed her to glimpse the monster myths undergirding aesthetic 
theory and educational thought – monster myths so ancient they seem like “nature.”  
These myths generate and perpetuate the “gendered meanings within which ideas about 
art and aesthetics are framed” and the “systematic and occasionally insidious 
phenomenon that can impart to concepts considerable power to shape the ways we think 
and see the world.”
120
  Indeed, an important version of this myth’s evolution was given 
new life in 19
th
 century aesthetic theory that appropriated traits traditionally ascribed to 
“feminine” nature (emotion, intuition, etc.) and procreative metaphors of female 
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reproductive biology to describe the singular, transcendent, male “creator” mind of the 
“mad” genius.
121
  In a move of unparalleled irony, the same emotional characteristics 
assigned to women and biological powers innate to women were considered weaknesses 
in actual women.
122
  Because of her self-education and in spite of her monstrous 
miseducation, Mary Shelley has Victor Frankenstein go beyond metaphorical conquest 
of female power to colonize the only biological space belonging exclusively to women 
– the genius dream of creative authorship.
123
  Despite some profoundly ambivalent 
moments, for Mary Shelley, the Romantic origins and essential goodness of human 
nature advanced by Rousseau and Condorcet collapse alongside the Enlightenment 
movement and powerful potentialities of human progress envisioned by the Royal 
Society of London.  Evinced in terror curriculum, the consequences of these ways of 
“conceiving,” “labouring,” “birthing,” “shaping,” “forming,” “creating,” and 
“destroying,” are ultimately calamitous, however sublime. 
But the deeply gendered Western tradition of transcendent masculinized artistic 
creators and feminized divine aesthetic inspiration did not spring fully formed and 
absurdly armed from the brow of Romantic Era patriarchal consciousness.  Indeed, the 
creation myth of singular male conquest of female procreative potential is a classical 
idea that Mary Shelley knew all too well.  This same myth gave birth to Socrates’ 
metaphor of teaching as midwifery, granted with an important disclaimer:  Socrates’ 
intentional practice attends the birth of abstract ideas from the “souls” of men, not real 
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babies from the “bodies” of women.
124
  Socrates, in his manifest squeamishness about 
women’s procreative potential, surely did not consider actual midwives as educators or 
actual women as ex nihilo creators. The everyday art of midwifery and the actual status 
of the midwife opens up the sort of ironic epistemological and ontological problems 
about the legitimacy of knowledge and expertise of professionals examined in 
Wollstonecraft’s oeuvre. Wollstonecraft knew that the metaphor of female procreative 
potential has been historically hijacked to describe the Miltonic myth of singular male 
creative genius, and her daughter knew it as well and built a thought experiment that 
would expose its monstrousness:  Frankenstein.
 
 They knew that these Zeus-like 
conceptual conquests eliminate the question of paternity. 
Primogenitor – and its attendant essentialism and exceptionalism – positively 
depends upon the regulation of female reproductive potential, but that regulation has 
built-in limits. The ideal of bildung supplements (perhaps in the Derridian sense) the 
slippage of genius and the origin myth of the singular male creator.  In 1818, after the 
publication of Frankenstein, Mary Shelley re-read William Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest.
125
  Amid real fears about Shelley’s estrangement from his father and his 
father’s fortune and her own troubled relationship with Godwin, during the following 
year, she wrote Mathilda, a novel about an incestuous relationship between a father and 
daughter.  Anxieties about a monstrous inheritance from Miltonic Godwin came home 
to roost in this novel just as they did in Frankenstein.   
To date, silence from the field of educational studies surrounds Mary Shelley’s 
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“hideous progeny,” her educational and aesthetic thought experiment Frankenstein.  But 
it is that myth, taken in tandem with her lived experience, that has enabled me to draw 
my conceptual formulation of monstrous miseducation, a deeply gendered brand of 
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CHAPTER III 
Exposition of Frankenstein as Educational Thought 
Just as Mary Shelley’s lived experience fell prey and bore witness to a peculiar 
material and intellectual history forged in monstrous miseducation, the Frankenstein 
myth is itself both a critique and a symptom of terror curriculum’s genius terror and 
bildung.  As with all myths, there are many retellings of the story.  Therefore, I will 
begin this exposition with a summary of the novel.   
Frankenstein is a frame narrative through which Victor Frankenstein tells his 
story and the story his creature relates to him to Robert Walton, an English explorer 
searching for the fabled Northwest Passage.  In letters to his sister in England, Margaret 
Saville, Walton narrates Victor’s story.  Confiding his tale in Walton, Victor positions 
himself as an object lesson in the consequences of passion for scientific discovery and 
recognition unchecked by ethical inquiry.   
According to Victor, at the age of seventeen, his idyllic childhood ends when his 
mother, Caroline, dies caring for his adopted sister and betrothed, Elizabeth, on the eve 
of his departure from Geneva, to attend university at Ingolstadt.  Excelling in natural 
philosophy, Victor eventually pieces together dead animal and human body parts to 
build a human being that he animates with life.  Victor, horrified at his handiwork when 
it comes to life, abandons the creature.  The “newborn” creature wanders out into the 
world and experiences people’s hatred, fear, and violence.  
Wounded and terrorized, the creature hides in a hovel adjoining a cottage of 
French exiles, the De Lacey family.  From his hiding place, he learns to read and write 
by secretly watching the adult children teach a visitor their language and history and the 
 119 
rudiments of emotional intelligence by watching them care and for their blind father.  
After finding Victor’s laboratory journal in the pocket of the cloak he instinctively 
wrapped around himself before leaving Victor’s dormitory, the creature learns of his 
unique origins.  Rejected by the De Lacey family, the creature uses information from 
Victor’s laboratory journal to find his way to Geneva to petition his creator for 
companionship.  When Victor returns to Geneva after learning that his six-year-old 
brother, William, has been murdered, he and his creature are reunited after two years.   
The creature uses the story of his initially virtuous and ultimately violent 
existence as an argument to persuade Victor to create a female companion for him.  
Victor consents and travels to the remotest of the Orkney Islands to construct the female 
creature.  As his male creature looks on, Victor destroys the female creature in a fit of 
conscience.  The creature avenges this broken promise by murdering Elizabeth on the 
night of her wedding to Victor.  Driven by a desire to avenge the murders of his loved 
ones, Victor tracks the creature to the northern-most regions of the globe where Walton 
finds him.  Walton, after listening in horror and admiration, to Victor’s cautionary tale 
agrees to destroy the creature after Victor’s imminent death, but when he finds the 
creature weeping over Victor’s corpse, he cannot kill him.  The story ends with the 
creature disappearing into the ice rifts, vowing to commit suicide.  Because we cannot 
know Victor’s secret for animating dead matter, we never know if the creature is mortal. 
This exposition will look at Mary Shelley’s actual text, but my conceptual 
formulations of monstrous miseducation and terror curriculum ultimately come from the 
Frankenstein myth.  Anne Mellor writes that Frankenstein “can claim the status of a 
myth” because it remains “so profoundly resonant in its implications for our 
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comprehension of our selves and our place in the world that it has become, at least in its 
barest outline, a trope of everyday life.”
1
  I would add that myth works through stories a 
culture tells itself about itself to educate its members about what to believe and what to 
fear.  Through the educational myth of Frankenstein modern culture learns what to 
believe and what to fear.  Mellor goes on to say that the Frankenstein myth is unique in 
that creature is “entirely man made” (without a female or “divine intervention”) and the 
myth’s creation was singular (“the waking dream of a specific eighteen-year-old girl on 
June 16, 1816”) and not related to any “traditional religious systems” or folklore.
2
  I 
agree with her criteria for myth status and believe Frankenstein meets them, but I would 
add that myth necessarily traffics in religious ritual and gods.  Otherwise, the story 
would be some other kind of traditional tale, a legend perhaps, or a folk or fairytale.  
Contrary to Mellor’s claim, I think Frankenstein is a myth that depends upon traditional 
religious systems and folklore alongside Jane Roland Martin’s deep structures of 
education and Carolyn Korsmeyer’s deep gender.  For all of those ancient resonances, 
though, Frankenstein is, perhaps, the only thoroughly modern educational myth we 
possess, and the only myth modernity could have produced.  I explore its possible 
influence in the next chapter. 
This exposition of Frankenstein reformulates the myth as educational thought 
about “culture as curriculum” and learning as “encounter.”
3
  I take as given that 
regardless of intention, culture is curriculum, and lived encounters with cultural 
landscapes or curriculum are learning.  Deploying the conceptual language of 
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monstrous miseducation and terror curriculum formulated from Mary Shelley’s 
educational metamorphoses and lived experience, the exposition of Frankenstein refines 
the core features of monstrous miseducation:  Miltonic identity politics (essentialism 
and exceptionalism); Godwinian perfectibility (paternalism and uneven development); 
abandonment to multiple educational agency (techno-scientific productivity and gothic 
sublimity).  Further, this exposition uses Mary Shelley’s thought experiment to imagine 
a counter-narrative to the monstrous miseducation of the Frankenstein myth, a narrative 
in which Susan Laird’s maternal teaching (circulation of gifts) and teachings (love and 
survival) and Donna Harraway’s cyborg affinity politics (alliances and amalgams) are 
present rather than absent.  
Miltonic Identity Politics as Monstrous Miseducation:  Essentialism and 
Exceptionalism 
Victor, like his creator Mary Shelley, is no Rousseauian “child of nature” reared 
by a policy of intentional “non-intervention,” what Martin names the “wild” variety of 
educational growth, “growth pure and simple.”
4
  With Rousseau, Mary Shelley would 
agree that “a man left to himself from birth would be more of a monster than the rest,” 
and she might well agree with my formulation of a Rousseauian monster as a genius.
5
  
Victor is the product of bildung ideology, the “progressive” bourgeois “gardening” 
practices founded on the principle of allowing a child to “grow in accordance with 
nature” toward the identity he was meant to occupy in society.
6
  His bildung fails, 
however, because of the larger culture’s inability or unwillingness to recognize multiple 
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educational agency and the cultural liabilities it transmits, including the ideal of bildung 
itself.  In order to understand the failure of Victor’s bildung it is important to note that 
cultural miseducation is not only the cause and consequence of the transmission of 
cultural liabilities; it is also the cause and consequence of a miseducated culture that has 
lost or disregarded items of cultural wealth like Susan Laird’s maternal teaching and 
teaching, Donna Haraway’s cyborg “affinity” politics,
7
 and education as Martin’s 
circulation of gifts
8
 to the sustainable end of Wollstonecraftian “rational hopes of 
futurity.”
9
  This failure of the bildung gardening philosophy suggests that if the broader 
culture has been miseducated, it will be unable to recognize multiple educational 
agency as such, much less to take stock of its assets and liabilities.  In particular, 
Victor’s failed bildung points to the hidden curriculum of terror and its peculiarly 
modern cultural liability:  the false educational ideal of genius.  Along with her 
creations, Mary Shelley received this deeply gendered terror curriculum – evolutionary 
bildung and revolutionary genius – of monstrous miseducation.  But Mary Shelley and 
her creature bore the burden of knowing the troubling implications of bildung and 
genius that Victor never fully understood because Victor’s privilege made the 
essentialism and exceptionalism of Miltonic identity politics invisible.  
Very early in life, Victor learned to see himself in terms of Miltonic identity 
politics, as his parents’ “plaything and their idol,” an “innocent and helpless creature 
bestowed on them by heaven, whom to bring up to good, and whose future lot it was in 
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their hands to direct to happiness or misery, according as they fulfilled their duties 
towards me.”
10
  Victor claims to have “received a lesson of patience, of charity, and of 
self control” during “every hour of [his] infant life.”
11
  Had Victor spent “every hour” 
learning these lessons in a vacuum, perhaps he would have progressed according to the 
false ideal of bildung.  But Victor is a member of human culture and, thus, exposed to 
multiple educational agency that intentionally and unintentionally transmits the 
culture’s wealth and liabilities.  Hence, the ideal was always already false.  
Like Victor, the creature acquires a worldview based on essential and 
exceptional categories, a Miltonic identity politics from which his is “irrevocably 
excluded.”
12
  When he speaks to Victor for the first time after his abandonment, the 
creature petitions his “natural lord and king” to “perform thy part, the which thou owest 
me…I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel.”
13
  Victor’s “faintness” 
and shrill epithets show him as a rather paltry, petty god in this epic showdown, yet the 
creature’s Miltonic frame of reference positions him as a powerful creator.  In one 
moment, the creature speaks as a towering, satanic, threat (genius) and in the next, as a 
cowering, supplicant, servant (bildung).  This juxtaposition of creator and creature 
illustrates the mythic quality of a Miltonic identity politics that shrinks before gods, 
refuses to negotiate with monsters, and cannot imagine a world in which gods and 
monsters coexist.   
During his exile in the woods outside of Ingolstadt, observing the domestic bliss 
of the cottagers, the creature worships the “perfect forms” of the De Lacey family: a 
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blind, elderly father, a young adult son, Felix, and a daughter, Agatha.
14
  Watching them 
interact, he is moved to tears by their physical beauty and the simple kindnesses they 
show one another.  He therefore equates moral goodness with physical beauty and blood 
relations within a family until Safie, a “beautiful stranger” of Turkish descent, joins the 
De Lacey family.
15
  The entire De Lacey family embraces this outsider and contributes 
to educating Safie to speak their language.  Unknown and unseen, the creature “claims” 
the education meant for Safie and learns to read and write, but he also learns the 
Miltonic identity politics of terror curriculum.
16
   
According to Miltonic identity politics, the cottagers are essentially bound to 
one another because of their biological relation.  Safie qualifies as an exceptional being 
by virtue of her beauty and her romantic attachment to Felix.  The creature, yet ignorant 
of his own strangeness, identifies with the stranger, Safie, and “dares” to hope for 
acceptance into the fold of “beloved” cottagers.  It is not until he sees his own reflection 
in a clear pool that he knows of his physical deformity relative to the cottagers’ perfect 
forms and Safie’s beauty.  It is not until he learns of human cruelty from Safie’s lessons 
that he connects the cottagers to the species that abused him in the village.  It is not until 
he reads Milton (and others) and Victor’s laboratory journal that he understands himself 
as a different species from these beautiful people.  But he still believes his kindness, 
conveyed in language, will compensate for his physical difference.  
Part of the creature’s bildung, then, includes learning to feel emotional as well 
as physical pain and pleasure as he becomes more acutely aware of himself as part of 
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and apart from the human species whose “form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid 
even for the very resemblance.”
17
  The creature learns to regret knowing anything 
beyond physical needs.  The hierarchized epistemology for our species’ bildung 
proscribes this “growth,” this educational metamorphosis, from physical to emotional, 
concrete to abstract, selfish to empathetic ways of knowing.  When, for example, a 
child’s exceptionalities do not allow her to “progress” according to this developmental 
model, to this bildung narrative of our species, she is considered “developmentally 
delayed.”  If that child comes to understand herself as “more horrid even for the very 
resemblance,” such knowing is deeply problematic for the knower and grounded in the 
Miltonic identity politics of monstrous miseducation.  The creature is this child.  
In his voyeuristic isolation, the creature learns the “sanguinary laws of man” and 
the “difference of the sexes…of brother, sister, and all the various relationships which 
bind one human being to another in mutual bonds” through C.F. Volney’s Ruins of 
Empires:  or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires and the Law of Nature, 
Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, Milton’s Paradise Lost, and Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young 
Werter.  Mary Shelley could have put other texts, including her mother’s educational 
thought, in the creature’s hands but did not.  This “absent” text could represent the 
cultural wealth of maternal teaching and teachings the creature was denied, cultural 
wealth that might have offset the terror curriculum’s cultural liabilities, not only for the 
creature but also for Victor, for Mary Shelley, and for modernity writ large.   
Instead, against the backdrop of these Miltonic narratives of creation, 
transgression, and fall, the creature learns of the “cursed origin of [his] being” by 
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reading his own creation story in Victor’s laboratory journal.
18
  The more the creature 
learns about the human species to which he does not belong and of his creator from 
whom he is banished, the more acutely he understands the horror of his own being and 
the more he learns to see himself as a monster in an irrational universe that forbids him 
community, continuity, and compassion.  The ontological implications of the creature’s 
invisibility to the De Lacey family suggest the optimal conditions for the transmission 
of terror curriculum.  By learning Victor’s (and by extension, the human species’) 
powers of reason and compassion and how to express them in language, yet still 
suffering horror and rejection, the creature complicates Wollstonecraft’s claim that “the 
nature of reason must be the same in all…the tie that connects the creature with the 
Creator.”
19
  In the same way, Mary Shelley’s lived experience of Miltonic identity 
politics in relation to Godwin and Shelley mocked this claim.   
Like the creature, Mary Shelley read an account of her “filthy creation” in her 
father’s Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and (like her 
creature) she understood the patriarchal literary tradition of Milton as “histories.”
20
  But 
she forbade her motherless creature access to her own mother’s educational thought.  
Psychoanalytic speculations about unavailable fathers and absent mothers aside, 
monstrous miseducation suggests a lack of maternal teaching and teachings because it is 
in this gap that the creature, like his second-order creator Mary Shelley, comes to know 
what he is by learning what he is not.  He, like Mary Shelley has dangerously 
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unmediated access to the texts of patriarchal culture, but is powerless to participate in 
that culture or change the injustices built into it.  The creature seems to profoundly 
understand (as Victor does not), Wollstonecraft’s proposition that, “Few…have had 
much affection for mankind, who did not first love their parents, their brothers, sisters, 
and even the domestic brutes.”
21
  The creature’s complaint is indeed that a lack of 
maternal teaching and teachings has crippled and criminalized him, but also that 
unmediated encounters with Miltonic identity politics of modernity have consequences. 
But would it even be possible for the creature’s unique experience of self-
education to follow the bildung ideal, moving “organically” from the physical, to the 
moral, to the intellectual ways of knowing?  What might it mean to the educational 
myth of Frankenstein that the creature sees the human species and culture through the 
eyes of another species?  The epistemological implications of the creature’s standpoint 
and the way difference cannot be understood when the prevailing curricular paradigms 
are bildung and genius confirm the falsity of those ideals and suggest the dire 
consequences of monstrous miseducation.  Despite suffering at the hands of the human 
species, the creature learns of its potential goodness and longs for companionship with 
members of our complex species.  Perhaps he desires human contact because he 
possesses the all-too-human need for emotional attachment and for physical touch.  And 
perhaps his education in and by human culture, peppered with examples of mindful 
human tenderness and altruism, merits his hope of building those relationships.   
Like Milton’s Eve, denied the first great metamorphosis and a mother, the 
creature sees his image reflected back to him in a clear pool and, after a moment of 
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Lacanian horror at his singularity, begins to place his faith in the “god-like science” of 
language.
22
  His educational aim is to “become master of their language” so that he can 
explain his “deformity” in “conciliatory language” that will earn him “their love.”
23
  
Unlike the creature, Milton’s Eve’s educational aim was absolute, solitary self-
possession.  The creature, who has spent the majority of his short life watching the 
domestic relations of a family, desires a link to another species with which he can share 
pain and pleasure.  The creature desires a history.  And for the creature, as for Mary 
Shelley, that history is profoundly connected to maternal teaching and teachings in love 
and survival.  Provocatively, Mary Shelley denies a mother to the De Lacey family.  
The text is absolutely silent on this point. 
The creature comes to regret knowing anything beyond physical needs, but 
before his metamorphosis, he aims to transcend the confines of his physical body by 
acquiring distinctly human ways of sensing, being, and knowing because he sees our 
species from the mythic and binary perspective of Miltonic identity politics, as “at once 
so powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, yet so vicious and base…a mere scion of the 
evil principle, and…all that can be conceived of noble and godlike.”
24
  From the 
instruction “Felix bestowed upon” Safie, the creature comes to understand “the strange 
system of human society…the division of property, of immense wealth and squalid 
poverty; of rank, descent, and noble blood.”
25
  Yet despite his “disgust” at the “system” 
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and its history, despite knowing he will be excluded because he possesses neither “high 
and unsullied descent” nor “riches,” like Mary Shelley, he still wants to belong.
26
 
Planning his approach and practicing his language throughout the winter 
months, the creature “allowed his thoughts, unchecked by reason, to ramble in the fields 
of Paradise, and dared to fancy amiable and lovely creatures sympathising with my 
feelings.”
27
  The creature waits for the spring day when “younger cottagers” leave old 
man De Lacey at home alone.  He has reasoned that the blindness of the De Lacey 
family’s patriarch should mean that the old man is not bound to an ocularcentric 
aesthetic, ontologic, or epistemic tradition.  Also, the old man’s status as an exile from 
revolutionary France should make him tolerant toward another outcast.  Indeed, perhaps 
De Lacey’s blindness ought to bind him to another creature who has suffered from 
prejudice born of a fear of difference.  And for a moment, their common language and 
shared status does bind the impotent patriarch to the supplicant creature.  But the 
younger, sighted cottagers return and misinterpret the scene before the creature can 
explain why he is clinging to their father’s knees, begging for mercy, protection, and 
friendship.  These beautiful, perfectible De Laceys read physical deformity as moral 
deformity just as sure as the creature reads physical beauty as moral beauty.  Felix 
strikes the creature and chases him from the cottage.  Calling upon the only frame of 
reference he has, Miltonic identity politics, in bitter anguish the creature laments that, 
“it was all a dream; no Eve soothed my sorrows, nor shared my thoughts; I was alone.  I 
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remembered Adam’s supplication to his Creator.  But where was mine?  He had 
abandoned me; and, in the bitterness of my heart, I cursed him.”
28
 
Deeply wounded by his rejection and terribly aware of the horror he inspires, the 
enraged creature refrains from retaliation on the vain hope that the old man might yet 
educate his children that the creature’s existence “has been hitherto harmless, and in 
some way beneficial.”
29
  The problem, however, is that even if the old man had 
“compassioned” the creature and insisted that his children give him a fair hearing, old 
man De Lacey (or any individual) could not wield the kind of power necessary to 
counter generations of monstrous miseducation wrought by terror curriculum.
30
  Indeed, 
this blind, Miltonic patriarch alone cannot “undeceive” his children without maternal 
teaching and teachings.
31
  The following day, the creature finds that the De Lacey 
family has fled.  He burns down the cottage and dances around the flames in an ecstasy 
of revenge.  After consulting Victor’s journal, the creature sets out for Geneva to find 
his “father,” Victor.   
Violence motivated by revenge and as a warning of things to come is bildung 
terror.  The burning of the De Lacey’s cottage could certainly be classed as bildung 
terror, but the creature’s pilgrimage to his creator is more complicated and profoundly 
tied to Miltonic identity politics.  We can desire revenge without that desire manifesting 
itself in an act of terror.  We can also get some sense of justice by means other than 
violence.  But if the thing that we desire is existential meaning within a world that 
cannot or will not accept us (or even see us), bildung terror is an inadequate vehicle to 
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meet that need.  Indeed, terror curriculum itself is an inadequate vehicle to get at 
anything like truth, but when the seeker is made and marred by monstrous miseducation 
she lacks alternatives.  Miseducated by terror curriculum, neither Victor nor his creature 
possesses the imagination to ask or answer such questions in any way but by means of 
terror because they cannot imagine a cyborg affinity politics that allows for chosen 
alliances of amalgamated, plural identities.   
On the outskirts of Geneva, the creature encounters a beautiful little boy he does 
not yet know is Victor’s six year-old brother.  The creature is struck by the idea that one 
so young may not yet have been monstrously miseducated, and “[i]f, therefore, I could 
seize him, and educate him as my companion and friend, I should not be so desolate in 
this peopled earth.”
32
  The creature yet believes in the bildung ideal, if not for himself, 
for the promise embodied in this child.  But the boy immediately calls the creature a 
“hideous monster,” an “ugly wretch,” and an “ogre,” warning the creature that his father 
(Victor’s father) M. Frankenstein, will punish the creature if he dares try to “keep 
him.”
33
  At the mention of a father and Frankenstein, the creature becomes enraged and 
silences the screaming child by strangling him.  This, the creature’s first crime, is the 
creature’s impulsive reaction to the boy’s shrill testament to the essentialism and 
exceptionalism of Miltonic identity politics and the bildung ideal that casts difference as 
monstrosity. This encounter marks the creature’s metamorphosis into a monster because 
he has been named a monster by a monstrously miseducated child.  The creature, too, is 
a monstrously miseducated, motherless child whose father is Frankenstein, but William 
can call out his powerful father’s name as effortlessly he can call out his own.  The 
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“spurned” creature cannot call on his father for protection.  Modernity, like the creature 
and Mary Shelley, has only a deeply gendered Miltonic identity politics by which to 
understand the world and the place of living and nonliving entities within it.  Rather 
than an act of terror, the creature killing William is a crime of passion against Miltonic 
identity politics, a crime for which Victor has a frame of reference that he deliberately 
suppresses in order to deny his complicity – essentialism and exceptionalism.  
I am not implying that Victor should have a “natural bond” with his decidedly 
artificial creation.  That would be to commit the same Miltonic essentialist fallacy that 
claims women should have a natural maternal bond with their offspring.  I say that had 
Victor not been monstrously miseducated, or had the cultural liabilities he encountered 
been tempered with maternal teaching and teachings, he might have had the imagination 
to engage Haraway’s affinity.  Affinity, as opposed to identity, denotes a feminist 
“coalition” united “not by blood but by choice” toward theorizing a counter to the 
rhetoric of the naturalized identity of a maternal bond or sentimentalized notions of 
nurturing capacities.
34
  Haraway conceptualizes affinity as “the appeal of one chemical 
nuclear group for another,” an advantageous “avidity” between creatures.
35
  Affinity 
alliances are voluntary.  Haraway sees possibility in “potent myths for resistance and 
recoupling” of the mind and body; the animal and human; the human and machine; and 
idealism and materialism in her thought experiment of the “cyborg society.”
36
  Rather 
than looking for some “new essential unity” that relies on a Miltonic identity politics, 
Haraway imagines a relational politics among amalgamated individuals and the living 
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and nonliving environment.  She calls for “affinity, not identity.”
37
  In modernity, the 
cyborg “wary of holism,” but “needy of connection” seeks affinity even while it “does 
not dream of community on the model of the organic family.”
38 
  
The cyborg affinity politics I have theorized from Mary Shelley’s lived 
experience and her Frankenstein myth do not demark a pristine, organic completeness 
that signals the end of the individual bildung or the beginning of genius.  I am 
suggesting that Victor’s monstrous miseducation, untempered by maternal teaching and 
teachings, did not equip him with the imagination required to choose affinity with his 
creation.  The Miltonic identity politics of monstrous miseducation depend on Lockean 
empiricism (direct experience) or Kantian judgments (a priori knowing) to legitimate 
knowledge.  Therefore, identification with a stranger, especially a very “strange 
stranger” like the creature, is either impossible or illegitimate.
39
  Cyborg affinity politics 
do not rely on either direct experience or a priori knowing to legitimate its 
understanding of the stranger or to imagine Wollstonecraft’s rational futurity as the 
circulation of gifts that are maternal teaching and teachings of love and survival rather 
than a patriarchal bequeathing “power-knowledge” systems.
40
  Cyborg affinity politics 
might well imagine education as rational futurity and circulating gifts of love and 
survival, a counter to the apocalyptic and nihilistic ends of terror curriculum.   
Unlike Victor, the creature initially does have the “rational” insight to imagine 
Wollstonecraft’s futurity along with the consequences of the deeply gendered, modern 
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terror curriculum.  Even though the creature’s monstrous miseducation leads him to 
appeal to his petty god, Victor, he is able to see the possibility of a cyborg affinity 
politics by which he could become “linked” by choice “to the chain of existence and 
events” and live and die peacefully alongside another amalgamated companion without 
“curs[ing]” his “maker.” 
41
  When the creature proposes his rationale for this possibility 
in order to convince Victor to create his companion, a small window opens in which 
Victor suppresses his revulsion, glimpses the logic of cyborg affinity politics, and 
“compassionated him.”  Realizing he holds the creature’s “small portion of happiness” 
in his genius hands, Victor agrees to create the female creature.  Despite the creature’s 
vow to “make peace with the whole kind” if even one of Victor’s species, our species, 
would include him and treat him with kindness, it is telling of Victor’s commitment to 
Miltonic identity politics that he cannot imagine offering the creature his 
companionship.  Victor cannot see this third and crucial option available to him because 
Victor no longer sees himself as a member of our species.  Victor has come to know 
himself as a genius.  Knowing the Miltonic “secrets of heaven and earth,” amounts to 
monstrous miseducation that unfits us to live even within the “normative community” 
from which the very ideal of genius sprung.
42
  Without maternal teaching and teachings 
of love and survival, the creature and creator are the only fit company left to one 
another, but monstrous miseducation voids even that undesirable connection. 
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Godwinian Perfectibility as Monstrous Miseducation:  Paternalism and Uneven 
Development 
With the benefit of hindsight, first-born Victor describes the early stages of his 
bildung in Geneva, Switzerland as “guided by a silken cord” within the bourgeois 
Frankenstein home and family that uncritically values monstrous miseducation’s 
paternalistic means and ends in the domestic realm.
43
  Led by “syndic” Alphonse 
Frankenstein, the family’s sense of domestic responsibility and individual perfectibility, 
while well-intended, amounts to noblesse oblige.  Victor’s own mother, Caroline 
Beaufort Frankenstein, was a foundling “rescued” through marriage by the “protecting 
spirit” of Victor’s much older father upon the death of her own father to whom she had 
sacrificed her girlhood.
44
  In turn, his mother saves a highborn, “fair” girl, Elizabeth 
Lavenza, from the poverty of the peasants who were raising this orphaned daughter of a 
“Milanese nobleman” among their own “dark-eyed, hardy little vagrants.”
45
  Upon 
receiving this “gift” (the child, Elizabeth) from his mother, Victor, “with childish 
seriousness, interpreted her words literally” and imagined his “more than sister” as “a 
possession.”
46
  Frankensteinian women and peasants embody the uneven development 
of imperial subjects who learned that their very survival depended on the good will of 
the Empire when in reality, the Empire depended on the uneven development of 
imperial subjects.  Arguably, Victor’s appropriation of bodies began with the family 
values of Godwinian perfectibility impressed upon him at the age of six.  Educated 
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according to the deeply gendered framework of modernity’s terror curriculum, he learns 
to evaluate the world, himself, and other people in terms of patronage and desert.   
For Frankensteinian women (and for bourgeois women more generally), 
patronage meant marriage to a man the age of her father or to a man with “promise” (or 
– ironically in light of the concept of “desert” for women – an inheritance), 
development meant virtuous matrimony and motherhood, and desert meant a delicate, 
blameless fall on misfortune that necessitated “raising” from destitution by a powerful, 
benevolent father-husband.  Such “feminine” dependence on others would have been 
repellent to a “self-made” man like Victor, a man with genius prospects in the late 
eighteenth century.  Indeed, the private home and larger cultural landscape in which he 
was raised taught him to see himself as a noble benefactor who giveth and taketh away, 
albeit on a rather petty scale.  Of course, Victor was not self-made any more than any 
other bourgeois gentleman of Geneva.  His patrimony determined the rights afforded to 
him and duties expected of him, but it also assured that his pursuits, projects, and 
paternalism could never quite be his own despite Godwinian perfectibility’s bildung and 
genius rhetoric to the contrary.  Like Percy Shelley, Victor’s privileged inheritance, 
paradoxically, is the province of self-born, self-made, self-directed, and self-contained 
singularity.  Denied maternal teaching and teachings about love and survival, Mary 
Shelley, is excluded from the Godwinian perfectibility she has read about even while 
she and most women are consigned to the uneven development of dependent imperial 
subjects.  The creature, though, from his strange stranger standpoint has no frame of 
reference for Godwinian perfectibility and its attendant paternalism or uneven 
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development.  His encounters initially educate him according to a circulation of gifts 
model that the terror curriculum quickly overshadows. 
 Hiding in the hovel connected to the De Lacey family cottage, the creature 
watches the family’s everyday expression of familial affections and exercise of 
domestic duties.  He learns that his habit of pilfering the family’s meager food stores 
causes them distress.  He stops stealing from them and instead starts contributing to 
their welfare as the “invisible hand” that supplies firewood and the “good spirit” who 
clears the path of snow.
47
  The creature lovingly begins to call the De Lacey family his 
“friends” and “protectors” despite the fact that they are completely unaware of his 
presence.  By stealth and voyeurism, the creature learns to give in a way that defies the 
model of rational self-interest an invisible hand might imply.  His giving is not 
paternalistic, nor is it predicated on his own advancement.  Rather than bequeathing, he 
gifts in a way that contributes to the general welfare because he sees real need and has 
the imagination to reason how he might help meet that need based on his unique 
strengths.  This circulation of domestic affection and responsibility, the cultural wealth 
of maternal teaching and teachings, suggests the contrary case that informed the 
creature’s ability to imagine cyborg affinity politics against all odds. 
Is Mary Shelley deploying the value-laden descriptor “invisible hand” 
ironically?  No extant evidence shows that she read Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1778).  However, it is clear that she was 
familiar with contemporary economic doctrine and policy.  From journals and letters, 
we know she read John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) in 
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1815, 1816, and again in 1820 and can speculate that she was also familiar with his 
defense of private property or at least the codification of its provisos into economic, 
political, and social policy (patrilineal bequeathing).  By Mary Shelley’s time, Locke’s 
Natural Law – including the system of private property – would have been the given 
that enabled Smith to compare the invisible hand of the market with the invisible hand 
of God; conflate social well-being with economic growth; equate monetary value and 
human value; and to measure progress in economic abstractions.  Human needs, not to 
mention stewardship of the living and nonliving planet, are rendered irrelevant or 
invisible by this admixture of proto-Darwinian evolutionary theory (bildung) and the 
invisible hand’s magical alchemy (genius).  Without understanding the monstrously 
miseducative underpinnings of the essentially deterministic growth model of bildung 
and the manifest destiny model of genius in Smith’s justification of market competition, 
it is easy to overlook the genocidal rhetoric of his political economy echoed in 
Godwinian perfectibility:  
Many would not be able to find employment even upon these hard terms, but 
would either starve, or be driven to seek a subsistence, either by begging, or by 
the perpetration perhaps, of the greatest enormities.  Want, famine, and 
mortality, would immediately prevail in that class, and from thence extend 
themselves to all the superior classes, till the number of inhabitants in the 
country was reduced to what could easily be maintained by the revenue and 
stock which remained in it, and which had escaped either the tyranny or 
calamity which had destroyed the rest.
48
 
Indeed, within a capitalist system, philanthropy may not be evidence of a love of 
humanity at all.  Ethics might not be something hardwired into the kind of beings we 
are as Smith’s “Theory of Moral Sentiments” would suggest.
49
  Ethical sensibilities 
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might not be the trait that distinguishes the human from the nonhuman.  It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that Mary Shelley is indirectly critiquing the mind-over-matter 
immortality and Malthusian logic of a Godwinian perfectibility that would lead to a 
society comprised completely of immortal adults.  The creature is “born” in a mature 
body with an intellect that develops with “superhuman speed.”
50
  By the age of two, the 
creature’s physical prowess exceeds that of Victor.  Arguably his intellectual dexterity 
equals that of his creator.  Surely, though, his emotional intelligence surpasses Victor’s 
stunted emotional intelligence.  
Perhaps an extremely cynical reading might yield a different interpretation of 
the creature’s motivation for giving and would find that the self-interest that stirs the 
creature’s “invisible hand” and wakens his “good spirit” is merely his desire to 
insinuate himself into the De Lacey household.  His philanthropy might not be 
philanthropy at all.  But that logic does not stand up to the educational thought Mary 
Shelley explores in the text.  As one who experienced his accelerated first great 
metamorphosis in isolation, the creature craves the connection that the genius ideal 
deems unnecessary.   
The solitary nature of the creature’s first great metamorphosis much closer to 
that of Victor, the Wild Boy of Aveyron than that of “self-made” genius, Victor 
Frankenstein.
51
  No contemporary documentary evidence exists to prove that Mary 
Shelley read about Victor of Aveyron.  However, she was fascinated with and well read 
in the natural and “social” science of the day.  She also includes the place name of 
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Aveyron in her travel narratives.
52
  Hence, I suspect she did know about his widely 
publicized case.  Captured in 1797, Victor quickly escaped the spectator sport of 
anthropological inquiry and almost as quickly reemerged in 1800 to spend the 
remainder of his life in the kind “captivity” of Dr. Jean Marc Gaspard Itard’s (1774-
1838) housekeeper, Mme. Guerin until his death in 1828.  But because Victor of 
Aveyron never acquired the “god-like science” of human language as the creature did, 
we will never know if he had an understanding of his unique ontological standpoint, as 
the creature did.  We do know that the creature appreciates that his physical strength 
and mental acuity is superior to that of our species, but we also know that the creature 
tries to throw off the alienating chains of genius and join the ranks of bildung.  The 
problem, as Martin points out, is that the first great metamorphosis is “a relational affair 
involving not only hard work but also the circulation of love.”
53
  The genius creature 
makes cognitive leaps that Victor of Aveyron seems never to have made, but he has no 
reciprocal alliances, no affinities, therefore love is always already short-circuited in part 
because the creature’s metamorphosis was of the quantum, revolutionary type rather 
than the slow, evolutionary variety characteristic of a more sustainable growth model.  
While Godwinian perfectibility was inclusive for its time in the sense that it 
conceived of a wide variety of human intellect, believed in the educability of all classes 
of people, and attributed differences in levels of cognitive achievement to external 
(material) circumstances, it also placed sole responsibility for the individual pupil’s 
education in the intentional hands of the educator.  Hence, “the question whether the 
pupil shall be a man of perseverance and enterprise or a stupid and inanimate dolt, 
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depends upon the powers of those under whose direction he is placed and the skill with 
which those powers shall be applied.”
54
  “Perseverance” and “enterprise” are rather 
vague descriptors of what it means to be well educated.  Such a powerful teacher might 
indeed create a focused, entrepreneurial warmonger.  Conversely, by this logic, a poor 
teacher does not have the power to make anything of his student – stupid dolt or 
otherwise.  In one breath, Godwin generously claims that all members of our species are 
capable of learning irrespective of physical and material differences.  But in another, he 
openly excludes those “cases that are palpably and unequivocally excluded by the 
structure of their frame” from the realm of perfectibility – the capacity for perpetual 
improvement.
55
  Perhaps the “deformation” in this educational paradigm is the 
paradigm itself:  the “frame” of the sculpture made with skill and intention, in a 
vacuum, by a powerful Godwinian sculptor. 
Astoundingly, rejection by the De Lacey family does not completely devastate 
the creature’s hopes for sympathetic relations with our species.  While he does express 
his suffering and rage by burning the empty cottage to the ground, the creature does not 
terrorize the family or kill them.  His restraint is remarkable.  Instead, he refuses 
“despair,” and decides to “bend [his] steps” toward the “father” and “creator” who he 
knew had seen him during his creation and birth, but could not possibly know him as the 
creature he had become.
56
  On the one hand, the “the spirit of revenge” motivates the 
creature to find Victor.  On the other, the creature’s desire for visibility and a 
connection to his maker motivates his search.  With the help of his Miltonic theology 
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from Paradise Lost and observing the De Lacey family, the creature elevates Victor to 
the status of a superhuman genius to which he must “apply” for “that justice which I 
vainly attempted to gain from any other being that wore the human form.”
57
  In effect, 
the creature, like Mary Shelley, feels that creator-Victor, like God-Godwin, owes him a 
meaningful acknowledgement of his existence.  Again, the language of desert and 
patronage characterizes the Godwinian perfectibility’s paternalism.  The creature’s 
journey to meet his maker in Geneva is another in a series of “whole person or identity 
transformations brought about by” monstrous miseducation – culture crossings “fraught 
with alienation, inner conflict, accusations of betrayal, and anxieties about going home 
again.”
58
  The creature looks to his imperial master for validation and cannot imagine 
that the imperial master looks back at his subject for the very same.  
By the time his two year-old creature tracks Victor down and demands that he 
create a female companion for him, Victor is no longer enchanted by the idea of being a 
god to a new species.  Instead, he grudgingly accepts the responsibility of a 
misunderstood genius, victimized by his own genius.  And in some important 
educational sense, this victimization is precisely what has happened to Victor – he has 
fallen prey to the fallacious reasoning of genius and Godwinian perfectibility.  Hence, 
he cannot relinquish his faith in the project of genius altogether.  If he had recognized 
the ideal of genius as a cultural liability, regardless of how “persuasive” the reasoning 
creature has become, Victor would not have used his “power” to create or to destroy the 
female companion.
59
  For, in the final hour of her “birth,” as the creature looks on 
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howling in agony, Victor dismantles the female creature’s body with his bare surgeon’s 
hands.  He destroys his female creation because he fears her procreative potential and 
because he has been formally educated according to a bildung ideal that values self-
replicating technology, he believes he knows the two creatures would usurp his 
perceived reproductive authority and relish mastery. 
Victor’s monstrous miseducation enables him only to imagine technological 
solutions to the problems wrought by technology.  Therein lies the dangerous continuity 
of monstrous miseducation and Godwinian perfectibility.  Judith Halberstam argues that 
the creation of the female, or the surgical construction of the uterus “out of bits and 
pieces of life and death, of criminals and animals, animate and inanimate objects,” is the 
more horrific creation for Victor – a creation that must be aborted.
 60
  Halberstam 
overlooks Victor's horror at the surviving male creature, however.  As the Godwinian 
sculptor, Victor must maintain creative control over the reproductive capacity of the 
arbitrarily constructed genders of his creations.  Hence, he must control both the male 
and female parts in the reproduction of human life.  If he had not aborted the female 
creature, he would effectively give up that authority.   
Victor is not, as he claims, concerned about being responsible for propagating a 
“race of devils,” or he would not have made the female creature reproductively viable.
61
  
Instead, he worries that he will lose control over the sexual reproduction of this new 
species – replication that would occur outside of his genius control.  Just like the 
arbitrary surgical control he exacts over the genders he constructs, Victor arbitrates over 
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the reproductive power of his creations and his genius cannot suffer their procreative 
potential.  Although the creature is clearly both created as a male and desires to occupy 
a “masculine” role, it is neither masculine nor feminine.  For Halberstam such in-
between-ness is coded as early-modern monstrousness, but for Haraway, this very same 
in-between-ness belongs to the post-modern cyborg who does not share 
…the hopes of Frankenstein's monster…does not expect its father to save it 
through a restoration of the garden…through the fabrication of a heterosexual 
mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos. The cyborg 
does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time 
without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of 
Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust.
62
 
Unlike Haraway’s cyborg, the creature is enmeshed in the bildung ideal derived 
from the terror curriculum that formed him, but ultimately he dares not hope for kinship 
with our species.  He uses a separatist argument to convince Victor that he and his mate 
will live in Edenic plenty far from the “neighborhood of man.”
63
  Oddly, the creature’s 
very existence, though, calls into profound question any singular notion of the “origin 
of species” for every living thing on earth that is not the creature or his mate.  It is not 
even possible to point to a particular moment when species A mutated into species B, 
hence the “growth and development” of any species (let alone the individual members 
of a species) is not as predictable and paradoxically stable as bildung narratives claim.  
The creature’s genius and genesis, then, condemns him to a “forced solitude” he 
“abhors”
64
 a “vagabond and a slave” to “thought and feeling.”
65
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Wollstonecraft asks the question that dismantles Godwinian perfectibility:  
“What, indeed, can tend to deprave the character more than outward submission and 
inward contempt?”
66
  She understood the dilemma of Mary Shelley and her creature: 
Slaves and mobs have always indulged themselves in the same excesses, when 
once they broke loose from authority.  The bent bow recoils with violence, when 
the hand is suddenly relaxed that forcibly held it…the plaything of outward 
circumstances, must be subjected to authority, or moderated by reason.
67
  
And she warned that “every violation of justice and reason, in the treatment of children, 
weakens their reason,” but monstrous miseducation depends upon injustice and 
unreason of Godwinian perfectibility.
68
  Paternalism and uneven development must 
have “illegitimate offspring” in order to validate the Empire’s very existence.
69
   
Abandonment to Multiple Educational Agency as Monstrous Miseducation:  Techno-
scientific Productivity and Gothic Sublimity 
The bildung ideal relies upon the meme of environmental determinism that 
divests the individual’s development of her social, economic, and political context.  The 
genius ideal relies upon a genetic meme, similar in consequence to that of bildung, that 
the individual can be understood and can understand herself apart from her biosocial 
environment.  Avoiding debates over developmental and aesthetic models rooted in 
psychoanalysis, but noting that Mary Shelley and her fictive creations are products of 
abandonment (physically and emotionally) seems rather unavoidable.  Alongside 
parthenogenic male birth of Miltonic mythos and Godwinian immortality, parental 
abandonment to multiple educational agency represents another core feature of 
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monstrous miseducation.  The trauma of such abandonment itself miseducates children 
that the world is not a safe place and that violence is one successful way to adapt to a 
hostile environment.  And indeed, the modern world is not a safe place and violence is 
one successful mode of adaptation – a lesson learned all too well by parents who 
abandon and abuse children physically and emotionally under conditions of stress, 
especially economic stress.  Abandonment is more often not of the literal variety 
undergone by the creature.  More often, it is like that experienced by Mary Shelley and 
Victor:  parents and guardians preoccupied with intellectual and business pursuits allow 
their children unmediated access to cultural stock that they are too busy and harried to 
inventory for liabilities that need to be discarded and assets that require preservation.   
At age 17, Victor was abandoned to the University of Ingolstadt shortly after 
suffering the death of his mother.  The first professor he encounters humiliates him by 
mocking his reverence for medieval and Renaissance alchemists in “this enlightened 
and scientific age.”
70
  But Victor’s capacious intellect soon makes room for Newtonian 
natural philosophy, and he swiftly mutates into what the encounters with the multiple 
educational agency of the larger cultural surround have miseducated him to be:  an 
isolated, arrogant, tragically misshapen being stripped of the ability to imagine himself 
in equal relation to others.
71
  Victor’s encounters with the bildung ideal of the university 
inspire him to deify certain kinds of self-replicating technologies – with known and 
unknown consequences – and their correspondent visions of progress.  This branch of 
the techno-scientific terror curriculum teaches him to value development as “naturally” 
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progressive and to see monstrous consequences as inevitable and ultimately solvable by 
more “advanced” technologies, all the while ignoring the power of that which 
historically gave rise to the technology in the first place.  The aspect of Victor’s 
monstrous miseducation that resulted from his abandonment to multiple educational 
agency, then, actually mimics the unchecked miseducative potential of multiple 
educational agency yoking the miseducative experiences of individuals to the 
miseducative ideologies of the terror curriculum.  The contemporary political rhetoric of 
“fighting fire with fire” and “the war on terror” exemplifies this manifestation of 
collective monstrous miseducation.  In fact, during Wollstonecraft’s time, monarchical 
England, like the twenty-first-century United States of America, was “fighting a war on 
terror” with the first two revolutionary democracies:  the newly independent United 
States of America and France.  
Wollstonecraft would not have registered surprise at the consequences of 
Victor’s expensive, single-sex miseducation. “Public” schools like Ingolstadt, 
Wollstonecraft insisted, are “hotbeds of vice and folly” where a curriculum of “habitual 
cruelty” teaches young men to exploit those at their mercy (animals, women, children), 
and instead of gaining “knowledge of human nature,” they learn “merely cunning 
selfishness.”  After surpassing the professors who bequeathed to him their knowledge 
and isolating in his private quarters to conduct his independent research, Victor begins 
to self-identify as a genius artist-creator.  The very evolving nature of his identification 
with genius suggests the culture crossing that induced his educational metamorphosis 
from self-interested bourgeois gentleman to narcissistic creative genius.  Indeed, 
Victor’s culture crossing from the private world of the Frankenstein estate to the public 
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world of the university amounts to abandonment to multiple educational agency 
wrought by techno-scientific productivity that is devoid of maternal teaching and 
teachings.
72
  Ostensibly, only the creature, a magistrate of Geneva, Walton, and 
Walton’s sister would ever know of his project.  Like his creature, he works alone.  
Equipped with the surgical skill to piece together a human body and the self-will 
to chase “nature to her hiding places,” Victor learns to appreciate the nude uniformity of 
the “human frame” from the disinterested, artist-creator perspective of genius.  It is this 
disinterestedness that enables him to “torture the living animal to animate the lifeless 
clay,”
73
 and transforms him from a selfish entitled child into a dangerously gifted 
engineer who, as Wollstonecraft warned, becomes the kind of being who “can see pain, 
unmoved” and “learn[s] to inflict it.”
74
  Culture crossings that amount to abandoning 
individuals to an-aesthetic experiences and environments devoid of maternal teaching 
and teachings, charged Wollstonecraft, “destroy the constitution before it is formed; 
hardening the heart as it weakens the understanding” by narrowly valuing education of 
the intellect “instead of cultivating domestic affections.”
75
  If we take Wollstonecraft 
seriously, it would seem that the intentional, progressive, enlightened curriculum of 
Ingolstadt labors under a long shadow of unintentional learning:  habits of cruelty and 
prejudice.
76
  For all its progressive promises, without the circulation of gifts that is 
maternal teaching and the cyborg affinity politics of love and survival that are maternal 
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teachings, Victor’s formal education isolates him and misshapes him in a way that 
forbids him to imagine sustainable, rational hopes for futurity.
77
  His apocalyptic an-
aesthetic cannot countenance a future of shared wisdom among amalgamated identities 
that have rationally chosen and formed affinity cells to build a sustainable environment. 
Hence, despite the paternalism propped up by the uneven development of those 
with limited social capital that characterized Victor’s upbringing (or because of its 
peculiar variety, Godwinian perfectibility), he never imagines himself parenting the 
being he endeavors to create.  Instead, he hubristically envisions himself a god to a 
Miltonic legion of such creations, marveling that “a new species would bless me…and 
owe their being to me.  No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as 
I should deserve theirs.”
 78
  Here, the educational myth of Frankenstein aligns with 
Korsmeyer’s deep gender analysis of the masculine “value placed on dangerously 
fanciful imaginative activity.”
79
  Victor has clearly undergone an educational 
metamorphosis and taken up the mantel of genius in which techno-scientific 
productivity is confused as art in a way that Mary Shelley never could but Percy Shelley 
surely did.  
Victor reports having experienced “rapture” when, as a child he sees through to 
the “causes” of natural phenomena.  Seeing “the world” as “a secret” he “desired to 
divine,” he eschews responsibility for his thoughts, feelings, and actions and instead 
fatalistically claims that “[n]atural philosophy is the genius that has regulated [his] 
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  Explaining his “predilection for” natural philosophy, he goes on to detail two 
encounters that ushered in his an-aesthetic culture crossing to techno-scientific 
productivity.  At age thirteen, he found and read Cornelius Agrippa’s (1486-1535) 
work.  In response to Victor’s enthusiasm for the occult “principles of Agrippa,” his 
father scoffs at his son’s gullibility, calling Agrippa’s thought “sad trash.”
81
  Victor 
blames his father for abandoning him to multiple educational agency and attributes his 
having “received the fatal impulse that led to [his] ruin” as a consequence of his father’s 
failing to explain “that the principles of Agrippa had been entirely exploded, and that a 




According to Victor, his father’s “cursory glance” and curt dismissal only 
peaked his adolescent interest in the alchemists and led him to read, “with the greatest 
avidity,” the works of Paracelsus (1493-1541) and Albertus Magnus (1193-1280).
83
  
While his interest in these “occult” medieval and Renaissance texts, the content of 
which historians of science today cite as early chemistry, might “appear strange” to 
Walton “in the eighteenth century,” Victor confesses to being “self-taught” in his 
“favourite studies,” compelled to supplement “the routine of education in the schools of 
Geneva.”
84
  In Victor’s retrospective of his bildung, his father went from one of “the 
agents and creators of all the many delights” to the ineffectual and “not scientific” 
patriarch who “left [Victor] to struggle with a child’s blindness, added to a student’s 
                                                          
80
 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein ed.  Johanna Smith (Boston:  Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 45-6. This 
mixture of religious, fatalistic language with scientific, positivistic language suggests the absurdity of 
genius as an educational ideal. 
81
 Ibid, 46. 
82
 Ibid, 46. 
83
 Ibid, 46-7. 
84
 Ibid, 47. 
 151 
thirst for knowledge…[u]nder the guidance of [his] new preceptors.”
85
  Like a good 
Godwinian perfectibilist, he became convinced in his “ardent imagination and childish 
reasoning” that he could “render man invulnerable to any but a violent death” and 
secure the genius end of immortality for the human species.
86
  
  While Victor has the luxury of “shunning his fellow creatures” and abandoning 
his creation, the newborn, full-grown creature is banned from the human species upon 
“receiving life.”
87
  Yet ignorant of his origins, the natural world, and society, the 
abandoned, sutured creature first comes to know sensations of light and darkness, heat 
and cold, hunger and thirst.  He learns through his experience of the natural world, 
noting through the “operations of the fire” that the same cause can have different 
effects:  physical pain and pleasure.
88
  But as Mellor argues, this “Promethean gift” of 
fire and “civilization” has both creative and destructive potential.
89
  It would seem a 
Promethean gift amounts to patriarchal bequeathing of power-knowledge systems 
enmeshed in the techno-scientific productivity realm of terror curriculum. 
Indeed, the “original era of [the creature’s] being” reads like the bildung 
narrative of Lockean empiricism, while in his telling of growth and development he 
self-identifies with Rousseauian Romanticism.
90
  It is tempting to cast the creature as a 
Rousseauian child of nature, but when Frankenstein is reformulated as a myth of 
monstrous miseducation, it is difficult to sustain the argument that the creature is any 
more a “natural man” than Victor or than Mary Shelley herself.  From his super-natural 
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inception, the creature is excluded from the province of “nature” and the “natural.”
91
  
He is unambiguously an artificially created thing, cast fully-formed – yet painstakingly 
sutured together by his maker – into the world in all its natural and cultural complexity.  
For all of the Lockean sensation and experience the creature gains in the forest outside 
Ingolstadt, his earliest educational encounters are not properly analogous to that of 
“primitive” peoples or cultures.  In spite and because of his unprecedented isolation, he 
is deeply mired in the cultural morass of his place and time, the terror curriculum.
92
   
If the sculptor’s abandonment of the sculpture can be considered a non-
interventionist policy of education, the creature’s precocious physical independence and 
mental aptitude suggest the educational ideal of genius.  Claiming the patriarchal 
education meant for someone else, the creature is self-taught in the Western intellectual 
tradition (like Wollstonecraft).  Surely, he is radically independent from birth, but he is 
not “self-begot” like Milton’s Satan.  Can it be said, then, that his genius is self-made, 
self-directed, and self-contained?  The implications of abandoning a physically (and 
quickly, intellectually) mature but emotionally immature creature to encounters with a 
world to which he is so singularly unfitted or which seems so singularly unfitted to him 
suggests the radical outsider status of genius.  But Victor abandons the creature to 
multiple educational agency that enthusiastically supports monstrously accelerated 
development in so many ways, yet rejects this ontologically unstable being as 
                                                          
91
 Without entering into the debate over what constitutes “nature” and “natural,” I do think it is important 
to see those terms as ideologically freighted, socially constructed ideas. 
92
 Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror:  An Essay on Abjection (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1982).  If the theory of cell memory has any validity, the creature is certainly no tabula rasa.  Also, while 
surely outside of my domain, Julia Kristeva’s answer to the patriarchal unconscious of Jacques Lacan and 
Sigmund Freud suggests that the creature occupies a sort of extreme abjection. 
 153 
incomprehensible.  Is he the kind of being that results when genius usurps the first great 
metamorphosis from a creature of nature to a member of human culture?
93
  
Denied the first great metamorphosis from a creature of nature to a creature of 
culture, this creature flies in the face of the nature/culture divide Martin highlights from 
Rousseau’s thought experiment in Book I of Émile.  Unlike Rousseau’s automaton, the 
creature knows he has a body and takes care to cover it before leaving Victor’s 
laboratory.  He seems to have a priori knowledge of the cultural convention of modesty.  
Some of the subtler distinctions (colors, etc.) take the creature time to acquire, but 
“[t]his man-child” never presents as “a perfect imbecile, an automaton, an immobile and 
almost insensitive statue” except for in representations of him in films.
94
  Here, the 
creature complicates the Romantic, neo-humanist narratives of genius and bildung.    
Still naively unconscious of his appearance, the creature is driven by cold and 
hunger to migrate from the forests surrounding Ingolstadt.  Violence born of fear marks 
every encounter he has with our species, but his encounters with physical violence and 
terror do not immediately become yoked to any latent capacities he possesses for 
violence. He does not learn to be violent from violence; he learns to be afraid.  In fact, 
the creature’s ambiguous ontological status challenges Martin’s idea of education as “a 
process of change in which the capacities of an individual and the stock of a culture 
become yoked together.”
 95
  It is his very singularity that tests Martin’s unified theory of 
education as encounter.  The creature claims that his “vices are the children” that 
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resulted from his singularity and abandonment.
96
  Abandonment is part and parcel of the 
monstrous miseducation that transmits the terror curriculum through multiple 
educational agency.  The creature confirms the consequences of short-circuiting the first 
great metamorphosis when he articulates the ontological questions that arose from his 
abandonment to multiple educational agency: 
Other lessons were impressed upon me even more deeply.  I heard of the 
difference of sexes; and the birth and growth of children; how the father doated 
on the smiles of the infant, and the lively sallies of the older child; how all the 
life and cares of the mother were wrapped up in the precious charge; how the 
mind of youth expanded and gained knowledge; of brother, sister, and all the 
various relationships which bind one human being to another in mutual bonds. 
But where were my friends and relations?  No father had watched my infant 
days, no mother had blessed me with smiles and caresses; or if they had, all my 
past life was now a blot, a blind vacancy in which I distinguished nothing.  From 
my earliest remembrance I had been as I then was in height and proportion.  I 
had never yet seen a being resembling me or who claimed any intercourse with 
me.  What was I?
97
  
 Victor’s training in empirical science teaches him to observe and interpret 
phenomena under “no uncertain” terms, and at the same time, ironically, to operate 
from a litany of assumptions garnered by his encounters with terror curriculum and 
especially the fatalism and will to irrationality I associate with the gothic sublime.  His 
metamorphosis into the genius-creator makes him believe he is omniscient.  It is 
monstrous miseducation that allows Victor’s will to irrationality, a consequence of an 
ideology of genius, to mask itself as a logically defensible position.  
Victor praises the genius hands that hold the potential and the genius minds that 
house the promise to master the secrets of the vast material universe.  His monstrous 
miseducation has at best ill-equipped him to function as a moral agent within a 
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coeducational world.  At worst, Victor’s monstrous miseducation has taught him to 
shun the uncouth and abandon the unlovable, illustrating Wollstonecraft’s somehow 
ironic warning that “till society is very differently organized, I fear, this vestige of 
gothic manners will not be done away by a more reasonable and affectionate mode of 
conduct.”
98
  Violating Wollstonecraft’s precondition to moral action, what Laird calls 
“republican coeducation,” monstrous miseducation denies its progeny communion with 
“the thing [it] had put together.”
99
  Thus denied, the progeny sees itself like Mary 
Shelley and her creature:  “abandoned…an abortion, to be spurned at, and kicked, and 
trampled on.”
100
  Hence, that second generation cannot but continue the to transmit the 
terror curriculum.  Just as Victor and the creature and just as Godwin/Shelley and Mary 
Shelley are bound to one another, the one monstrously miseducated generation is 
terribly bound to the one that follows unless intervened upon by a culture “very 
differently organized.” 
 It is in retrospect, as Victor offloads his burden onto Walton, that the fatalism 
and will to irrationality comprising gothic sublimity are most evident.  He describes 
another educational encounter that “regulated [his] fate” while he was still in Geneva 
happened when he was fifteen years old.  After “watching [the] progress” of a “violent 
and terrible” thunderstorm, he “beheld a stream of fire issue from an old and beautiful 
oak” and in the next moment saw the same oak “had disappeared, and nothing remained 
but a blasted stump.”
101
  When he ventured out to the oak in the morning, he was awe-
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struck that the tree had been “shattered in such a singular manner” and marveled at 
something having been “so utterly destroyed.”
102
  Upon reflection, Victor decides that 
“nothing would or could ever be known” and “natural history and all its progeny” were 
ultimately “a deformed and abortive creation.”
103
  After “a man of great research in 
natural philosophy” in explaining the theory of “electricity and galvanism…threw 
greatly into the shade” Victor’s alchemists, he turns his mind to the “secure 
foundations” of “the mathematics.”
104
   
Ostensibly, Victor tells Walton this story of the “catastrophe” and his 
subsequent disillusion for the same reason he tells of his enthusiasm for the alchemists: 
to explain how he became the broken man Walton sees before him.  However, the 
reason this moment in Victor’s bildung heralds an educational metamorphoses has to do 
with Victor’s feelings of envy and sense of defeat in the face of the real, sublime power 
of “nature” despite the fact that in retrospect he fatalistically concludes: 
Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by such slight ligaments are we 
bound to prosperity or ruin.  When I look back, it seems to me as if this almost 
miraculous change of inclination and will was the immediate suggestion of the 
guardian angel of my life – the last effort made by the spirit of preservation to 
avert the storm that was even then hanging in the stars, ready to envelope me.  
Her victory was announced by an unusual tranquility and gladness of soul, 
which followed the relinquishing of my ancient and latterly tormenting studies.  
It was thus that I was to be taught to associate evil with their prosecution, 
happiness with their disregard.
105
       
Victor, with the benefit of hindsight, sees his metamorphoses as predetermined sites of 
epic battles between good and evil “angels” and forces.  He learns to distance himself 
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from responsibility for his actions by aggrandizing his destiny as transcendent, an 
apocalyptic one of creative, destructive, suffering “super-natural” genius.  
Drawing on his monstrous miseducation, Victor certainly sees his development 
as fatalistically guided by “Chance – or rather the evil influence, the Angel of 
Destruction, which asserted omnipotent sway over me from the moment I turned my 
reluctant steps from my father’s door.”
106
  But Mary Shelley confounds terror 
curriculum’s deterministic narratives by showing Victor’s miseducational 
transformation into one who makes and suffers in the Deweyan aesthetic sense, but 
never regains the equilibrium with the environment necessary for a live creature to live 
among other live creatures.  This, Victor’s experience of gothic sublimity, an 
experience that inspires and is inspired by his apocalyptic visions, suggests he has 
undergone an an-aesthetic experience that leaves him with a fatalistic (ironically) 
retrospective and a will to irrationality.  Like his creator Mary Shelley, Victor 
ostensibly tells his story for the moral edification of a third party, Walton.  And while 
he insists that his tale is a didactic on the unforeseen consequences of overweening 
ambition (a pitfall of genius and bildung ideals), in his last, dying words, it is unclear 
whether Victor has learned the lesson he imparts: 
Seek happiness in tranquility, and avoid ambition, even if it be only the 
apparently innocent one of distinguishing yourself in science and discoveries.  




In the wake of his “success,” Victor realizes of the enormity of his “failure,” yet 
seems incapable of taking responsibility for it.  Incapacitated by despair and guilt, he 
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opts to look upon his “experiment” as a terrible gothic nightmare and attempts to drive 
the memory from his mind despite the whispering spirits of his dead loved ones calling 
to him from the grave.  Mary Shelley, too, recorded feelings of being haunted by the 
spirits of the dead.  Guilt, a rather selfish emotion, drives Victor’s apocalyptic an-
aesthetic of gothic sublimity.  After leaving home for the university and becoming 
smitten with techno-scientific productivity, he virtually abdicated all domestic 
responsibilities.  
It is only after receiving a letter from his father announcing William’s murder 
that Victor finally returns home from Ingolstadt after six years away at the university 
without a single visit or even a letter home.  Outside of the gates of Geneva, Victor 
visits the site of William’s murder and catches his first glimpse of the creature he had 
abandoned two years before: 
Could he be (I shuddered at the conception) the murderer of my brother?  No 
sooner did that idea cross my imagination than I became convinced of its 
truth….  Nothing in human shape could have destroyed that fair child....  The 
mere presence of the idea was an irresistible proof of the fact.
108
 
Victor’s unshakeable confidence in his ability to recognize the monstrous is a 
consequence of monstrous miseducation, especially of gothic sublimity.  While he 
suspects, in retrospect, that his “own vampire…let loose from the grave” carries some 
responsibility for the crime, he blames the carnage on supernatural “will and power” 
instead of accepting the singular culpability of a mythic creator or a mythic destroyer.
109
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Had he intuited that he had been monstrously miseducated (as his creature intuited) to 
believe in his genius, he might have rightly blamed the terror curriculum.
110
   
But, Victor’s Machiavellian bildung can only see the living and nonliving world 
under “no uncertain” terms:  because “the idea” crosses “his imagination,” it becomes 
“irresistible proof of the fact.”
111
  Despite his certainty that the creature killed William, 
however, Victor does not come forward to defend Justine (another martyred 
Frankensteinian woman) because he believes that the court would judge him “mad” if 
he revealed the story of the creature and his “proof” of the creature’s guilt (it came into 
his mind when he saw the creature scaling the side of a perpendicular alpine cliff in a 
flash of lightening).  Instead, Victor’s monstrous miseducation allows him to stay silent 
while the devoutly Catholic Justine is coerced to “confess a lie” in order to obtain 
absolution before her execution.
112
  To distance himself from the terrible injustice done 
Justine, Victor had to superimpose a fatalistic, irrational mind over the mind his liberal 
education has trained to be scientific and rational. 
Deploying the discourse of gothic sublimity – “artistic madness” and scientific 
progress – Victor “conceives” the idea of “the creation of a human being,” endures 
“painful labour” to assemble it, and “bestow[s] life” in the virtual womb of his 
laboratory.
113
  But the positivistic bildung paradigm on which Victor has learned to 
distinguish the deviant from the normal and the singular mold of genius into which he 
has poured himself cannot negotiate a middle ground between “extinguish[ing] the 
spark” he so “negligently bestowed” or abandoning the “detested form” of which he is 
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the “miserable origin and author.”
114
  Nor can Victor face his gender transgression of 
co-opting the feminine trait of biological (if also artificial) reproduction.  As long as the 
rhetoric of genius (male artist-creator) referred to an abstract act of creation, Victor 
could have kept a reverential and safe distance from the experience and object of terror. 
Here, Mary Shelley renders both the Burkean and Kantian notions of the 
sublime as problematic.  In the Burkean sublime, power exists in the object and, 
therefore, may be kept at a safe distance.  In the Kantian sublime, power exists in the 
object and the subject, yet the subject has mastery over the power.  In the Frankenstein 
myth, the object’s power (the creature’s experience) breaks through the object-subject 
screen, and subject’s experience (Victor’s experience) of sublimity becomes terror.  
Immediately after “birth,” the creature reaches out to touch Victor, and Victor turns 
away in disgust and horror.  Terror, in the Frankenstein myth, is not in the eye of the 
beholder; it is the eye of the beholder.  Power shifts and master Victor becomes slave to 
his creation.   
The terror of the gothic sublime is not sustainable as an aesthetic experience in 
the Deweyan sense.  The live creature cannot regain her/his equilibrium in conditions of 
abject terror.  It would seem, then, that when the artist-creator discovers that he is 
unable to maintain the thrilling distance from the experience and power over the object 
of creation, the gothic sublime associated with genius collapses.  There is another 
possible outcome of Victor’s project that has little to do with the terror of the sublime 
and everything to do with openness to the strange stranger:  he could have seen a 
connection between himself and his creation (as a Pygmalion to a Galatea or a tutor to 
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Emile, however problematic the sculptor/sculpture and gardener/plant models of 
education).  He could have practiced a kind of stewardship over the “thing he had 
created.”  His failure to imagine such a connection points to the danger of the bildung 
and genius ideals in education and constitutes the gothic sublime that features in the 
monstrousness of Victor’s miseducation.  The experience of sublimity reduced to terror 
does not allow the subject to identify or empathize with the object, and that is dangerous 









Influence of Frankenstein as Educational Thought  
Clearly Frankenstein is haunted by the canon of educational thought and other 
texts that might well be identified as educational thought if the definition of what counts 
as educational thought was broadened to include literary studies as a foundational 
discipline of educational studies and if what counts as education were broadened to 
account for intended and unintended cultural reception and exchanges.  Equally 
apparent is the fact that the myth and meme of Frankenstein has become idiomatic, at 
least in the Western world, of hubristic kind of techno-scientific projects that unleash 
unintended negative consequences on naïve humanity preoccupied with the business of 
progress.  And just as Frankenstein has become a meme of popular culture, it has also 
educated the popular scientific imagination – for better and for worse.  Surely, allusions 
to Frankenstein inspire suspicion of unchecked scientific “genius,” but not on the 
educational ideal of genius itself.  Doubtless, those same allusions cause us to fear that 
our creations and our ideologies may grow to be more powerful than their creators, but 
we do not question the deep structure of bildung.  Even facing the fear of “making 
monsters,” the educational components of such coming of age stories as that of the 
creature or his creator’s bildung disappear in favor of essentially deterministic 
narratives that neatly ignore social, economic, and political contexts and problems.  The 
cultural influence of Frankenstein is undeniable, but what parts and versions of the 
story does Western culture retell and reproduce?  In what forms and with what 
omissions and additions is this particular item of cultural stock transmitted, for what 
educational purposes, and with what educational consequences?  
 163 
Frankenstein as Educational Myth and Meme 
 As I demonstrated in the previous two chapters, the educational character of the 
questions raised by Frankenstein and the lived experience of its creator test prevailing 
narratives of education by showing the ways in which these humanist myths amount to 
the modern terror curriculum informing and informed by monstrous miseducation.  
There has been a plethora of recent scholarship across academic disciplines considering 
the aesthetic, epistemological, ontological, social, psychological, cultural, economic, 
political, and historical implications of dividing the world into the monstrous and the 
“human.”  This scholarship has critiqued discourses ranging from performance art and 
body modification to gender continuums and queer theory, from disability studies and 
addiction sciences to colonial exploitation and genocidal hegemony.  Popular culture, 
too, routinely takes up the monstrous and the monster itself. Frankenstein’s creature 
appears as a comic book hero (a misunderstood force for good), as the subject of 
popular music (comic and tragic), as an action figure (many different iterations), and in 
a host of other forms.  The pervasiveness of the creature’s presence alone suggests that 
he is an important cultural icon exploited by myriad media, and the pop cultural 
performance of the “goth” and “steam punk” aesthetic with which Frankenstein has 
become identified must surely have some relevance to monstrous miseducation.  The 
influence of popular culture’s multiple educational agency, and its treatment of the 
monstrous has important educational implications. 
It is easy to dismiss the film versions of Frankenstein as wildly divergent from 
Mary Shelley’s text, but they do explore the sense of the monster as a teacher. The film 
tradition of Frankenstein is beyond the scope of this project, but it is important to 
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acknowledge its influence, as film is an educational agent.  In the film tradition, most of 
the educational motifs of Frankenstein are either omitted or they are reduced to 
caricatures of the creature’s cognitive and affective development. The most notable film 
versions include the James Whale classics, Frankenstein (1931) and The Bride of 
Frankenstein (1935).  However, there are hundreds of films featuring “a mad scientist, a 
raising-from-the-dead theme, or a Creature cameo.”
1
  In Whale’s Frankenstein, the 
credits name Mary Shelley, “Mrs. Percy Bysshe Shelley,” while in his Bride she is 
credited as “Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley.”  In the Percy Shelley/Godwin-less Bride, 
she also features as two characters (both played by Elsa Lanchester):  as herself, the 
author Mary Shelley, and as the creature’s bride.  Whale’s creature (Boris Karloff) 
certainly does not manage the Miltonic verse of Shelley’s creature, but he does learn the 
word “friend” from his “wild-boy,” non-intervention, growth pure and simple 
education.  Of course, this backfires badly.  When he calls his bride by the name of 
“friend,” she screams in horror like any number of the human species to which neither 
the creature nor his bride can claim membership. 
Sometimes films portray the creature as possessing only the rudimentary circuits 
necessary for the eventual commission of violence. Sometimes, the creature is given the 
“genius” brain of Waldman, Victor’s favored professor.  Other times, the creature is 
given the “monstrous” brain of a criminal made and molded in the image of a corrupt 
society.  Whale’s bride receives a brain “grown” artificially by Dr. Pretorius amid his 
archetypical homunculi.  These films reduce “Dr. Frankenstein’s” dilemma to the 
hubristic dream of any selfish antihero instead of engaging the ontological, 
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epistemological, aesthetic, and educational questions Mary Shelley posed.  Other 
overtly Frankensteinian-themed films are more sympathetic to the creature than 
Whale’s treatment, offering up that he is misunderstood or misdirected.  But for all of 
their pathos, in these versions, it is the creature’s “human nature” that turns him 
violently against the violence and prejudice of our “superior” species.  
Although it has not been traditionally classed as a Frankensteinian myth, David 
Lynch’s The Elephant Man better engages Mary Shelley’s questions about the terror of 
humanist myths than any film in the gothic/horror genre.  Her questions are Dr. 
Treves’s questions in the film:  How can I know with any certainty that this being is a 
human being?  And if I cannot be sure of the human status of John Merrick (the actual 
“Elephant Man” was named Joseph Merrick), how can I be sure that I am human?     
At one point in Lynch’s film, another surgeon reassures Treves by telling him 
that his subject is “a complete imbecile.”
2
  Treves replies, “I pray to God he’s an idiot.”
3
 
By allowing her creature to speak for himself, Mary Shelley puts the reader in the 
position of Dr. Treves.  The modern educational problem of terror comes into the 
picture when she does not put these questions in Victor Frankenstein’s mouth.  Neither 
genius nor bildung models can afford to ask these questions.  Importantly, the historical 
person of Joseph Merrick was developmentally and cognitively “delayed,” but David 
Lynch’s John Merrick suffers only from physical differences.  The actual Joseph 
Merrick would have failed the test of “being human” according to eighteenth-century 
Scottish philosopher, James Burnett, Lord Monboddo’s (1714 –1796) “linguistic 
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 in the same way Jean Marc Gaspard Itard (1774-1838) denied human status 
to Victor of Aveyron.  Monstrous miseducation demands quantitative proof of human 
status and will question and torture a subject until it passes some equivalent of a Turing 
Test.
5
  Mary Shelley’s nameless creature would have passed a Turing Test.  His creator, 
Victor, may not have.  
Victor’s educational metamorphoses are all but ignored in the film tradition.  
Rather, he features as an obsessive god-scientist driven mad by his own exalted genius.  
Sometimes, Victor is painted as “the real monster,” a monstrous genius that commits 
monstrous deeds in the name of “scientific progress,” but genius itself is not taken to be 
monstrous.  In fact, Victor does not have to bear the burden of his techno-scientific 
tortures alone and in secret in these films as he does in the novel.  If he does not have a 
loyal assistant or evil fellow-scientist, at least others in his circle know of his 
experiments.  Generally, these films are self-conscious productions of the horror genre 
and are often characterized by a camp, hyperbolic violence that, instead of frightening 
or terrorizing, paradoxically serves to mitigate the threat of violence. 
As cultural stock, monster narratives seem to say that monsters do indeed have a 
great deal to teach about the kind of individuals, good and bad, the human species has 
the capacity to become.  But these cultural artifacts do not necessarily take as a given 
that it is wrong-headed to cast difference as monstrosity.  Nevertheless, much has been 
made in the humanities over the way monster myths help members of the human 
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species understand themselves as moral actors in the world.
6
  In a common language 
sense, the label monster is rather haphazardly applied to any number of alien, deformed, 
or menacing beings in popular culture.  Perhaps this linguistic carelessness underlies 
educational philosophy’s colossal underestimation of the monster’s power to teach.  
But, like film, the entries listed in the Oxford English Dictionary are not particularly 
useful toward making the conceptual distinctions.  Citing “mythical,” hideous crosses 
between animals and humans, “malformed animals and plants,” and “something 
extraordinary or unnatural,” falls rather short of the conceptual categories needed to 
address an educational sense monsters or monstrousness despite taking its derivation 
from the Latin, mōnstrō.
 7
   The definition of mōnstrō,“to point out, exhibit, make 
known, indicate, inform, advise, teach, instruct, tell,” is highly suggestive of the 
premise that monsters do teach, from the culture as curriculum standpoint.
8
   
Accepting that monsters are persistent cultural stock – makers and shapers – that 
do seem to instruct individuals for better and for worse, it makes sense to begin seeing 
them in light of monstrous miseducation and the false educational ideals of genius and 
bildung transmitted in terror curriculum.  Powerful beings that exceed the natural laws 
that bound the physical universe could be termed genius monsters.  While perhaps 
beholden to a host of inscrutable cosmologic regulations ostensibly not of human 
design, “extraordinary and unnatural” immortal deities and demons are depicted as 
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distinctly not human.  Thus, even by the OED’s rather amorphous definition, they are 
genius monsters.   
By the same tolken, a bildung monster would be suggestive of creature that casts 
off of the human, “a not-quite-human subject, characterized by its morphic variability, 
continually in danger of becoming not-itself.”
9
  Therefore, vampires, werewolves, and 
other manner of shape-shifting entities might be termed bildung monsters.  But there is 
another variety of bildung monster:  the individual who attempts to move toward 
becoming human by engaging in human activities despite a typically limited 
consciousness.  Automatons, golems, reanimates, robots, cyborgs, and to a lesser extent, 
zombies might fit this category.   
But, as the exposition argued, Frankenstein’s creature occupies both genius 
monster and bildung monster simultaneously, thereby calling into question any essential 
or exceptional designation “human” rather than uncovering any essential or exceptional 
qualities that demark “monster.”  This is the central question of Mary Shelley’s text – 
the one that keeps the creature and his creator alive in the popular and scholarly 
imagination.  This is the stuff of which educational myths are made.   
Literature as a Foundational Discipline of Interdisciplinary Studies of 
Education 
The study of myth and literature, especially as they represent the bildung and 
genius terror curriculum of monstrous miseducation, is a largely unacknowledged 
foundational discipline for the interdisciplinary foundational study of education.  
Drawing on the disciplines of philosophy and history of education along with that of 
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literary and cultural theory, my multi-disciplinary approach to the study of myth as a 
genre of educational thought aims to hybridize educational and literary aesthetics.  
Educational studies’ neglect of art as a source of educational thought – especially that of 
historically marginalized and silenced groups – results in the cultural anemia of a closed 
system.  Literary fiction, like education, is not only a cultural production; it is a 
producer of culture. 
What has monstrous miseducation to do with the patriarchal aesthetic that 
fathered the values, concepts, and hierarchies “at the very foundations of philosophy” 
that has largely denied literature as a source of educational wisdom?
10
  Carolyn 
Korsmeyer’s project continues the work begun by daughters of artist-fathers and male 
creators like Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and a legion of others.
11
  Indeed, the 
culture has inherited the legacy of “the creator of art” as a “masculine ideal”; hence one 
aim of feminist aesthetics has been to expose the deep structural flaws that coalesce in 
the conceptual apparatus of monstrous miseducation.
12
  The influence of terror’s 
curricular tenets are staggering and the consequences are enduring.  Therefore it is 
important to understand that the patriarchal educational landscape on which monstrous 
miseducation enjoys pride of place is not the exclusive province of “fathers.”
13
  
At the height of the radical feminist movement, Adrienne Rich claimed that it is 
the invisible workings or deep gender of patriarchy that keep women from organizing 
for their collective wellbeing against identifiable multiple (mis)educational agency 
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within the acknowledged educational institution of the academy.  In relation to other 
women within the academy, Rich argued that women work against their own best 
interests by complying with the miseducational tokenization a few “exceptional 
women.”
14
  Instead of mentoring and supporting the “younger feminist scholar-teacher,” 
the tokenized woman safeguards her own status and survival by alienating them “as if 
they belonged to a distant tribe.”
15
  Exceptional women, according to Rich, are most 
obliged and least likely to use their privilege to make patriarchy visible.
16
  Ultimately, 
Rich’s structural critique of patriarchy depicts the academy as a dysfunctional 
“patriarchal family” in which Miltonic fathers seduce and encourage certain “gifted 
daughters,” and mothers abandon and resent them.
17
  This dysfunctional family amounts 
to double bind in which women cannot but lose:  men devalue and objectify women and 
women dismiss other women in an effort to gain recognition by men.  Rich described 
the gendered double bind of the terror curriculum in which Mary Shelley found herself, 
a self-perpetuating algorithm of dysfunctional monstrous miseducation. 
After all, how can we realize Martin’s “‘gender-sensitive’ educational ideal” – 
learning and curriculum that account for gender “when it makes a difference” and 
dismisses it “when it does not” – if difference is naturalized (masculine) by bildung or 
super-naturalized (masculine) by genius?
18
  What if, consciously and unconsciously, 
monstrous miseducation has engendered an aesthetic, “at the ‘deep level,’” that denies 
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the educational thought of half of our species?
 19
  Is the virtual absence of women from 
the historical canon of educational thought analogous to the virtual absence of women 
from the ranks of “high art” and from the canon of thought on aesthetics?  Is the field of 
educational studies still beset by terror curriculum’s false ideologies of a Romantic 
bildung that naturalizes “emotions in women's art” and attributes “fine-tuned” 
sensitivity and “masculine genius” to “the male artist [who] produces a new creation 
that transcends the dictates of nature”?
20
     
The same terror curriculum that considers practitioner wisdom gleaned from 
anecdotal maternal teaching and teachings as unworthy of serious academic 
consideration has historically relegated women’s artistic production to the caste of 
useful “domestic crafts” unworthy of serious aesthetic consideration.  Women’s 
“silence” in the academic canons of educational and aesthetic thought has a gendered 
material history sublimated by terror curriculum that is transmitted generationally via 
monstrous miseducation.  Korsmeyer attributes the absences and silences to the fact that 
women were “denied the kind of education and training that prepared them for the 
exacting standards of the public audience.”
21
  Perhaps, though, women were getting a 
certain kind of education.  More precisely, perhaps women were getting a certain kind 
of education that allowed them insight into monstrous miseducation that masculinity’s 
privilege simply could not see.  Because they were not taken seriously as scholars and 
because they took art seriously, women (surely privileged by being “lettered” at all) 
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theorized monstrous miseducation in “certain art forms…such as the prose novel” 
beginning in the early nineteenth-century when Mary Shelley published the first edition 
of Frankenstein was anonymously.
22
  Doubtless, the artistic quality (and the male 
recognition of the artistic quality) of these novels varies, but these novels archive 
women’s important thought on aesthetics as well as education.
23
  It is simply self-
defeating for educational studies to ignore the educational thought in these novels.  
Arguably for both sexes, these novels were as much theory-works as they were 
art-works.  But especially for historically marginalized and silenced members of 
society, art (fiction) was a safe place to work out theory, aesthetic and educational.  
Hence, looking to women’s art begins to fill in the historical gaps and silences of 
women’s thought.  For good or for ill, art bears witness to “the degree to which 
philosophy and cultural production travel hand in hand.”
24
  Surely, a continuity of 
women’s thought exists in the “useful” art of women; it is just buried alive. 
Hence, Frankenstein as an educational myth of monstrous miseducation and 
terror curriculum has influenced narratives of development authored by women to 
theorize their own lived experience within a world that would make that experience 
monstrous and bury it.  Women’s educational wisdom regarding monstrous 
miseducation and its attendant genius and bildung terror is buried in diverse imaginative 
literary sources.  Lesser-known texts published a century after the first publication of 
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Frankenstein by American women like Sarah Orne Jewett’s The Country of the Pointed 
Firs (1896), Zitkala-Sa’s American Indian Stories (1921), Paula Hopkins’s Contending 
Forces (1900), and Anzia Yezierska’s Hungry Hearts (1920) demonstrate the influence 
of Mary Shelley’s educational thought, especially by imagining alternatives to the terror 
curriculum of monstrous miseducation.  Here, I will focus specifically on Jewett’s The 
Country of the Pointed Firs, but my hope is that this analysis of Jewett’s text as a 
contrary case of monstrous miseducation will point to the necessity of future 
scholarship in Zitkala-Sa, Hopkins, and Yezierska.       
 Frankenstein, Mary Shelley’s educational thought experiment, points out how 
the false ideology of bildung and genius are linked by an irreconcilable paradox: 
perpetual transformation (progressive) and essential/exceptional identity (conservative).  
But while Frankenstein hints at alternatives that might have remedied monstrous 
miseducation, it does not offer any sustainable contrary or borderline cases.  In fact, I 
could not identify a contrary case of a counter-narrative to monstrous miseducation 
outside of literary fiction.  Therefore, I explore the educational thought in Jewett’s The 
Country to show the powerful influence of Frankenstein as well as to provide a contrary 
case to modernity’s deeply gendered terror curriculum and monstrous miseducation. 
The Country of the Pointed Firs as a Thought Experiment in Maternal Teaching and 
Teachings and Cyborg Affinity Politics  
It is difficult to give a summary of The Country because it does not follow the 
structure of a traditional narrative.  In fact, it might be designated as a counter-
bildungsroman, or novel of “education,” “formation,” “coming-of-age,” “self-
discovery,” “apprenticeship,” and “development” because it confounds the plot of 
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individual growth from childhood to maturity.  Like Mary Shelley, Jewett calls into 
question this decidedly Western, bourgeois, patriarchal medium that meant to 
domesticate frenzied modernity and contain limitless capitalism through gendered 
narratives of transformation that ironically rely upon Miltonic origin myths of fixed 
identity – bildung and genius.  But a century later, Jewett offers a contrary case of 
monstrous miseducation that imagines Wollstonecraft’s “rational futurity” lived 
relationally through Haraway’s cyborg affinity politics, in which the gifts of Laird’s 
maternal teachings circulate.   
Indeed, its very refusal to conform to that tradition it imagines an alternative to 
terror curriculum and monstrous miseducation.  However, the obscurity of the text 
requires a brief summary.  The Country reads like a bit like travel log narrated by an 
unnamed professional female author who journeys to Dunnet Landing, on the coast of 
Maine, for a summer of writing.  The narrator boards with Almira Todd but does her 
writing in an abandoned schoolhouse.  Many of Dunnet Landing’s odd characters share 
stories with the narrator, but herbal healer Almira offers the most prolific renderings of 
the village’s “progressive era” and its current decline. 
The traditional bildungsroman instantiates the paradox of monstrous 
miseducation, signaling artificial endpoints for personal, social, and national identity, 
while insisting that singular identity is born of a shared rural ancestor.  Jewett’s counter-
bildungsroman names that ancestor, Dunnet Landing, a fictional maritime village in 
mid-coast Maine – a village in decline on the eve of a new century.  But her women 
profoundly trouble “feminine” narratives of development that posit female maturity as 
moving from childhood to marriage to motherhood.  Jewett’s narrative of declension 
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also confounds the “masculine” plot trajectory of rational self-interest, private 
enterprise, upward mobility, and forward progress toward the “victory” of absorption 
into a modernized middle-class.  Thus, Jewett’s critique of gender identity in personal 
and social development also critiques narratives of the nation’s development.   
Modern progress meant economic decline for geographically marginalized mid-
coast Maine on the eve of the twentieth century:  railroad expansion allowed the nation 
to access the Great Lakes and Pacific Northwest thereby decimating Maine’s lumber 
industry; refrigeration made Maine’s ice industry obsolete; materials like concrete and 
steel replaced Maine’s granite industry; and over-harvesting as a result of fishing 
technologies destroyed Maine’s fishing industry.  But at the same time these material 
industries declined, Maine’s tourist industry developed.  After the Civil War, middle-
class tourists from metropolitan centers called “rusticators” began seasonally colonizing 
mid-coast Maine.  Developers bought up oceanfront property and built hotels to 
accommodate these middle-class visitors, while wealthier tourists built obscenely lavish 
oceanfront vacation “cottages.”  Unsurprisingly, this uneven development displaced 
local people who sold their property and their labor to these “summer people” in order 
to survive the economic decline.  These “summer people” thwarted attempts to revive 
traditional industries and initiate economic progress because they wanted the region to 
remain “rustic,” scenic, and sparsely populated for aesthetic and ideological reasons.   
Maine’s bildung, then, becomes the site of tensions between the progressive, 
forward-orientation of the nation and the regressive, backward-orientation of the region.  
On the one hand, Dunnet Landing represents a pre-modern myth of America’s rural 
infancy that depends upon a modern rhetoric of America’s progressive national adult.  
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On the other hand, the national “parent,” like William Godwin and Victor Frankenstein, 
depends upon the uneven, arrested development of its pre-industrial, regional “child” to 
ground itself historically and to identify itself nationally.  In this way, Dunnet Landing 
represents a resistant regional or colonial child independent of its national, imperial 
parent insofar as the region does not look to the nation for an “official” historical 
continuity to bind its community.  Dunnet Landing, like Mary Shelley and her creature, 
has its own stories.  The nation or the Empire, a busy, modernized parent, looks to its 
errant regional or colonial child for the imagined roots it believes it may have lost or 
sold along the boundless path of futurity.  Oddly, the region or the colony comes to 
figure as both parent and child of the nation or Empire.  Demonstrating the assumptions 
propping up this paradoxical relationship between nation and region, Empire and 
imperial subject, progress and decline, parent and child, future and past, Jewett’s 
nameless, urban narrator projects her own “childish certainty of being the center of 
civilization” onto the locals of Dunnet Landing in the first chapter, provocatively 
entitled “The Return.”
25
   
The narrator’s perspective changes, but does not develop according to growth 
rubrics of the feminine bildung.  She initially imagines finding a lost innocence in the 
nation’s “inner child” she presumes safely tended in the nursery of Dunnet Landing.  As 
a professional writer, like Mary Shelley and Victor, she wants to educate her readership 
about what has been lost and what might still be found in Dunnet Landing.  But surely 
unlike Victor, Godwin, or Percy Shelley, this narrator begins to realize that her summer 
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of participatory ethnography may only contribute to the exploitative cultural tourism 
that she saw herself as having transcended.  Finally, though, the narrator maps Dunnet 
Landing as a “waiting place” where the idiom of the feminine bildung finds no 
purchase.  Both narrator and text slip the narrow identity enclosures set by a zero-sum 
game of imperial cultural tourism and an endgame of feminine spiritual questing.  
Surely Jewett’s narrator, like Mary Shelley and her creature, learns about the 
nation’s and the Empire’s gendered coming-of-age narratives.  Like Mary Shelley’s 
return to England after her exiled life of loss with Percy Shelley, Jewett’s self-exiled, 
childless, middle-aged, middle-class narrator must wonder about the America to which 
she will return.  How will her Dunnet Landing education serve her when she returns to 
the infinitely young, indefinitely progressive, indisputably male-dominated nation from 
which she has sojourned?  Perhaps her “backward view” of Dunnett Landing affords 
Jewett’s narrator, like Mary Shelley, a peculiarly tragic understanding of what lies 
ahead.  Jennifer Fleissner suggests that the “female power” of Dunnet Landing exists in 
a state of suspended animation between competing “feminist views of domesticity and 
maternity” enacted by Jewett’s women in the shadow of “the hovering presence of an 
uneasy past.”
26
  And indeed, the hyper-development of the modern nation and Empire 
on the backs of the retrograde region and imperial subject labors under the same deep 
shadow as gender inequity and false educational ideologies like genius and bildung.   
The narrator’s transformative learning experience in the “waiting place” of 
Dunnet Landing involves gaining full knowledge of what Fleissner names, 
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  This new knowledge about women, learned from women, may allow the 
narrator to read and write narratives of female development in a new way.  But this 
understanding of stuckness does not signal closure to the question of identity in the way 
the feminine bildung invites the culture to believe heterosexual romance, marriage, and 
childbearing does.  As a thinking woman on the eve of a new century, the narrator’s 
experience of personal, social, and national identity, like Mary Shelley’s experience, is 
initially one of profound loss and longing.  But without maternal teaching and 
teachings, without a cyborg affinity politics, Mary Shelley and her creature would only 
have the dubious, alienated satisfaction of a wretched recognition of their stuckness. 
Despite the fact that Franco Moretti’s theoretical lens for the bildungsroman is 
decidedly masculinist, his ideas about youth and modernity are valuable to conceptual 
analysis of monstrous miseducation.  Moretti claims that in the aftermath the “double 
revolution” (French and industrial) the old world found itself in the new “without 
possessing a culture of modernity.”
28
  For Moretti, youth, both in its “formlessness” and 
its certain end, becomes the central “‘symbolic form of modernity,’” and the 
bildungsroman becomes the “great narrative” whereby a shaken culture looks for 
“meaning in the future rather than the past.”
29
  Youth, the rhetoric of “reformation” and 
“backwardness” claimed, could weather the experience of modernity’s shocking 
newness.  But for all their romanticized “progressive”-mindedness and past-
consciousness, young Romantics like those of Mary Shelley’s circle longed for a 
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containment strategy that the terror curriculum ironically promises.  A century later, 
Jewett refused to be intimidated by the terror curriculum and imagined another way. 
By largely excising children from the text, by featuring them as “memories,” 
and, curiously, by infantilizing all of her adults and “queer folks,” Jewett disrupts the 
feminine bildung fathered by monstrous miseducation’s patriarchal consciousness.
30
  
The narrator’s summer “hire” of the schoolhouse as a quiet sanctuary for writing proves 
that children do indeed exist in Dunnet Landing.  But, it is only when the “small 
scholars” are away that the narrator can write “with authority” at the teacher’s desk.
31
 
Noting the wild tansy thriving in the schoolyard, Almira remarks that “being scuffed 
down all the spring” made the flowers stronger “like some folks that had it hard in their 
youth, and were bound to make the most of themselves before they died.”
32
  In a 
bildungsroman, Almira’s musings would herald a procreative, progressive narrative, but 
Almira’s rough evolutionary logic suggests something else: careless children “scuff” the 
young plants in the spring, and because of, or in spite of suffering in youth from the 
indifference of children, the surviving tansy grow stronger.  Almira’s radical analogy 
might mean that procreation and parenting builds character through suffering at the 
hands of children, but neither she nor the narrator is a biological mother.  Perhaps 
Almira alludes to a different kind of parent-child relationship – that of national or 
imperial parent and regional or colonial child.  Almira is wise, though, and knows that 
the roles have reversed.  She recognizes herself as related to the narrator by cyborg 
affinity politics, as the landlady/mother/teacher/healer who circulates gifts of love and 
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survival.  Almira is a custodian of cultural wealth.  No such custodian intervened in the 
lived experience of Mary Shelley or her creature.  Rather, they were abandoned to 
unmediated encounters with the cultural liabilities of deeply gendered Western thought 
transmitted by unconscious or irresponsible multiple educational agency.  
In another sketch of an absent child, healer Almira “answers the call” of a 
worried visitor requesting an herbal remedy for a sick child in a “kind, motherly 
voice.”
33
  When Almira returns and picks up her dropped narrative stitch, the narrator 
attributes Almira’s distractedness to “a last considering thought” of the child.
34
  The 
absent child represents a message from the present that interrupts a story from the past, 
suggesting the preciousness and the precariousness of children in the region or the 
colony.  The past, for the terrifyingly modern creature, was “a blot…a blind vacancy” in 
which he had always been as he was “in size and proportion,” but the present was a 
place where his “sorrow only increased with knowledge.”
35
  For Mary Shelley, the past 
was filtered through Godwin and the present was divined by Percy Shelley.  The only 
mother she knew was in texts that she forbade her creature.  Without maternal teaching 
or teachings, education as a circulation of cultural wealth was impossible for Mary 
Shelley and her creature.  Like Godwin, Shelley, and Victor, Mary Shelley and her 
creature were “beneficiaries” of cultural stock – assets and liabilities that had not been 
inventoried – bequeathed (rather than circulated as gifts) patrilineally over generations.  
Without such cultural bookkeeping, it was a miseducated and miseducative modernity. 
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It is important to note that Almira’s was custodian of a morally neutral 
pharmacopeia that healed the bodies of children and their mothers.  The text alludes to 
pennyroyal, a well-known abortifacient,
36
 and the “special herb” of childbirth and 
menstruation.
37
  When Almira takes the narrator to the place where the pennyroyal 
grows, she shares the secret love, loss, and survival it represents to her:  in her youth, 
Almira gave her heart and her body to another man before she married a “good man” 
who died at sea “before he ever knew what he ’d had to know if we ’d lived long 
together.”
38
  What his death spared him from knowing and Almira from telling is 
intimately tied to pennyroyal.  Another absent child looms over this wild pennyroyal, 
and that shared secret binds these two women to one another and perhaps to all women 
in a cyborg affinity politics.
39
  Without maternal teaching and teachings, Mary Shelley, 
like her creature, did not enjoy such affinities.  Both lived out the consequences of 
monstrous miseducation: Mary Shelley driven to silence by an incapacitating sense of 
loss and the creature driven to violence by a desire for revenge.  
By slippery critical arithmetic Frankenstein escapes, Jewett’s thought experiment 
in female autonomy is often equated with abortion and lesbianism.
40
  Allegations of 
retaliatory abortion and lesbianism turn Jewett’s “pointed firs” into the pointed witch hats 
of crossed women.  Accounting for the text’s tendentiousness toward the gender 
expectations reproduced in the feminine bildung in this way reproduces a mythic 
masculine revenge fantasy for the “original,” genius narrative of declension:  the Edenic 
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fall.  Instead, the pennyroyal motif represents maternal teaching through the circulation of 
gifts and maternal teachings about women’s reproductive health – including her biological 
choices and selected alliances.  Again, Jewett’s text confounds Godwinian perfectibility 
and Miltonic identity politics. 
It is true, though, actual children almost always interrupt the narrative.  The “gay 
voices and laughter from a pleasure-boat…full of boys and girls” just off the shore of 
the island remind the narrator of self-imposed isolation.
41
  The distant worldly clamor of 
other people’s children remind the narrator that she is an “islanded” woman who 
deviates from the heteronormative plot trajectory of the feminine bildung.  When 
maturity and adulthood mean marriage, children, and becoming the angel of the house, 
not marrying, not having children, and not enforcing moral order mean perpetual 
infancy unless one is able to choose affinities with other amalgamated beings.  With the 
maternal teachings of love and survival that Almira circulates, the narrator is able to 
imagine such affinity unlike Mary Shelley or her creature (or Godwin, Percy Shelley, or 
Victor).  Certainly Jewett’s women suffer for their cyborg affinity politics and their 
transgressions against the terror curriculum, but they are able to acknowledge their 
fragmented being and to collectively imagine a sustainable, rational futurity.  
By listening to Almira’s mother, Mrs. Bowden-Blackett’s retelling of stories she 
heard during her own girlhood, we learn with the narrator that at the turn of the previous 
century, during Mary Shelley’s time, long before Maine was a part of the United States, 
the area was teeming with Bowdens.
42
  Mrs. Bowden-Blackett tells the story that her 
own mother told her about a long ago Sunday afternoon when a “scatter-witted little 
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bound girl” burst into the stiflingly hot “meetin’-house” and interrupted the minister 
with screams of “Mis’ Bowden, Mis’ Bowden!...[y]our baby’s in a fit!”
43
  The “whole 
congregation,” seemingly comprised of  “Mis’ Bowdens,” abandoned the sermon and 
fled to their respective homes to check the welfare of their children.  Amused, the 
minister gave “‘em the benediction.”
44
  Almira angrily halts her mother’s bequeathing 
of this once removed story of the “Mis’ Bowdens” as a cultural liability that amounts to 
terror curriculum.  It is clear that Almira has not become a “Mis’ Bowden” and resents 
her mother’s deployment of her own mother’s gendered narrative of development.  
Almira rejects this version of Bowden foremothers as breeders of weak children 
dependent upon a man’s benediction for their volition as monstrous miseducation. 
Cresting the hill above the Bowden’s ancestral homestead sitting between two 
generations of Bowden women, the narrator sees the house as a “motherly brown hen” 
that raised “five generations of sailors and farmers and soldiers,” patiently awaiting the 
return of her “flock that came straying toward it from everywhere” to hover near her 
like “huge bees.”
45
  But amid the images of fecundity and pollination, is a “burying-
ground that stood like a little fort.”
46
 Mrs. Bowden-Blackett reports that “most of the 
home graves were those of women” because the bones of sailors, farmers, and soldiers 
who “had been [the house’s] children” were “scattered” across the nation – at sea, out 
West, and on battlegrounds.
47
  These images suggest the Bowden homestead serves as a 
place on which personal, social, and national identity is grafted, but the images that 
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follow refuse the idea that those identities are stable or essential or exceptional.  Rather, 
Jewett describes the relational quality of cyborg affinity politics that make the 
circulation of maternal teachings and sustainable, rational futurity possible. 
Picturing “the old Bowden house made of durable gingerbread” falling “to ruin 
at the feast’s end,” suggests that the rustic homestead simply cannot provide moorings 
for the family, much less for the nation.
48
  The generations of reunited Bowdens 
marching together absurdly against the backdrop of an always already exploited mid-
coast Maine suggests the absurdity of national and imperial myths of identity formation 
and.  Feeding the narrator a slice of American “early-apple” pie embossed with the 
“whole word Bowden,” Almira consumes the word “Reunion” in a ritualistic 
communion between region or colony and nation or Empire that acknowledges a shift in 
the way the region, nation, colony, Empire, and these women must come to know 
themselves if they are to learn to love and to survive together.
49
 
Jewett genders the gingerbread house’s “maker” and that of the “brown hen” 
Bowden house feminine:  the former an “artist” reproducing a model and the latter a 
procreator reproducing Bowdens.  Here, among the graves of women, Jewett teaches 
the durability and transience of the house of Bowden built by women:  mothers, 
daughters, sisters, aunts, “those that aren’t kin by blood,”
50
 and “new folks” like the 
narrator
51
 who might archive a history of women’s lives and preserve a tradition of 
women’s art.  While the text applauds an artistic idea of domesticity as a social good for 
women, men, region, and nation, it refuses paternalistic versions of domesticity.  
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Instead, it proposes a sustainable, rational futurity that exploits the cultural wealth and 
eschews the cultural liabilities of the past to foster cyborg affinity politics among those 
multiple educational agents charged with stewardship and circulation of that wealth. 
The narrator learns about alternative versions of development by finding her 
way into stories of shared girlhood that Jewett allows her women to circulate.  Mrs. 
Fosdick tells of a time when her mother forgot to pack the girl’s clothes, and until they 
reached a port where the prepubescent Mrs. Fosdick could be “fitted out pretty,” 
dressed in her brother’s “jacket and trousers.”
52
  This “spell of freedom” and wildness 
that “frighten[ed]” Mrs. Fosdick’s mother only made the young Mrs. Fosdick feel more 
acutely the “hem at [her] heels” and that “youth was past and gone.”
53
  Much like Mary 
Shelley during her widowed years, a wistful Mrs. Fosdick sees youth as a thing of the 
past in trousers that was cruelly hemmed in by a present that has never allowed her that 
remembered volition.  But like the evergreen of the pointed firs, the very simultaneity of 
young and old identity suggests the monstrously miseducative trap of Miltonic identity 
politics.  But instead of reproducing a normative doctrine that signals the endpoint of 
womanhood as matrimonial motherhood, this text is “laced with destabilizing 
subnarratives” that teach “the instability of all human positions and perspectives” and 
suggests the need for an alternative cyborg affinity politics.
54
  Dunnet Landing is 
decidedly not a Godwinian utopia of adult immortal men, relieved of the burden of 
relearning cultural stock from previous generations.  Neither is it a healing “herland” of 
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  Rather, it is a safe space where maternal teaching and 
teachings are circulated, cyborg affinity politics are practiced, and rational futurity is 
imagined.  
Casting this text as counter-narrative of to patriarchal iterations of the bildung 
means that the text reevaluates, remaps, and reeducates the gendered contours of 
personal, social, and national/imperial development that Mary Shelley theorized in 
Frankenstein but was finally unable to live herself.  While The Country preserves local 
folk wisdom and archives disappearing life-ways of mid-coast Maine, it is not 
regionalist or nationalist propaganda celebrating the “local color” of “white 
imperialism.”
56
  Rather, the text offers a kind of queer folk resistance to reductive 
character valuations and essentialist or exceptionalist gender narratives by radically 
questioning the terror curriculum’s narrow thesis of  “self-improvement” and a broad 
thesis of “progress.”  By imagining the intergenerational continuity of maternal teaching 
and teachings as gift circulation in the interests of sustainable, rational futurity 
necessitated by and necessary for cyborg affinity politics, Jewett allows her characters 
to select outsider affiliations and non-procreative identities in a way that Mary Shelley 
did not or could not do in her educational thought experiment, Frankenstein.  Jewett 
counters the feminine bildung and revisions women’s place in the lost and found of 
educational thought. 
The cultural and individual influence of Frankenstein, Mary Shelley’s “hideous 
progeny,” is undeniable.  Like its influence, its relevance to modernity, Mary Shelley 
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seemed to understand, was always already out of her control.  Perhaps its relevance as 
educational thought, as a modern myth of monstrous miseducation, has been buried 
alongside much of women’s educational thought.  Mary Shelley embodies Korsmeyer’s 
claim that “the female artist cannot escape being regarded as an aesthetic object, even 
while she is actively engaged in producing other aesthetic objects.”
57
  Her legacy is the 
troubled legacy of terror curriculum that transmits “messages about a circumscribed 
feminine ambit of taste and ability” so deftly, “it would be nearly impossible not to 
internalize at least some of these values.”
58
  Finally, she could not separate herself from 
her monster or her monstrous miseducation.  Feeling the need to “give account” of 
herself as an author/authority and the influence of her monster as art/theory some fifteen 
years after its first anonymous publication, Shelley describes “[h]ow I, then a young 
girl, came to think of, and to dilate upon, so very hideous an idea."
59
   
Writing from the standpoint of a financially (and otherwise) insecure widow in 
her mid-thirties, in 1831 she mythologized her own creative process and thereby 
relinquished any creative control (or responsibility) she might have imagined she ever 
held over Frankenstein.  She describes her eighteen-year-old self as under the influence 
of the spellbinding genius:  that “[i]nvention consists in the capacity of seizing on the 
capabilities of a subject, and in the power of moulding and fashioning ideas suggested 
to it” in the context of voyages of discovery (and conquest), and “the nature of the 
principle of life” in the context of natural philosophy with Percy Shelley and Lord 
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  In light of the influence of Frankenstein and Mary Shelley’s avowed faith in 
its supernatural origins, the creation myth of Frankenstein itself is worth quoting at 
length: 
When I placed my head on my pillow, I did not sleep, nor could I be said to 
think. My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the 
successive images that arose in my mind….  I saw—with shut eyes, but acute 
mental vision, —I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the 
thing he had put together. I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, 
and then, on the working of some powerful engine, show signs of life, and stir 
with an uneasy, half vital motion. Frightful must it be; for supremely frightful 
would be the effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism 
of the Creator of the world. His success would terrify the artist; he would rush 
away from his odious handywork, horror-stricken. He would hope that, left to 
itself, the slight spark of life which he had communicated would fade; that this 
thing, which had received such imperfect animation, would subside into dead 
matter; and he might sleep in the belief that the silence of the grave would 
quench for ever the transient existence of the hideous corpse which he had 
looked upon as the cradle of life. He sleeps; but he is awakened; he opens his 
eyes; behold the horrid thing stands at his bedside, opening his curtains, and 
looking on him with yellow, watery, but speculative eyes.
61
 
Surely, Frankenstein is one powerfully influential text of “social formation” by 
which “individuals learn how to be gendered beings through their interactions with 
cultural discourses.”
62
  While unspoken, the myth of Frankenstein itself has influenced 
the deeply gendered terror curriculum of war Virginia Woolf takes up in the first 
chapter of Three Guineas even as it bears witness to monstrous miseducation.  The 
apocalyptic trajectory of such an aesthetic – one that miseducates men for the “public” 
profession of war-making and women for the “private” profession of marriage-making 
– has had and will have dire consequences for the entire species (“history in the raw”) 
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and for individual lives (“biography and autobiography”).
63
  Woolf knew (but 
ultimately could not live with) what Mary Shelley and her creations learned and 
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Contemporary Relevance of Frankenstein as Educational Thought 
The test of monstrous miseducation’s relevance and value to educational thought 
is its pragmatic utility in helping us to draw educational wisdom from contemporary 
cases of terrorism.  Deploying the deep educational structures of bildung and genius to 
explore the aesthetic – making and shaping – power of terror curriculum and monstrous 
miseducation, this chapter tests the paradigm case of Columbine and the borderline case 
of The Freedom Writers.  It bears repeating here that schooling is only one of myriad 
educational agents that act as custodians and transmitters of cultural stock, and school 
violence is but one consequence of monstrous miseducation.  While the contemporary 
consequences of monstrous miseducation are only rarely enacted in school violence, I 
have chosen Columbine and The Freedom Writers as cases because they most clearly 
show the contemporary relevance of Frankenstein as educational thought. 
Columbine:  A Paradigm Case of Monstrous Miseducation 
Before Tuesday, April 20, 1999, those who cared knew “columbine” as a high 
desert wild flower.  The people of Jefferson County, just outside of Littleton, Colorado 
knew Columbine as a large, affluent suburban high school that took its name from the 
fragile flower.  After the massacre on April 20, Columbine became a metonym for the 
“incomprehensible” violence of the terror curriculum’s genius terror.  Paradoxically, in 
an effort to make sense of a seemingly senseless tragedy, Columbine has come to 
represent the outer limits of the violence and misanthropy conceived of and enacted by 
children.  Columbine signifies the nightmare stuff of genius terror: pandemonium 
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designed and directed by what the monstrously miseducated popular imagination has 
deemed powerful, obscure grotesques, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold.   
The etiological myths of bildung and genius designed to explain the “natural” 
and “super-natural” causes of Columbine are legion, but finally the endless inquiries 
and inadequate explanations only seem to heighten dread and confusion.
1
  Could the 
availability of firearms and the “culture of violence” in the United States be to blame?
2
  
Could high school hierarchies be to blame?  Could violent literature, video games, 
music, and films be to blame?  Could the increase in prescriptions of anti-depressants to 
children be to blame?  Could unregulated internet access, ineffective parenting, and the 
community values of Littleton be to blame?  Could negligent teachers and 
administrators be to blame?  Could mental illness be to blame?  Ultimately, the answer 
to all those questions seems to be yes, to some extent.  But Columbine utterly 
confounds teleological clarity and deeply troubles the bildung paradigm of the “natural” 
growth and development of children.  What kind of mutation had these two children 
undergone in order to adapt to the hostile environment of monstrous miseducation?  
Violent Landscape:  Miseducative Encounters with Terror Curriculum 
Planning the attack on April 19
th
, Eric intended “Judgment Day” for Columbine 
to fall on the anniversary of the confrontation at Ruby Ridge in Idaho, the tragedy at the 
Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, and Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the 
Murrah building in Oklahoma City.  According to Dave Cullen: 
McVeigh was tried in federal court in downtown Denver and sentenced to death 
while the boys attended Columbine in the suburbs.  The scenes of devastation 
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were played over and over….  Oklahoma was a one-note performance:  
McVeigh set his timer and walked away; he didn’t even see his spectacle….
3
   
Saavy about the media’s educational agency, McVeigh bequeathed the cultural liability 
of the terror curriculum to Eric who predicted that Judgment Day would “be like the 
L.A. riots, the Oklahoma bombing, WWII, Vietnam, Duke and Doom all mixed 
together. I want to leave a lasting impression on the world.”
4
  Dylan referenced “the 
holy April morning of NBK (Natural Born Killers)” of terror in Eric’s yearbook at the 
end of their junior year, a year before the actual terrorist event, fantasizing about his 
genius, “godlike” wrath and “revenge.”
5
 
Judgment Day had to be delayed until April 20 because Eric wanted more 
ammunition than he currently possessed.
6
  He reasoned that Adolf Hitler’s birthday 
would work just as well on a symbolic level as the domestic terrorist events that marked 
April 19.  Eric planned to level the commons area (the cafeteria) during the peak of the 
lunch hour rush (meticulously timed) by detonating two bombs placed underneath twin 
structural pillars.  Ideally, the twin pillars would collapse, causing the upper floor 
library to plummet to the ground floor causing massive, instantaneous death.  Guns, 
therefore, were not Eric’s weapons of choice.  Columbine was to be a bombing like 
Oklahoma City (or September 11 or the Boston Marathon), not a shooting.
7
  The arsenal 
of guns and smaller bombs were to be used to “pick off” people fleeing from the 
carnage of the commons area.  Excessive armaments are a hallmark of school rampage 
shootings.  Katherine Newman theorizes that such excessive weapons stockpiles 
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amount to an aesthetic of overkill that is meant to impress onlookers.
8
  I suspect that 
they are part of the fatalism and will to irrationality that inform monstrous 
miseducation’s apocalyptic and nihilistic vision of the future.  
For Eric and Dylan, this was to be a grand theatrical event in three acts 
(bombing, shooting, and car explosions upon investigation by law enforcement and 
media – two educational agents), complete with costumes and props.  Both boys wore 
long, black “duster” coats to conceal the guns, rifles, knives, and bombs strapped to 
their bodies.
9
  Eric’s t-shirt read, “Natural Selection” and Dylan’s read, “Wrath.”  From 
the grandiose heights of genius and the insecure depths of teen-angst, Eric wrote: 
“Sometime in April me and [Dylan] will get revenge and will kick natural selection up a 
few notches. We will be in all black. Dusters, black army pants...we will have knifes 
[sic] and blades and backup weaponry all over our bodies...”.
10
  For the boys, it was as 
important to look “badass” as it was to conceal the weapons.
11
  While they had to 
depend on third parties to obtain the guns and ammunition, they made the bombs from 
household materials.  The guns were to be primarily for show – to inspire terror. 
Although he was reasonably sure that he and Dylan would die at the high school on 
Judgment Day, Eric mused about the possibility of widening their genius terror to 
include “hijack[ing] a hell of a lot of bombs and crash a plane into NYC with us inside 
[f]iring away as we go down, just something to cause more devistation [sic].”
 12
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After all, the United States’ military, another educational agent, had put on quite 
a display of aesthetic overkill just an hour before Columbine: the largest single-day 
bombing of Kosovo.  Despite the “best” intentions, those bombs killed indiscriminately.  
On that day, the targets included a hospital and a primary school.
13
  Those bombs were 
also “homemade”—possibly at the Lockheed Martin factory in Littleton, Colorado.  
According to Michael Moore’s documentary Bowling for Columbine, Lockheed Martin, 
the single largest defense contractor in the world, is the top employer in Littleton, 
Colorado.
14
  While neither Eric nor Dylan’s parents worked for Lockheed Martin, a 
large proportion of Columbine High School’s parents did work at the weapon’s factory.  
Littleton’s wealth and prosperity comes from producing the “weapons of mass 
destruction” at the heart of the U.S. military-industrial complex and the rationale for 
campaigns of bildung terror and monstrous miseducation on a global scale.
15
 
School to World:  Miseducative Encounters with an An-aesthetic Environment 
The predominantly affluent, white population of Columbine High School 
numbers just under 1700 students.
16
  Prior to April 1999, Columbine was a rather 
unremarkable, suburban public high school, for better and for worse, much like the 
“public schools” that Victor Frankenstein attends and Wollstonecraft criticizes for 
breeding habitual cruelty.  Although the names of the ranks have surely changed since 
Mary Shelley’s time, the notion of a hierarchy endures in American high schools like 
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Columbine.  In descending order, that hierarchy consists of:  Preps, Jocks, Cheerleaders; 
High Achievers; Future Farmers of America, Normals, Straight Arrows (band, church); 
Nerds, Druggies/Burnouts, Vocational Education; and the outsiders, Goths.
17
  Of course 
there is some mobility and variance among the ranks, but the high school “chain of 
being” bears out with stunning consistency.  Contrary to initial reports, Eric and Dylan 
were not considered outsiders: Eric and Dylan were “cool brains” because despite being 
extremely bright, they “smoked, drank, and dated.”
18
  They both contributed to and 
resented the hierarchical structure of the high school.  They both bullied and suffered 
from bullying.  Despite his nonconformist appearance (longer hair, unshaven), Dylan 
followed Eric’s lead, “he puffed up and acted like a tough guy, then glanced over at Eric 
for approval.”
19
  Eric’s cult of personality was rather limited, but he had one blindly 
devoted disciple in Dylan. 
Eric and Dylan were uncharacteristically prolific writers, detailing their plans 
and pain in journals.  In good genius form, Eric titled his journal, “The Book of God.”
20
  
Dylan chose a more bildung title, naming his, “Existences: A Virtual Book.”
21
  We 
never learn what Victor Frankenstein named his journal, but the creature reads it as a 
“book of God” and “existences,” a terror curriculum of the genius and bildung variety, a 
creation myth transmitted to an abandoned creature via educational agency.  Mary 
Shelley does not name her journals, but they surely chronicle monstrous miseducation.  
More important to Mary Shelley, her reading the story of her “filthy creation” in 
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Godwin’s biography of Wollstonecraft like the creature’s reading of his creation in 
Victor’s laboratory journal, ushered in an epistemological crisis for both.  As for 
modernity and the larger cultural surround, the exponential growth in literacy rates after 
1789 made text accessible on a mass scale.  Like the creature, the Western world 
learned to read and write at an accelerated pace.  Eric and Dylan inherited this legacy 
and were highly literate in a host of media.   
They also made a slew of videotapes, the most infamous of which were named, 
“The Basement Tapes.”  Eric maintained a website, but took it down when he and 
Dylan got into trouble for vandalism, bullying, and theft.
22
  Eric left lists, maps, and 
diagrams planning the attack.  The common denominator among all of these artifacts is 
the hubristic nihilism and misanthropic eschatology characteristic of genius terror, but 
also our failure as a society to recognize it as such.  While both journals conveyed a 
genius admixture of contempt and superiority, the most common word in Dylan’s 
journal was “love” (primarily in the context of being denied love) and the most 
frequently used word in all of Eric’s artifacts was “hate.”
23
  The hatred ranged from 
petty and narrow (“’fitness fuckheads,’ phony martial arts experts, and people who 
mispronounced ‘acrosT’ or ‘eXpreso’”
24
) to transcendent and broad (“’I declare war on 
the human race and war is what it is.’”
25
).  Indeed, the boys might have hated based on 
ethnicity or religion, but more important, like the creature, they learned to hate the 
species – themselves included.  In his performance of genius terror, Dylan often 
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referred to members of our species as “zombies” and distanced himself from our species 
by naming himself a “god.”
26
  Eric, too, adopted the identity of “god” for himself, but 
he called members of our species, “robots.”  Eric’s journals expressed the homicidal 
inclinations of genius terror while Dylan’s tended toward the suicidal.  Both were 
monstrously miseducated in Miltonic identity politics by which they learned them to see 
themselves as outside of the human species and, like the creature to first “turn[] away 
with disgust and loathing” and then to seek revenge.
27
  While Victor expresses disdain 
for the miserable fate his godlike genius has wrought, in his final moments he clings to 
the genius project and the hope that “another may succeed” where he has failed.  Mary 
Shelley, on the other hand, turned her disgust and loathing for our species inward and 
refused opportunities for violent revenge, a qualitative difference that suggests the 
deeply gendered nature of terror curriculum.  The aesthetic of masculinity seems to 
demand the spectacle of violence denied to femininity.   
Violent Media:  Miseducative Encounters with Art and Technology   
Eric and Dylan enjoyed violent art, both canonical and popular.  Whether violent art 
may be classed unequivocally as a cultural liability registers an ancient aesthetic debate 
that matters to monstrous miseducation.  While Plato’s Socrates would grant that the 
philosophical imagination is nourished by the play of ideas, he rather notoriously 
discouraged the inclusion of poetry in the curriculum designed for the guardians of the 
Just State on grounds that poetic fiction often sheds a less than flattering eye upon the 
deeds of gods and heroes, tainting aesthetic virtue.  Of course, Plato’s Socrates could 
scarcely have imagined the catalogue of misdeeds (in words and images) readily 
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available to a 21
st
 century audience.  Martin says that the campaign of the censorship of 
cultural liabilities (“violence and hatred” for Martin; “cowardice and impiety” for Plato) 
transmitted via multiple educational agency (not primarily schools, but media, 
museums, corporations, churches, families, and a host of others) has historically elicited 
two opposing heuristic models:  the “cathartic model” and the “imitative model.”
 28
 
In the cathartic model, the beholder of violent or lascivious materials 
experiences vicarious revulsion or desire, thus purging her of the need for the actual 
experience.  The prevailing contemporary view, however, is that of the imitative model 
in which the viewer becomes both desensitized to scenes of violence and aroused by 
images of sexual exploitation.  Such desensitization and arousal, the theory goes, leads 
the viewer to attempt imitation of the scenes to which she has witnessed.  Martin argues 
that while both models present compelling viewpoints, the popular electronic media 
(along with a host of other educational agents) tends to create what it claims to find in 
terms of violence and hatred.
29
   
Hence, educational agents as “custodians” of a given cultural stock have a 
responsibility to “staunch the flow” of cultural liabilities.
30
  In other words, in a 
democratic society, one in which all citizens hold office, it is not the responsibility of 
some mythical, omniscient regulatory institution of the Just State to censor images.  
Rather it is the responsibility of a given educational agent, first to recognize its status as 
an educational agent and then make selections based on deliberate consideration (read:  
ethical) of the material it chooses to hand down to succeeding generations.   
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It should, but does not, go without saying that the curricular considerations of 
multiple educational agency needs to go beyond the short-term economic advantages of 
pandering violent images, pornographic scenes, and hate speech.  Additionally, other 
educational agents like family might offer a different set of images to offset those of 
violence, exploitation, and hatred.  Schools, but a single educational agent in a vast 
array, might ask the entire school population to engage in various projects of cultural 
bookkeeping to inventory the relative wealth and liabilities status of a 
“superabundance” of cultural artifacts and ideas that each might be plotted on a 
dynamic “continuum of preservation.”
31
  A thin sense of censorship or selection is 
inadequate to deal with the curricular components of terror curriculum.  
In a nation that bemoans the cultural illiteracy of its youth, Eric and Dylan were 
exceptionally well read in more “elevated” violent literature as well as in violent 
popular culture.  Eric’s diverse tastes included John Steinbeck’s The Pastures of 
Heaven, William Shakespeare’s Macbeth, King Lear, and The Tempest, Thomas 
Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles, and Euripides’s Medea.  He memorized Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe’s “Der Erlkönig” (The Alder King) in German and read Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Thomas Hobbes extensively.
32
  Eric acknowledged Mothers’ Day in his 
school-issued day planner by quoting Miranda from Shakespeare’s The Tempest: “good 
wombs hath borne bad sons.”
33
  Eric’s identification with a “bad seed” narrative 
suggests that he imagined himself as the defective product of a sort of supernatural 
genius parthenogenesis, thus absolving his mother from responsibility for her 
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“monster.”  This allusion resonates with the absence of maternal teaching and teachings 
in Mary Shelley’s lived experience as well as that absence in the creature’s 
identification not with Milton’s Adam, but with the “fitter emblem” of his Satan and 
with Victor’s identification not with a parent but as an übermensch to a “new species.”     
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Eric was fascinated with National Socialist ideology, 
writing an extensively well-researched, disturbing paper called, “The Nazi Culture” that 
“began by asking the reader to imagine a stadium packed with murdered men, women, 
and children—not just filling the seats but piled high into the air above it.”
34
  Ironically, 
Eric’s interest in academics coupled with an unfailing public charm, won him approval 
from the officer overseeing his probation after the “van incident.”
35
  Among friends, 
Eric openly praised Heinrich Himmler and Adolph Hitler’s policies until they chastised 
him about “all the damn Nazi shit.”
36
  When Eric and Dylan were bowling together, a 
good turn would result in shouts of, “Heil Hitler!”  Dylan’s mother was Jewish, and this 
fascist cheer was the extent of Dylan’s contribution to Eric’s Nazi fascination.
37
   
Nationalist and fascist ideologies represent the monstrous dream of bildung 
Godwinian perfectibility and techno-scientific productivity taken to its logical extreme.  
In a 1923 lecture, Thomas Mann famously praised Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Travels 
as “a wonderful anticipation of German progress” that “teaches us to see the element of 
education as the organic transition from the world of inwardness to that of the objective; 
how the one grows humanly and naturally out of the other.”
38
  The narrative of bildung 
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on the eve of the nineteenth-century and the revival of the myth of bildung in the early 
twentieth-century, shows “the movement of ‘education’ as a progression from 
inwardness to action and from theory to praxis” whereby “aesthetics emerges as a 
highly effective, and profoundly unstable, political force.”
39
  The zeitgeist of bildung 
would become associated with nationalist myths and fascist ideologies of late modernity 
the full implications of which Mary Shelley could not have imagined in her educational 
thought.  It can hardly be surprising for a contemporary audience that the monstrously 
miseducated Eric and Dylan were fascinated by the aesthetic of immortality, techno-
scientific productivity, and genocidal ideologies. 
Dylan (named after Dylan Thomas) was identified as “gifted” and “by third 
grade was enrolled in the CHIPS program: Challenging High Intellectual Potential 
Students.”
40
  Like Eric, Dylan was interested in literature and philosophy.
41
  As he grew 
older, he began to ponder existential questions through a biblical and philosophical lens, 
finally believing in a literal Heaven and Hell.
42
  Dylan “identified with two powerful 
characters to convey his torment: the protagonists of The Downward Spiral and David 
Lynch’s Lost Highway.”
43
  Resolving to commit suicide, Dylan gave up on school 
despite the potential consequences he faced with his parents and with the probation 
officer.
44
  His journals portray a boy mired in suicidal despair akin to those of Mary 
Shelley.
45
  Dylan’s homicidal rhetoric seemed reserved for Eric’s company.  Unable to 
imagine horizontal movement along ascending the progressive developmental track of 
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bildung, Dylan plotted a future of punishments along a Dantesque vertical trajectory of 
genius.
46
  Convinced that he was “going down,” Dylan began to take some solace in the 
idea that he could take others with him in an act of genius terror.   
Romantic suicides during Mary Shelley’s time were idealized as the final act of 
an autonomous genius.  In fact, Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werter, a text Mary 
Shelley puts in her creature’s hands, is devoted to just such Romantic suicidal ideations.  
The Sorrows reception was a rash of suicides among young, privileged second sons 
across Western Europe.  Mary Shelley’s own suicidal ideations are well documented in 
her journals and she has Victor contemplate suicide on several occasions while she ends 
the novel with the creature rowing off into the abyss with the avowed purpose of killing 
himself.  After causing his creator’s death, the creature has neither a desire to live 
(bildung) nor an idol to worship (genius).  Like Dylan, the creature makes good on his 
threats to “glut the maw of death” with Victor’s friends and family, and like Dylan, the 
creature initially sees this violence as somehow recompense for Victor’s having created 
a being that he “drivest from joy for no misdeed.”
47
  Again, the because of the 
paternalism associated with terror curriculum, the monstrously miseducated make terms 
according to desert.  Is there a misdeed for which one ought to be driven from joy?  
What kind of (mis)educational encounters with what kinds of cultural stock make and 
shape an individual and a culture that operates according to such a twisted meritocracy?  
Both boys were smitten with the educational agent of industrial rock like Nine 
Inch Nails, Marilyn Manson, KMFDM (Kein Mehrheit Für Die Mitleid roughly 
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translates into, “no pity for the majority”), Rammstein (connected to Nazi ideology and 
wear the Third Reich’s red, black, and white), and other bands whose message echoes 
the sentiments of genius and bildung.  They compulsively watched Oliver Stone’s 
Natural Born Killers (NBK).
48
  However, the “egotistical, empathy-free attitude” of 
NBK bore a closer resemblance to Eric than to Dylan.  The whole idea that one might 
be born a “natural” killer resonates with the deterministic narratives of both genius and 
bildung terror.  Presumably, a natural born killer would be either violent at her birth or 
evolve into a violent killer according to some “natural” process.  Neither concept takes 
into account the multiple educational agency that (mis)educates individuals by the 
transmission cultural stock (liabilities), nor acknowledges that education takes place at a 
cultural as well as at an individual level.  The idea of a natural born killer focuses 
narrowly on the individual and distracts the culture from the social, political, and 
economic contexts of violence.  This way of thinking about violence neatly takes 
violence out of the educational realm.    
Eric was extremely talented at the video game, Doom.  His only real 
competition was Dylan.  They met and became friends at the age of eleven largely due 
to the time they spent together in Doom’s dark, “virtual playground.”
49
  Eric created a 
pantheon of gods and monsters armed to the teeth with “medieval armor and 
submachine guns.”
50
  Eric and Dylan’s virtual victims suffered horrendous deaths – 
terror curriculum’s imaginary at work regardless of the cathartic/imitative debate.  At 
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issue is the fact that terror’s imaginary arises under conditions of monstrous 
miseducation void of maternal teaching and teachings.   
Like Mary Shelley and Victor Frankenstein, Eric thought of himself as a kind of 
mythic creator.  “I often try to create new things,” he wrote in a freshman English paper 
titled “Similarities Between Zeus and I” in which he hailed Zeus (and himself) as a 
great leader, finding no fault in Zeus’ pettiness or malice, only identifying their shared 
inclinations:  “Zeus and I also get angry easily and punish people in unusual ways,” he 
wrote.
 51
  As Anne Mellor has suggested, Mary Shelley may have worked out her 
violent fantasies and her guilt at having “killed” her mother in Frankenstein by having 
her creature kill a child who bore the name of her own child, William, and by “killing” 
Caroline, Victor’s mother.
52
  Victor, “the pale student of unhallowed arts,”
53
 his 
“unfashioned” creature, “but half made up,”
54
 and Mary Shelley, the girl whose 
“unbidden” imagination saw this “odious handywork,”
55
 would understand Eric’s art in 
all of its sublimely creative and destructive glory – the aesthetic hallmark of genius.  
According to Newman’s research on the phenomenon of rampage shootings, 
“the contribution violent media makes to violence among youth is inconclusive, 
although it is suggestive.”
56
  Discerning whether the violent media initiates violent 
behavior or whether children likely to engage in violent behavior tend to choose violent 
media has yet to be analyzed empirically. This nature/nurture question itself is guided 
by the terror curriculum that operates on a “badness versus madness,” genius versus 
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bildung, dichotomy that is not particularly useful and likely dangerous.  But Martin’s 
unified theory of education as encounter suggests that the reciprocal exchange between 
the individual and the culture accounts for a rather permeable (mis)educative membrane 
between the two.  It makes sense that a violent culture would produce violent 
individuals and vice versa.  At issue for monstrous miseducation, however, is not what 
can easily be named violence.  It is formed by and forms the deeply gendered structures 
of education, the terror curriculum, which informs violence. 
Also, Eric, Dylan, and a host of other children involved in school violence are 
not here to participate in such a nature/nurture study of violent media and violent 
behavior because they took their lives.  Extreme caution should be taken in making a 
blanket statement that violent media begets violent behavior not because a relationship 
does not exist, but because a host of other factors must be considered.  Such an assertion 
is too simple and risks eliminating examination of a variety of causal relationships 
within terror curriculum and of the cultural transmission of monstrous miseducation.  
In Bowling for Columbine, Moore addresses the issue of violent children and 
violent media saying, “Yes our children were indeed something to fear.  They had 
turned into little monsters.  But who was to blame?”  His question is followed by a 
litany of violent media outlets (multiple educational agency) vilified by “experts,” 
ironically, from the media.  Martin tries hard not to value specific items of cultural 
stock, but she considers the most detrimental cultural liabilities to be hate and violence 
and worries that the cultural stock we are bequeathing to our children includes “murder 
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and rape, terrorism and war, prejudice and discrimination, poverty and greed.”
57
  Moore 
shows no such restraint in valuing cultural stock.    
After a montage of scenes of U.S. aggression that Noam Chomsky would 
certainly classify as miseducation and terror, Moore interviews Marilyn Manson, the 
musician who received the most egregious blame for Columbine.
58
  Amid a 
conversation about the media’s “campaign of fear and consumption” and President 
Clinton’s bombing of Kosovo only an hour before Columbine, Manson considers the 
scale and cause of violence and poignantly remarks on the power of multiple 
educational agency without naming it as such:  “Who’s a bigger influence, the President 
or Marilyn Manson?  I’d like to think me, but I’m gonna go with the President.”  Moore 
then asks Manson what he would say if he could speak directly to the kids at 
Columbine.  In full “shock rocker” regalia, an extremely articulate Manson responds, “I 
wouldn’t say a single thing to them.  I would listen to what they had to say and that’s 
what no one did.”
59
  This echoes the creature’s first request of his maker, “[l]isten to my 
tale,” “hear me,” and “[l]isten to me.”  Terror curriculum’s children have a tale to tell 
that monstrously miseducated adults do not want to hear because the Miltonic identity 
politics of global terror and the uneven development of Godwinian perfectibility sustain 
a “quality of life” that depends on keeping the terror curriculum hidden.  
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Lost Generation:  Miseducative Encounters with the Medical Community
60
 
Eric was identified as having an “anger management” problem a year prior to 
Columbine.  In addition to mandatory classes and counseling, his parents sent him to a 
psychiatrist who prescribed him antidepressants: initially, Zoloft and finally, Luvox.  In 
fact, though Eric would be dead before the news was out, a Marines’ recruiter had 
rejected him on the grounds that he was being treated with antidepressants.
61
  Dylan, 
who by all accounts was deeply depressed, was never prescribed any sort of 
antidepressant.  Toxicology tests on the bodies of both boys revealed no traces of illicit 
drugs in either body—tests found only the licit drug prescribed to Eric, Luvox.
62
 
A study conducted in 2005 published in the Journal of Adolescent Health, found 
a “marked increase” (2.6-fold) in prescriptions of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRI) like Zoloft and Luvox to children and adolescents between the years of 1995-
2002.  Researchers concluded “These trends raise concerns regarding the widespread 
off-label use of antidepressants lacking reliable evidence of safety and efficacy for use 
in children and adolescents.”
63
  Profits for pharmaceutical companies must have soared 
during this period as they do now.  The side effects’ disclaimers on prescription drug 
advertisements today have become almost comically dire and ubiquitous, but in 1999 
the spectacularly negative consequences of these drugs were still unknown.  While 
speculation into biomedical research may be too far afield from monstrous 
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miseducation, the fact that Eric, who by most accounts was mentally imbalanced, but 
not depressed, was prescribed an antidepressant at all suggests the need for scrutiny.   
An entire generation of children is being treated with medication for depression 
and anxiety without reliable evidence of safety and efficacy.  It is worth considering 
whether the antidepressant actually boosted the clarity of purpose Eric needed to 
manipulate those watching him (parents, school, counselor, and probation officer) into 
thinking he was “cured” and allowed him to focus with more precision on his plans for 
Columbine.  Doubtless, a monstrously miseducated clinical community surely would 
have medicated Mary Shelley and her Romantic circle just as the monstrously 
miseducated “man midwife” Godwin called to attend his daughter’s birth poisoned 
Wollstonecraft’s blood and recommended heinous after“care” practices.  Arguably, 
monstrous miseducation killed Mary Shelley’s mother.  Certainly Victor Frankenstein is 
emblematic of monstrous miseducation in the biomedical field.   
Parental Abandonment: Miseducative Encounters with Emotional Unavailability 
Eric and Dylan were afforded a great deal of privacy and spent a significant 
amount of unmonitored time on the internet.  On the one hand, Eric and Dylan’s 
“privacy” might be read as a non-interventionist educational policy or neglect by busy, 
modern parents whose careers have made them emotionally unavailable to their 
children (and themselves).  On the other hand, it could suggest that Eric’s and Dylan’s 
parents trusted them.  Non-intervention (genius) and emotional unavailability (bildung) 
evidence the generational stress and trauma embedded in terror curriculum.  But the rest 
of the story reveals that neither set of parents trusted the boys as a result of their 
behavior and monstrous miseducation just does not deal in trust anyway.   
 209 
When Eric’s parents were made aware of his hate-filled online activity, they 
confronted and disciplined him.  In fact, Eric’s father, Wayne Harris kept an anecdotal 
history of Eric’s “unwilling” and “unmotivated” transgressions and detailed his parental 
attempts to correct them.
64
  In retrospect, Wayne’s assurance to “deal with” Eric’s poor 
sleeping and studying habits by restricting “TV, phone, computer” and his sound-byte 
demands that Eric “prove to us [his] desire to succeed by succeeding, showing good 
judgment, giving extra effort, pursuing interests, seeking help, advice,” show a bildung 
faith that is chilling.
65
  Eric’s father was simply acting in accordance with the tenets of 
Godwinian perfectibility, trying to assert patriarchal authority over behaviors he could 
not understand because of his own monstrous miseducation.  When Alfonse 
Frankenstein dismisses Victor’s interest in Cornelius Agrippa as “sad trash,” it only 
made the adolescent Victor feel powerless and intensified his fascination with the 
occult.
66
  But it was the absence of maternal teaching and teachings in both Eric and 
Victor’s case that was most consequential.  
Informed by the bildung ideal of their own monstrous miseducation, Dylan’s 
parents took an intellectual approach to discerning misbehavior and designing 
discipline.  When Dylan (with Eric and another boy) was caught vandalizing and 
looting lockers, they agreed that “Dylan had demonstrated a shocking lapse of ethics,” 
but maintained a philosophical disagreement with the school’s choice of suspension as a 
punishment.
 67
  It is not clear what alternative punishments Sue and Tom Klebold 
proposed, but Dylan was ultimately suspended for the offense.  Without the written 
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record of Wayne Harris, it seems that Dylan parent’s meted out similar punishments 
with regard to restricting Dylan from the privileges he enjoyed.   
When Dylan submitted a “disturbing” piece “about a man in a black trenchcoat 
who brutally murders nine students,” his creative writing teacher notified the Harrises at 
a parent-teacher conference.
68
  Dylan said it was “just a story.”
69
  While they never saw 
the writing, the Harrises agreed that the paper should be submitted to the school 
counselor.  No one ever followed up on the incident, but in 2009, Sue Klebold wrote an 
article entitled, “I Will Never Know Why,” for O Magazine that cited this incident, but 
not as an example of a missed opportunity for getting Dylan help.  Was it a missed 
opportunity?  At Dylan’s age, Mary Shelley also produced a “disturbing” piece of 
writing that she felt the need to justify in her mid-thirties because of pressure from the 
deeply gendered terror curriculum.  Victor Frankenstein was just a few years older than 
Dylan when he produced his masterpiece, but he could not share his reasoning because 
he feared the label of madness or because he desired sole ownership of his intellectual 
property – again, because of the terror curriculum and his monstrous miseducation. 
Perhaps Dylan disavowed his masterwork in suicide.  During the hours before 
Judgment Day, he mused, “What fun is life without a little death? It's interesting, when 
i'm in my human form, knowing i'm going to die.  Everything has a touch of triviality to 
it.”  But many adolescents produce disturbing art and go on to be lauded as genius 
adults.  The qualitative difference that seems to make the difference for terror’s actors is 
an absence of maternal teaching and teachings in multiple educational agents whose 
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agency extends far beyond home or school.  The qualitative difference that seems to 
make the difference is the absence of cyborg affinity politics. 
The marked difference between the Harrises’ and the Klebolds’ respective 
parenting styles centers in the Klebolds’ prohibiting Dylan to spend time with Eric.  The 
Harrises’ list of restrictions included no such provision.  Understandably, as the boys’ 
misdeeds turned criminal, both sets of parents were concerned about the mounting list 
of wrongdoings dotting the boys’ permanent records and affecting their future 
prospects.  Remember that for Dewey an aesthetic environment is one in which the live 
creature can adjust her whole being to the environment by using wisdom gained in the 
past, losing and regaining balance in the present, and anticipating the possibilities of the 
future.  In some sense, Eric’s and Dylan’s parents must have taken comfort in the 
bildung promise that their sons’ present “imbalance” amounted to the temporary 
indiscretions of youth, but in another, they must have intuited the pall hanging over the 
lives of their children.  Wayne Harris would place a 911 call stating his suspicion that 
Eric was involved in the events transpiring at Columbine in the immediate aftermath of 
the massacre.  The community, the nation, and the world would graft the free-floating 
sense of terror Columbine inspired onto the Harris and Klebold families.  Even as these 
parents asked themselves in good bildung form where they had gone wrong, the public 
blamed them for having gone wrong.      
Institutional Blindness:  Miseducative Encounters with Systemic Injustice  
As the actual event faded into memory, the replays of the event kept it fresh in 
the minds of ordinary people and the blame radiated out to the school personnel of 
Columbine High School.  Without having a conceptual category, the terrorized public 
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named the contours of the terror in the teleological terminology of bildung, blaming 
administrative mishandling of bullying, teasing, and harassment at Columbine High 
School.  Doubtless, those complaints carried some validity.  Trey Parker and Matt 
Stone, the creators of the controversial animated television show, South Park (surely 
cultural stock of questionable merit), grew up in Littleton.  However, contrary to 
Michael Moore’s insinuation that they attended Columbine High School, neither did.  
However, Moore’s interview with Matt Stone in Bowling for Columbine is telling of the 




S:  Yeah. Painfully, painfully, painfully normal.  Just absolutely, painfully, 
horribly average.  Littleton in general is... I remember being in sixth grade and 
I...had to take the math test to get into Honors Math in the seventh grade.  And 
they’re, like, “Don't screw this up. Because if you screw this up, you won't get 
into Honors Math in seventh grade. And if you don't get in in seventh grade, you 
won't in eighth grade, then not in ninth grade. And “th” and “th” grade and you'll 
just die poor and lonely.”  And that’s it, you know? You believe, in high school 
- and a lot of it is kids, but the teachers and counselors and principals don’t help 
things.  They scare you into conforming and doing good in school by saying: “If 
you’re a loser now, you're gonna be a loser forever.”  So that with Eric and 
Dylan, people called them “fag.”  They’re like, “You know what?  If I’m a fag, 
now I’m a fag forever.”  And you wish someone just could’ve grabbed them and 
gone, “Dude, high school’s not the end of....” A year, a year and a half, was it? I 
don’t even know.  You just move out— 
M:  No, no, they were two weeks away from graduation. 
S:  Yeah, you’re done. It’s amazing how fast you lose touch with all those 
people.  They just beat it in your head as early as sixth grade: “Don’t fuck up.  
‘Cause if you do, you’re gonna die poor and lonely.  You don’t want to do that.”  
You're, like, “Fuck, whatever I am now, I’m that forever.” Of course, it’s 
completely opposite.  All the dorks in high school go on to do great things and 
all the really cool guys are all living back in Littleton as insurance agents....
71
 
                                                          
70




It is telling that the interview is steeped in the language of bildung and genius.  Stone 
believes that Eric and Dylan saw their high school identities as fixed, genius things 
because they encountered a hidden curriculum that “whatever I am now, I’m that 
forever.”  If they could only have imagined themselves as “cool guys” in the future, 
Stone laments, perhaps things would have gone in a different direction and they would 
not have become the Columbine killers.  Speaking of schooling’s rhetoric of infinitely 
delayed gratifications of the “real world” and steadily increasing stress on performance 
at each grade level, Stone blames the institution for stifling creativity and rewarding 
conformity.  This may well be true, but Stone also says that “if somebody could’ve 
told” Eric and Dylan that “[a]ll the dorks in high school go on to do great things and all 
the really cool guys are all living back in Littleton as insurance agents,” Columbine 
might have been averted.  This rings a bit hollow because in all likelihood these media 
savvy boys knew full well that their technological and creative skills were marketable in 
the world of techno-scientific productivity.  And within that context, like Victor, Eric 
and Dylan did have a plan to “do great things,” exceptional things, genius things.  
 A website created by Vanessa West called The Criminal Mind details public 
perceptions of the causes of Columbine and missed opportunities for interventions on 
Eric and Dylan that betray an abiding faith in the process of bildung and the invisible 
power of genius ideology.  Narrating Eric’s (screen name, “Rebdomine”) online 
conversations with an anonymous party (identified as “R”) in an America Online chat 
room, West, like others, sees certain points in Eric’s life where an intervention could 
have prevented Columbine:  
In mid March of 1999, R pointed out to Rebdomine that he was taking matters far 
too personally. In a private message, Rebdomine asked R what he meant by this, to 
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which R responded that his (Rebdomine’s) point could be better made if he used 
less profanity and personal attacks. Perhaps because R took the time to reach out to 
Rebdomine - Eric Harris - a sort of online friendship arose.
 72
 
According to West, as a result of their “online friendship,” Eric trusted R enough to e-
mail him some of the book he was writing and a link to his website.  R reported that the 
content of the book was “disturbing,” including, “detailed, explicit instructions on how 
to build pipe bombs and produce homemade napalm, even relating in the instructions 
how and where to hide gasoline so that one’s parents wouldn’t discover it.”
73
  R noted 
that each page of the Eric’s writings bore a copyright with the name, Wayne Harris, 
Eric’s father.  No longer able to dismiss Eric’s rants as youthful indiscretion or teen 
angst, R planned to confront Eric in the chat room and to contact Eric’s father.  R made 
his decision to intervene on behalf of this troubled child on April 19, 1999, the day 
before Columbine.  This “too lateness” is prevalent in the individualism characterizing 
monstrous miseducation.  To have been short-circuited, modernity’s terror curriculum 
would require a collective effort at cultural bookkeeping toward rational futurity.   
Theorizing the “social roots” of school rampage shootings, Newman looks 
closely at the December 1, 1997 shooting at Heath High School outside of West 
Paducah, Kentucky, and the March 24, 1998 shooting at Westside Middle School 
popularly known as, The Jonesboro Massacre.  Her study validates the importance of 
student perceptions of an actual hierarchy, versus the “truth” of de facto equity.
74
  
Validating another’s perceptions (especially those of children) even if we can 
demonstrate them to be false is important in the interests of justice.  The creature 
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articulates the outsider’s perception of injustice and outrage at “the strange system of 
human society” that Newman’s study seeks to confirm:
75
 
I learned that the possessions most esteemed by your fellow-creatures were high 
and unsullied descent united with riches. A man might be respected with only 
one of these advantages; but, without either, he was considered, except in very 
rare instances, as a vagabond and a slave, doomed to waste his powers for the 
profits of the chosen few! And what was I?  …When I looked around, I saw and 
heard of none like me. Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which 
all men fled, and whom all men disowned?
76
 
Echoing the damning sentiments of Newman, Stone, Manson, and Moore, West 
too speaks for ordinary people’s perception of the causes of school violence saying, 
“Violence, in all its forms, is part of the American education curriculum. Kids tease, 
humilate [sic], and make fun of one another for trivialities of all kinds, never realizing 
that there is a world beyond high school - a world full of many, many kinds of 
people.”
77
  According to Newman’s report of Columbine’s culture:  
Students…alleged that the football team was sometimes exempted from the 
random drug tests that are, in theory, administered to all students…whether or 
not it was actually the case, some…students thought it was…this belief provides 
one more example of responsible adults supporting a key pillar of the social 
hierarchy among students:  athletes rule.
78
  
West seconds Newman’s findings, detailing the unspoken tolerance of Columbine 
administrators, teachers, and students for misbehavior and criminality in the “popular 
sect,” primarily athletes.
79
  West claims: 
The school's state wrestling champion was allowed to park his $100,000 
Hummer in a 15 minute parking space - all day. A football player repeatedley 
[sic] teased a girl about her breasts - in class, in front of a teacher - with no fear 
                                                          
75
 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein ed.  Johanna Smith (Boston:  Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 109.   
76
 Ibid, 109.   
77
 Vanessa West, The Criminal Mind. Tripod.com, 2009. 
http://www.members.tripod.com/~VanessaWest/columbine-4.html. 
78
 Katherine S. Newman, Rampage (New York:  Basic Books, 2004), 138.   
79
 Vanessa West, The Criminal Mind. Tripod.com, 2009. 
http://www.members.tripod.com/~VanessaWest/columbine-4.html. This evidences the educational 
problem of both overt sexism and deep gender.   
 216 
of retribution. And just like any school in America, the sports trophies were 
displayed in the front of the school, the art in a back hallway.
80
 
Painting a rather damning picture of Columbine High School’s culture, she goes 
on to detail a litany of discrimination on the part of the faculty.  She describes 
Columbine in terms of genius terror (rather than taking out their anger on specific 
targets, Eric and Dylan killed indiscriminately), but sees the anonymity of the violence 
as responding to larger injustices and human rights violations perpetrated by the 
institution as a whole.
81
  If West’s claims are taken seriously, Columbine was both 
genius and bildung terror.  West does not condone Eric and Dylan’s actions, but she 
sympathizes with their desire for revenge on “an environment” that, through “varying 
degrees of cruelty” breeds “feelings of inferiority, hoplessness [sic], and anger.”
82
  In 
the vernacular of blogger folk wisdom, West is describing an an-aesthetic environment 
in which the live creature cannot thrive.   
For West, Columbine was a grand statement by two boys who were abused by 
public schooling.  But even while she condemns the institutional forces that conspired 
to create Eric and Dylan, she focuses on what these dead children have come to 
symbolize in the public imaginary:  “icons for misfits” and “poster boys for evil.”
83
  
With the possible exception of Moore, West stands as a fair representation of the public 
who see Eric and Dylan as tragically miseducated individuals without addressing 
educational agency beyond the very limited transmission of the school.  Without 
directly dealing with the (an)aesthetic components of monstrous miseducation, the 
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response to Columbine illustrates Martin’s succinct critique of education’s built in 
“intentionality” clause that neatly “casts the hidden curriculum of school and society 
outside the educational realm”; denies the first great metamorphosis in order to bolster 
claims about learners’ volunteerism; dismisses the attainment of feelings and passions 
by “confining education to the achievement of knowledge and understanding”; restricts 
education’s “intended outcomes” to virtues thereby ignoring “vices”; and rendering 
“education writ large” invisible by imagining “education solely from the standpoint of 
the individual.”
84
  Unless we revise our ideas about what education is and is not, terror 
curriculum will remain hidden and we will need to place blame on singular institutions 
or sick individuals rather than to see terror as an educational problem with educational 
solutions for the culture writ large.  As a modern myth of education, Frankenstein 
shows the consequences of the very denial, abandonment, and invisibility that allow the 
public to lay blame on a flawed high school culture and two sick children. 
Individual Anomalies:  Miseducative Encounters with Psychological Profiling 
The wisdom of ordinary people carries a distinct vitality in relation to 
understanding Columbine or any other disaster that seems to defy comprehension, but 
what do the “experts” say about Eric and Dylan?  Dave Cullen’s journalistic book, 
Columbine, on which this analysis has extensively relied, concludes that Eric was a 
classic psychopath and Dylan was a textbook depressive.  Cullen draws his conclusion 
after exhaustively examining the evidence accumulated over the ten years that had 
passed since Columbine.  During the initial investigation into Columbine, the theory 
that both Eric and Dylan suffered from profound psychological disorders was put forth 
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most credibly by Dwayne Fuselier, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent, clinical 
psychologist, and parent of a Columbine High School student present and accounted for 
on April 20, 1999.
85
  Fuselier’s specialty was hostage negotiation and criminal 
profiling.  As a member of the FBI’s Special Operations and Research Unit, Fuselier 
was called in to negotiate and investigate some of the most notorious hostage situations 
to date including the Atlanta prison siege, the Montana Freeman standoff, and the 
Branch Davidian crisis, in which he was the last person to speak with David Koresh 
before the compound was engulfed in flames.
86
  Had his son not been a student at 
Columbine High School, Fuselier and the FBI would likely never have been called in to 
investigate.  As it happened, Fuselier, like so many of us, became haunted by the 
question of, “why?”  Ultimately, like Godwin with his phrenology and Shelley with his 
genealogy, Fuselier believed the deterministic narratives of terror curriculum.   
After years of analyzing Eric and Dylan’s journals and the infamous “Basement 
Tapes” on which the boys recorded their goodbyes amid a flurry of hate-speech and 
profanity, Fuselier concluded that while Dylan was depressed, Eric was psychopathic.
87
  
Dylan, according to Fuselier, fit the profile of a depressive, “self-medicating with 
alcohol” whose “journal read like that of a boy on the road to suicide, not homicide.”
88
  
Fuselier explains that the condition of depression involves deep-seated anger, but in 
most cases that anger is turned inward as the case of Mary Shelley shows.  In very rare 
cases, he contends, deeply depressed people will commit a “vengeful suicide” and take 
the lives of others before taking their own life – an act of bildung terror.  But Fuselier 
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believes this scenario unlikely in Dylan’s case because “Dylan Klebold was not a man 
of action.  He was conscripted by a boy who was.”
89
   
The “man of action,” in Fuselier’s estimation, was Eric, whose view of the 
human species and its future was distinctly darker.  Espousing his philosophy of 
education in his journal, Eric shows off his deep understanding of bildung as a fallacy 
alongside his abiding faith in the genius ideal and his own humanist exceptionalism: 
ever [sic] wonder why we go to school? besides [sic] getting a so called 
education. [sic] its [sic] not to [sic] obvious to most of you stupid fucks but for 
these [sic] who think a little more and deeper you should realize it. its [sic] 
societies [sic] way of turning all the young people into good little robots and 
factory workers thats [sic] why we sit in desks in rows and go by bell schedules, 
to get prepared for the real world cause “thats [sic] what its like”. well [sic] god 
damit [sic] no it isnt [sic]! one thing that seperates [sic] us from other animals is 
the fact that we can carry on actual thoughts. so [sic] why don't we? people [sic] 
go on day by day. rutine [sic] shit. why [sic] cant we learn in school how we 
want to. [sic] why [sic] cant we sit on desks and on shelves and put our feet up 
and relax while we learn? cause [sic] thats [sic] not what the “real world is like” 
[sic] well hey fuckheads [sic], there is no such thing as an actual “real world”. 
its [sic] just another word like justice, sorry, pity, religion, faith, luck and so on. 
we [sic] are humans. if [sic] we dont [sic] like something we have the fucking 
ability to change! but [sic] we dont [sic], atleast [sic] U dont [sic]. I would.
90
 
Eric knew that the monstrously miseducated human species would not 
understand the genius terror of Columbine.  “He might kill hundreds, but the dead and 
dismembered meant nothing to him.  Bit players—who cared?  The performance was 
not about them.  Eric’s one-day-only production was about the audience.”
91
  It was 
about inspiring genius terror and attaining genius immortality.  According to Fuselier’s 
monstrously miseducated diagnosis of Eric’s psychopathy, there could not have been a 
great deal done to stop the boy from killing “to demonstrate his superiority and to enjoy 
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  Fuselier’s conclusion is based on educational thought’s deep structures that see 
the project from an individual standpoint and insist on its intentionality, volunteerism, 
virtuous aims, and confinement to schooling the intellect.  Eric, it seems, would 
dismantle that project based on his terror curriculum-informed humanist beliefs.   
As inheritors of a deeply gendered modern tradition of terror curriculum, Eric 
and Dylan, like the creature, responded with brutal efficacy to the quality of social 
relations, parental distress, and environmental pressures of the cultural landscape.  They 
were monstrously miseducated to see the world as a cruel and dangerous place where to 
get what we need (determined by an unsustainable false ideology of bildung and/or 
genius) we must fight a “good” fight or a “bad” fight, but fight we must.  In the political 
economy of monstrous miseducation, the fight is simply a determined, disembodied 
“human nature” divorced from the cultural surround.  The fight is not a matter of the 
ends justifying the means in monstrous miseducation because, finally, the end is the 
fight.  In terror curriculum, the bildung concept of “cooperation” means building 
networks that enable singular, self-made genius to increase its functional power to fight 
exponentially.  Cooperation, in this algorithm means “incorporation” not cyborg affinity 
politics.  Monstrous miseducation is behind Eric’s and Victor’s inability to understand 
and empathize with Dylan and the creature’s desire for a cyborg affinity politics.  
Absent maternal teaching and teachings, Victor’s mind-set of techno-scientific 
productivity forces his assumption that the creature requests a mate in order to “have a 
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companion to aid” him in “the task of destruction.”
93
  Eric and Dylan are Victor’s 
nightmare made manifest.  
The Freedom Writers:  A Borderline case of Monstrous Miseducation 
The cultural bookkeeping project of The Freedom Writers is a borderline case of 
monstrous miseducation that provides the beginnings of a counter-narrative to the terror 
curriculum in spite and because of a monstrously miseducated cultural landscape.  
Rather than receiving their names from a patriarchal authority like Mary Shelley or 
naming themselves according to some genius ideal like Eric and Dylan, the Freedom 
Writers named themselves.  After studying the Civil Rights Movement and the Freedom 
Riders during their junior year at Woodrow Wilson High School in Los Angeles, 
California, Erin Gruwell asked the social activists in her English classes to think of a 
name for themselves and for their journals that would convey the hope woven through 
the narratives they hoped to publish.  Gruwell’s students began writing the journals that 
would become The Freedom Writers Diary during their turbulent freshman year and 
during Gruwell’s uncertain first year as a classroom teacher.   
Upon discovering an offensive caricature of an African American drawn by one 
of her students depicting another student, Gruwell told them that just such caricatures 
feature prominently on Nazi propaganda pieces depicting Jews.  Her chastisement was 
met with looks of confusion tinged with curiosity.  Gruwell asked how many students 
had heard of the Holocaust.  None raised a hand.  Then she asked them how many had 
been “shot at.”  Almost every child in the room raised her/his hand.  Gruwell discarded 
her “meticulously planned lessons” and resolved to make “tolerance” the heart of her 
                                                          
93
 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein ed.  Johanna Smith (Boston:  Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 130. 
 222 
“curriculum” for her “at risk” freshman English course.
94
  The concept of tolerance has 
had a bad time of it in the academy, but in the wake of the L.A. Riots and escalations in 
racial tensions and gang violence, a curriculum of tolerance at Wilson High School was 
promising.  In an attempt to curb gang activity, the district chose to change the 
demographics and transferred a number of African American, Latinos, and Asian 
students to the once-predominantly-“white, upper-class” Wilson High School.
95
  
Students of color now represented the school’s majority population.  
This turn marked Gruwell’s first act of what would become a rigorous campaign 
of subversive kindness to combat the violence meted out by compulsory public 
education and to oppose the monster that created it.  The children in Gruwell’s were 
refugees of what they came to call “undeclared war”—urban gang violence and a 
system of privilege that ultimately profited from the chaos and bloodshed.  Without 
naming it as such, Gruwell circulated maternal teachings of love and survival. 
Freshman Year:  Encounters with Hybridity 
The racially and ethnically diverse group of children enrolled in Gruwell’s 
classes “had been written off by the education system and deemed ‘unteachable’.”
96
  
Perhaps being “unteachable” and not its ostensible contrary, “teachable,” was ultimately 
what taught them to love and survive.  The adjective “teachable” comes from the Latin 
word “docilis,” from which the English word docile comes.  Docile, meaning “apt to be 
taught; ready and willing to receive instruction; teachable; submissive to training; 
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tractable, manageable,” Gruwell’s students decidedly were not.
97
  The children 
shuffling into Gruwell’s classroom on that first day of her first year as a teacher were 
angry, sullen, cruel, racist, and violent—damaged survivors still suffering acutely from 
the fallout of the recent Rodney King riots and chronically from generations of 
monstrous miseducation.  The prompt Gruwell devised for the students’ first journal 
entry was to detail “their expectations of me and the class.”
98
  Keenly aware of the 
complex dynamics involved in the subtext of Gruwell representing “the great white 
hope,” the students unflinchingly shared their interpretation of their enthusiastic teacher 
and of the bildung’s false ideology, giving Gruwell exactly what she requested: 
We all know she’s going to treat us like everyone else has….  I’m pretty sure 
she thinks she’s the one who’s going to change us.  She alone, the “too young 
and too white to be working here” teacher is going to reform a group of helpless 
“sure to drop out” kids from the ‘hood…I give her a month.
 99
 
For this group of disaffected, world-wise freshman, Gruwell’s “sweetness and 
light” character had more than a tinge of dishonesty about it.   Her character necessarily 
cast her students as foils.  And Gruwell could not proceed on the premise of 
“colorblindness” because, for her students, it was all about color.  But it seemed hardly 
fair to contend with history’s creation of the illegitimate monster of racism.  Gruwell 
had to ask herself how she might learn from the monster might.  Watching, listening, 
and learning what appealed to her students, Gruwell introduced young adult literature, 
organized field trips, analyzed Rap lyrics, and made space for live creatures’ aesthetic 
expression and experience: 
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Ms. Gruwell just asked us to write or draw a picture describing our 
neighborhood.  I can’t believe she’s allowing me to draw.  I wonder if she 
knows I hate writing…Tagging is what gives me a thrill.  The chance to express 
my talent.  To hear people talk about my art gives me the “ganas” (strength) to 
continue what I do.  I never do any of my classwork, so I spend my time in class 
sketching on my notebook, handouts, backpack, or on anything in sight.  I’m an 
artist and I love what I do.  I know it sucks for the people’s property, but getting 
away with it is part of the thrill.
100
 
The children’s animosity toward Gruwell subsided, but the ethnic rivalries, self-
destruction, and self-loathing continued—they trusted Gruwell, but they did not trust 
each other or themselves and could not realize cyborg affinity politics outside of the 
classroom.  Physical, sexual, and verbal abuse, gang activity, drug use, poverty, 
vandalism, and a host of other injustice and criminal activity filled the pages of the 
children’s journals.  During the fall semester, the journals served primarily as personal 
cathartic expressions, but those expressions moved far beyond the individual student’s 
desk or life.  Increasingly, the students’ journal entries began to relate the literature and 
world stage to their lived experience.  
I can’t believe what happened in Oklahoma City.  168 innocent men, women, 
and children had their lives cut short by one man who was angry with the 
government…There are many Timothy McVeighs around us every day…like 
walking time bombs waiting to go off…The ticking often begins with a 
derogatory comment…No matter what race we are, what ethnic background, 
sexual orientation, or what views we may have, we are all human. 
Unfortunately, not all humans see it that way.
 101
 
Sophomore Year:  Encounters with Activism  
The reality of genocide forged the vital link between literature, the world, and 
the children’s own lived experience as survivors of an undeclared war.  The Diary of 
Anne Frank and Zlata’s Diary:  A Child’s Life in Sarajevo authenticated the idea that 
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the circulating the narrative of one’s singular experience set within the context of larger 
historical narratives constitutes a valuable artifact, a gift.  The children’s journaling 
began to whisper of love in a world in which, statistically, the odds were against their 
survival to high school graduation.
102
  The students became activists and Gruwell’s 
room 203 became a safe haven from the educational agency of their streets and homes: 
Zlata and I lost our childhood innocence because we were denied the right to do 
childlike things, like go to school, talk on the phone, or just play outside.  The 
buildings were burning and people got beaten up just because of the color of 
their skin, their religion, or ethnicity….  I can’t believe that someone I don’t 
even know…could have so much in common with me.
 103
 
In the spirit of spring, Gruwell and her students made a “Toast for Change” and 
“seemed to transform themselves into scholars with a conscience.”
104
  She was pushing 
these live creatures to undergo an aesthetic experience and regain equilibrium within a 
shared environment.  Gruwell was asking her students to willingly undergo an 
educational metamorphosis toward a cyborg affinity politics. What began as a writing 
assignment turned into 150 written invitations asking exiled Bosnian Zlata Filipovic to 
come from her asylum in Dublin, Ireland to speak to Gruwell’s safe asylum in Long 
Beach, California.  Keenly aware that the majority of his time is spent in a war zone, 
one student concluded his letter to Zlata with an expression of cyborg affinity politics. 
Now that I’ve read your book, I am educated on what’s happening in Bosnia.  I 
would like the opportunity now to educate people on what is happening in my 
‘America’ because until this ‘undeclared war’ has ended, I am not free!
 105
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The spring brought two guests from Europe:  Zlata and Miep Gies, Otto Frank’s 
secretary and the woman responsible for preserving Anne Frank’s diary.  When the 
children called Gies a hero, she quickly reminded them that they were heroes, part of a 
great chain of heroism: “A legacy left by one girl, carried by one woman, was passed on 
to a new generation of teens who had the chance to make a difference like Anne’s diary 
did.”
106
  Gruwell’s classroom again became a site where the gifts of love and survival 
were circulated among those committed to cyborg affinity politics. 
Because the children’s perceptions of the world had changed did not mean the 
world had changed.  The violence, hatred, injustice, and poverty of the neighborhood 
and the world continued.  But once they learned of it, the children became activists 
speaking out and acting, in their private and public lives, against a terror curriculum that 
named them developmentally delayed or existentially violent.  Hosting the fifteen year-
old Zlata proved an aesthetic experience of that defied Miltonic identity politics. 
I have always been taught to be proud of being Latina, proud of being Mexican, 
and I was.  I was probably more proud of being a ‘label” than of being a human 
being, that’s the way most of us were taught.  Since the day we enter this world 
we were a label, a number, a statistic, that’s just the way it is.  Now if you ask 
me what race I am, like Zlata, I’ll simply say, “I’m a human being.”
 107
 
The year ended with “Basketball for Bosnia,” described by one student as “a 
rebirth.”
108
  A host of community sponsors contributed to the tournament and the 
children of Long Beach raised money and collected toys to help ease the suffering of 
the children of Bosnia.  In turn, the children of Long Beach felt their suffering relieved.   
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Junior Year:  Encounters with Cyborg Affinity Politics 
Gruwell was understandably worried about how to “top” the activism of the 
previous year.  She and her students had won the final victory of their sophomore year, 
pressuring the administration to allow Gruwell to continue with this particular group of 
students (and new students requesting transfers to Gruwell’s class, often from advanced 
placement courses).  The junior English curriculum called for American literature, 
hence the children began by studying the Transcendentalists, Emerson, and Thoreau.  
Clearly, the children internalized their own respective concepts of “self reliance.” 
One journal entry described a fight at school between an African American boy 
and a Latino boy that spilled over onto a city bus after school.  What had begun as a 
dispute between two boys turned into a battle between twenty representatives from 
“each side” of the “gangland” divide.  When the bus driver threatened to call the police, 
the group of African Americans exited the bus.  A Latino boy walked by the recently 
ousted group, and they beat him brutally.  After what seemed like an eternity to the 
author of the journal, the police finally came to the broken boy’s aid and arrested those 
responsible for breaking him: 
“Why didn’t I do anything to help him?”  I asked myself.  Maybe it was because 
I was scared of the consequences.  Most likely, I would have been mauled by the 
crowd.  Even though I could have been hurt, I wish I had done something.  If 
Ms. G finds out that I just stood by and did nothing, she’ll really be pissed at me.  
After all, I wasn’t being very “self-reliant.”  I just hope she doesn’t find out.
109
  
But he knew she would “find out” because he shared his experiences with her in a 
journal he knew she would read, but somehow he trusted that she would love him.  
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The students read J. D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye and bemoaned the 
“phonies” and “conformists” peopling the school, charging teachers (Gruwell, students 
maintained was an exception) with being “operators running the mind-control 
factory.”
110
  Surely, this rhetoric smacks of Eric Harris’s journals, yet the presence of 
maternal teaching and teachings as well as a cultivated cyborg affinity politics was the 
difference that made the difference for The Freedom Writers.   
Reading Alice Walker’s The Color Purple set the issue of domestic abuse and 
rape in stark relief and sparked a staggering number of journal entries detailing 
domestic abuse.  Bravely vowing to protect their mothers and themselves, these children 
began to see a relationship between macrocosmic violence on the world stage and 
microcosmic violence at home.  More important, they wanted to live in a way that 
would stop it, not to avenge it.
111
  Contrary to the creature and his creator, their 
encounters with maternal teaching and teachings and cyborg affinity politics enabled 
them imagined a rational futurity where violence could not be sustained as a solution.   
Gruwell realized that room 203 had become “a refuge from all the mayhem” and 
that “outside my classroom walls, anything can happen.”
112
  As the spring semester 
progressed, Gruwell found her students staying in the classroom later and later at night.  
Driving them home, Gruwell’s heart sank as she passed “crack dealers,” “gangsters 
hanging out drinking 40s,” “flowers and candles adorning the bloodstained concrete.”
113
  
These moments inspired Gruwell to move beyond her privileged, personal guilt (like 
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Victor never could) and take action by soliciting corporate support for maternal 
teaching and teachings.  John Tu (already an ardent financial and moral supporter of 
Gruwell and her student’s efforts) donated 35 computers, all of which would be 
awarded to the 35 out of 150 students who graduated with the highest grade point 
averages.  This incentive seemed to appeal most to the administration who saw grades 
soar into the A and B range (incidentally, the test scores of Gruwell’s student improved 
vastly after their freshman year) and high school retention rates increase.  While this 
move sounds like success, paternalistic bequeathing based on a meritocracy and on 
determination of desert by a privileged outsider amounts suggests the Godwinian 
perfectibility schemes of monstrous miseducation.  However, it could be argued that the 
harnessing resources of privilege to continue circulating maternal teachings of love and 
survival only makes sense in this scenario.  This gift horse made the publication of their 
journals possible and to look it in the mouth would have flown in the face of affinity. 
While the computers enabled the children to compile and share their stories, 
their study of the Freedom Riders gave them a name and a mission.  They became the 
Freedom Writers and aimed to march on Washington and meet with the Secretary of 
Education, Richard Riley.  Students who identified with different races and genders 
paired to revise their journals, they noticed striking similarities in the narratives 
themselves.
114
  While preserving the dignity of difference, they began to think of 
themselves as more than a community, calling themselves a family. 
Naming their compiled journals was a group decision.  The students rejected 
first title, An American Diary…Victims of an Undeclared War and chose instead, An 
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American Diary…Voices from an Undeclared War.  The “self reliant” objected to 
referring to themselves as “victims.”
115
  With bound diary in hand, Gruwell and her 
students, with the financial support of many, flew to Washington D. C. to meet with 
Secretary Riley.  Explaining the importance of the Freedom Writer’s gift, a student who 
had been injured by gun violence and damaged by racist violence spoke up: 
I guess that’s why I want Richard Riley to read my story.  I want him to know 
that the guys with guns were absolute strangers.  All they saw was our color 
because they were ignorant.  If they were educated, like I am, they’d to see past 
shades and beyond exteriors and see people.  I guess that’s why the Freedom 
Writers had to write about our lives and share them with him, because he’s in a 
position to educate kids like that.
116
 
As they stood together in front of the Lincoln Memorial, “as if on cue, all 150 of them 
joined hands and began to slowly retrace the same steps Marin Luther King, Jr. walked 
down over thirty years ago.”
117
  In unison, the Freedom Writers began chanting, 
“Freedom Writers have a dream!” – the chant of cyborg affinity politics and “rational 
hopes for futurity” educated by maternal teaching and teachings.     
Senior Year:  Encounters with Futurity 
During the Freedom Writer’s senior year, Gruwell focused on getting them 
“college bound.”  Enlisting the help and mentorship of graduate students from the 
education seminar she developed for National University, Gruwell was able to partner 
two Freedom Writers with one graduate student.  In addition to guiding students 
through the tedious process of preparing for and scheduling entrance exams and 
applying to colleges, the graduate student mentors also spent time engaging with their 
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mentees socially and taking them on college campus visits.
118
  Gruwell and a patron of 
the Freedom Writers “created a non-profit organization called the Tolerance in 
Education Foundation” to help offset the financial obstacles facing her college bound 
seniors.
119
 Again, the issue of patronage and philanthropy is a complicated and deeply 
gendered one that defies cyborg affinity politics and education as a circulation of gifts.  
However, a monstrously miseducated culture may not have the imagination to construct 
an alternative and these children went on to live qualitatively better lives because of 
donors’ financial support of their post-secondary education.  Imagine the even greater 
impact that Gruwell’s mentorship program and its circulation of gifts might have had if 
so much of the time together had not been focused on securing financial support and 
navigating university bureaucracy. 
Thinking that she “could teach young girls like me that they too could ‘be 
somebody,’ one of the Freedom Writers announced that she planned to become “first 
Latina Secretary of Education” and “nobody laughed.”
120
  In fact, the other Freedom 
Writers expressed concern over the fate of Secretary Riley’s job.  The Freedom Writers, 
enjoying quite a bit of celebrity, began mentoring grade school children and circulating 
the gifts of maternal teaching and teachings driven by a sense of intergenerational 
commitment to rational futurity and cyborg affinity politics:  
These children are like lotus plants.  A lotus flower doesn’t grow in a swimming 
pool, but it grows in a muddy pond.  It lives in a dirty environment, but amid the 
muddy pond lies a beautiful flower emerging from the water.
121
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In the spring, the Freedom Writers won the Spirit of Anne Frank Award.  The 
Anne Frank Center insisted that the award be accepted in person, but the timeframe 
would not begin to allow for Gruwell and the Freedom Writers to obtain the funds for 
150 students to accept the award.  The award committee suggested that Gruwell send a 
single representative to accept the award.  Gruwell refused, saying, “we’re a package 
deal.”
122
  GUESS clothing company agreed to sponsor 45 of the Freedom Writers to fly 
to New York City to accept the award.  In order to be considered for the trip, the 
Freedom Writers wrote an essay explaining why they would make good ambassadors 
for the group.
123
  The eloquent 45 were chosen and spent four days together in New 
York City.  In light of monstrous miseducation, this funding source and selection 
process is problematic.  For any number of (equity) reasons, those who might have 
benefitted most from attending did not meet the criteria set by a corporate sponsor 
whose educational agency transmits overtly sexist and deeply gendered cultural stock.  
GUESS rather famously traffics in essentialism, exceptionalism, and crass 
consumerism; thus it is not shocking that they would tie their patronage to an elite 45.  
But, the gifts that such narrow patronage enabled to circulate was truly remarkable. 
Unlike the trip to Washington when the children got to choose their own 
roommates, Gruwell made the decisions about accommodations in New York.  One 
student who, because of her father’s Miltonic identity politics, had grown up ethnically 
segregated and had found herself in a room with an Asian, an African American, and a 
Caucasian girl: 
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My experience made me realize my father’s beliefs were wrong….  I believe 
that I will never again feel uncomfortable with a person of a different race.  
When I have my own children someday, the custom I was taught as a child will 
be broken, because it’s not right.  My children will learn how special it is to 
bond with another person who looks different but is actually just like them.
124
 
The Graduation Class Speaker was a Freedom Writer who circulated the gift of 
maternal teaching and teachings, the hope of cyborg affinity politics, and the rational 
promise of sustainable futurity: 
It won’t be until Jun 11, 1998, when I can proudly say, “Now my dream of 
being the first person in my family to graduate is coming true!”  I have learned 
that it doesn’t matter if your inspiration in life comes from negative or positive 
events.  The most important thing is to learn and go on.  Twenty or thirty years 
from now, when we have accomplished world peace, when we have succeeded 
in ending racism and intolerance, the world will remember that the Freedom 
Writers kept their promise.
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The cases of Columbine and The Freedom Writers demonstrate both the need for and 
the pragmatic utility of monstrous miseducation’s conceptual framework and 
vocabulary toward understanding and mitigating contemporary terrorism.  These cases 
also give rise to a host of questions for future scholarship in interdisciplinary 
educational studies.  What marks the threshold between The Freedom Writers’ activism 
and Columbine’s terrorism?  The argument that one person or group’s terrorism is 
another person or group’s activism seems to be a slippery slope.  Where does 
scholarship intersect in all of this?  We all probably have some idea of what scholarship 
without activism looks like, but what would activism without scholarship look like 
terrorism?  What is the value of an activist or charitable spirit that never really gets off 
the ground because it is mired in an oddly self-interested sentimentalism?  But 
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alternatively, what happens if we cannot even muster patronizing pity in response to 
schools and society rife with social and economic injustice?  Is there some golden mean 























Getting outside of the endless curricular loop of monstrous miseducation to a 
safe place where wise decisions about actions and policies might be made and revised is 
difficult today.  Such thought-work and action take time – time we too often imagine 
that we do not have amid real terror.  
Actual terror events and the representation of these rare events take the focus off 
of empirically guaranteed threats to the survival of all species and the planet itself in the 
form of myriad ecological disasters and epidemic diseases.  These biopolitical threats 
are democratic in a terrible way, but their workings are largely invisible.  That is to say, 
the living and non-living planet is in the midst of climate disaster from which none of us 
is immune, but monstrous miseducation makes responsibility invisible because it 
operates from a utopic or dystopic imaginary that precludes action. We may wince at 
the irony of believing in the invisible hand of the market even while many scoff at the 
invisible hand of climate change and healthcare crises, but the move from individualism 
to corporatism endemic to the ideological underpinnings of monstrous miseducation is 
rife with just such ironies.  Amid the false immediacy of monstrous miseducation, we 
cannot see the real immediacy of day-to-day individual, social, and ecological violence 
because terror events absorb that systemic violence makes them invisible.  We answer 
shock and awe with shock and awe.  Sometimes awe looks like pity.  Pity for victims is 
contingent upon an imbalance of power that, were it to be balanced, would upset the 
relief that paternalism promises.  
For instance, we were too enthralled with the spectacle of the Boston Marathon 
Bombing on Patriot’s Day of April 15, 2013, to pay much attention two days later to the 
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causes and consequences of the industrial deregulation that caused the deadly explosion 
of a fertilizer plant in West, Texas.  Resources flooded the investigation and prosecution 
of the Tsarnaev brothers, but most of us would not even recognize the name of the plant 
owner, Donald Adair, much less the names of corporate lobby groups who have long 
protected such facilities from government regulations by opposing safety laws or 
backing political players who ensure that government agencies responsible for such 
oversight are woefully underfunded.  Indeed, ten years after the plant’s last, failed 
safety inspection, Adair’s plant was storing massive quantities of the very same 
ammonium nitrate that Timothy McVeigh used to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.  Yet we might hesitate to label the plant explosion 
as an act of terrorism or Adair, the business lobbies, or the Texas lawmakers who 
persist in their campaign for decreased government oversight of manufacturing 
safeguards as terrorists.  Of the Tsarnaev brothers and their actions, activists and 
activism in some troubling sense, there can be little doubt about their terrorist identity 
and their terrorist plot.  Arguably, we could not have anticipated the Boston Marathon 
Bombing while we could have prevented the explosion at the fertilizer plant.   
The myriad conditions leading up to disaster are enmeshed in monstrous 
miseducation and what we do in the aftermath of disasters of “natural” and human 
origins, of accidental and intentional design seems intimately linked to the peculiar 
species of cultural miseducation I formulated from Mary Shelley’s lived experience and 
from her Frankenstein myth.  Profound cynicism and nostalgia; morbid desire and fear; 
blind vengeance and faith; crippling despair and paranoia; and hollow tenderness and 
smugness characterize our thinking, feeling species in a troubled complex world 
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without maternal teaching and teachings of love and survival alongside a cyborg affinity 
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